An evaluation of an evaluation: Sallis on Young on Nietzsche.
I’d like to comment on aspects of Julian Young’s philosophical biography of Friedrich Nietzsche. Consistent with “fair use” scholarly criticism, a minuscule fraction of the work will be quoted here and analyzed. This will not be a traditional book review,
in which the entire work is scrutinized and put into the balance – suffice to
say I think the book is mostly excellent and is recommended to those interested in such
topics. However, I will note that Young’s liberalism on many topics shines
through clearly, which I found extremely distasteful (e.g.,
Young’s pro-feminism is pitiful and his attempts to legitimize Lou Salome’s
sociopathic exploitation of beta orbiters are pathetic), although Young draws the line at attempts to
have his “Fritz” portrayed as a closet homosexual. I won’t get into the Cate plagiarism controversy. I will say Young is much
more honest about Nietzsche than was the Jew Walter Kaufmann (should we be
surprised?) – indeed, after reading Young, I realized how badly I had been
hoodwinked by Kaufmann’s mendacity (again – I’m shocked, shocked).
Instead, the point here is to focus on
specific items of Nietzsche’s philosophy (and Young’s interpretation thereof)
and put in into a perspective to those who may share my own sociopolitical
inclinations. In the spirit of
Nietzsche’s aphorisms, these will be very short analyses of specific snippets
of text. Note that in some cases these are excerpts linked together and not
direct quotes of intact paragraphs, where one sees sentences linked by “…” one
should assume that considerable text has been deleted. These deletions have
been carefully done so as to not change the meaning or context of the quoted
material. As always, I strongly urge the
reader to obtain the original work and read it in its entirety themselves. Footnote numbers have also been deleted from
the quotes to avoid confusion.
All of the quotes should be ascribed to:
Young, Julian (2011-07-27). Friedrich Nietzsche. Cambridge University
Press.
What
is wrong with the mythless ‘motleyness’ of modernity?...The first symptom is
loss of unity. Since the unity of a community, of a ‘people’, can only exist
when individuals are gathered into the ‘maternal womb’ of a unified myth, there
is, in modernity, no community, no homeland. Instead, all we have is a ‘wilderness
of thought, morals, and action’, a ‘homeless wandering about’…the society
driven by the frenzied quest for ‘experiences’, cheap thrills; for sex, drugs,
rock and roll and ‘extreme’ sports….Without the (healthy) stress provided by an
identity-defining ideal, one can only try to preserve oneself from boredom
through the ever-diminishing returns of ever more exotic thrills.
That seems to me to be an accurate description of, and criticism of, today’s
rootless, deracinated, globalist multiculturalism, which replaces the organic
solidarity of a folk community with the “cheap thrills” that came to the fore
in the 1960s and has become amplified in today’s degeneracy. By the way, “game” and the pursuit of sexual
hedonism is part of this degeneracy, as is Randian “individualism,”
“libertarianism” and any other of the “isms” that have come to define 2st
century modernity.
In
explaining why this is our overriding task, Nietzsche appeals, not, this time,
to high-flown metaphysics, but rather to biology…So, concludes Nietzsche,
mankind ought to seek out and create the ‘favourable conditions’ under which
those great men can come into existence…Nietzsche here is appealing to a
version of (social) Darwinism…And what he is appealing to, in particular, is
the value of, in Darwinian language, the ‘random mutation’. According to
evolution theory, he is observing, a species evolves into a ‘higher’ species
when it produces a mutation which is better adapted to the current state of the
environment. Because the mutations breed successfully whereas the remainder
tend to die out before doing so, gradually the species evolves into a new
species better adapted to thriving in the current environment. Because human
beings and human societies belong, just like plants and animals, to the realm
of biology, Nietzsche concludes, we ought to apply this same principle to
society and so do everything possible to promote the appearance of ‘chance existences’,
random mutations.
This interpretation by Nietzsche of
course veers into the “naturalistic fallacy” but that “error” can be obviated
by invoking values. There is nothing inherently wrong with choosing values that
support a “social Darwinism” foundation for society. By so doing, Nietzsche
also supports, at least indirectly, the viability of group selection (at least
that promoted by human choice), and the competition between human cultures that
forms the basis of such selection. I (and certain other
sociobiological-oriented people( would argue that such has actually occurred in
human history and is occurring today.
Also, anyone whose initial understanding of Nietzsche was malformed by
exposure to Kaufmann’s Asiatic mendacity will find passages such as this quite
refreshing.
On the
Darwinian line of argument the great individual is again valuable only as a
means, this time a means to the evolution of society as a whole to a ‘higher’
condition….
Once again, this is consistent with
group evolution arguments. And, once again, all of Kaufmann’s Levantine
flim-flam asserting that Darwinian interpretations of Nietzsche are a totally
wrong misinterpretation are shown to be, at best, wrong, and at worst,
intentionally mendacious.
Are we
all consigned to slavery to create his ‘freedom from the necessity of earning a
living’? Should all non-geniuses become coal-miners or sock-darners? Not so.
Even ‘second and third rate talents’ can contribute to the task by preparing
both ‘within’ and ‘without’ for the appearance of genius. Presumably the idea
here is that the higher the general level of culture the more favourable are
the conditions for the appearance of genius.
And today’s degenerate culture mitigates
against the emergence of genius. Is that part of the plan?
…since
a large gap between rich and poor causes envy and social unrest, the
concentration of enormous wealth in private hands will be avoided. Businesses,
in particular banks, that generate such wealth will be state-owned. This
passage makes two things clear: that, at least in Wanderer, Nietzsche's
‘anti-socialism’ is in fact anti-communism, and that the social-democratic
ideal of partial nationalisation of the means of production and exchange is
something he actually endorsed.
That sounds a lot like national
socialism and/or fascist corporatism to me. Why not call it as it is?
But
everyone can, in a way that fits their expertise and station in life,
contribute to the well-being of the community as a whole and in that way secure
self-respect and their own kind of feeling of power: their own happiness, in
other words.
Thus, to the “individualist” Nietzsche,
self-expression and authenticity can be achieved by working to contribute to
“the well-being of the community.”
The
positivist worldview offered a theory of the world of incredible power and
efficiency in comparison with that which had preceded it. And that, surely, one
can imagine Nietzsche saying, is some kind of evidence of truth. Creatures,
that is to say, who are radically mistaken about the nature of the world tend
to die out before reproducing. Conversely, those whose power over their
environment enables them to survive and thrive are probably close to the truth…
Nietzsche can never be certain that his metaphysics of will to power is true.
What, then, is its intended epistemological status?...The best theory is that
which ‘works’, which, in other words, gives us power over ourselves and our
environment. Nietzsche's claim for the will to power – his, as he sees it,
corrected and completed version of Darwinian science – is that it comprehends
reality in a way that is more comprehensive and powerful than any rival theory.
He would, I think, also add, as I suggested in discussing Dawn, that the fact
that a theory ‘works’ well is evidence – less than completely conclusive
evidence, to be sure, but still evidence – that it is true.
This is an important point. While
Nietzsche denies that scientists can ever know the way reality really is,
because reality is filtered through their human perceptions, nevertheless, for
practical purposes, those closer to the truth will be vindicated through their
ability to exert power over the environment and to survive. Hence, the power of
science, and why science, properly applied, is different from metaphysics, from
religion. If an asteroid or comet was hurtling toward the Earth, with the
potential to wipe out all human life, religious faith and “praying to Jaysus”
is not going to help. Science can detect the threat, and science has the
potential to avert the threat. If two peoples are in a war to the death, and
People A use thermonuclear weapons, ICBMs, nerve gas, mustard gas, and
weaponized anthrax, and People B use "the power of prayer,” hopefully all sane
people can predict total victory for People A.
Whether People A perceive “reality as it truly is” doesn’t matter, since
they perceive it close enough to true reality to be useful for their ultimate interests.
It is,
in other words, the ‘survival of the fittest’ in a competitive and, at least
potentially, hostile environment. Nietzsche applies this theory to human
society, which makes him a ‘social Darwinist’: he regards human societies as
organisms subject to the same laws as organisms in general…a ‘universally
binding…faith’ sometimes also ‘morality’ or ‘custom’. It is such a faith that
constitutes the community as a community, orders the relations between
individuals in such a way as to enable the social organism to function as an
efficient survival machine.
Nietzsche: social Darwinism and group
selection. Kaufmann: a despicable liar (or, simply, a Jew).
Without
the social glue of a communal faith a society loses its capacity for collective
action and becomes ripe for destruction, either through internal disintegration
or through colonization by a more successful society. The principal means by which
the community – or ‘herd’ – preserves conformity to communal faith consist in
more or less crude forms of social ostracism. What makes this effective is the
individual's basic need for community. ‘Even the strongest person…fears a cold
look or a sneer on the face of those among whom he has been brought up. What is
he really afraid of? Growing solitary’. Nietzsche calls this ‘the herd
instinct’ in the individual. The ‘herd instinct’ has thus two aspects. On the
part of the community it is the instinct to exert pressure on the individual to
conform. And on the latter's part it is the instinct to give in to that
pressure.
Thus, Nietzsche recognizes societal
policing of free-riding, which critics of EGI seemingly are unable to
understand (or, more accurately: they pretend to not understand).
In a
Darwinian world the law is: mutate or die. The agents of such mutation are the
non-‘herd’ types, those who resist the pressure to conform to current norms,
free themselves from the chains of current morality: the ‘free spirits’. ‘The
celebrated European capacity for constant transformation’ depends on such
‘malcontents’. China, on the other hand, Nietzsche claims, is a country in
which large-scale discontent became extinct centuries ago, and with it the
capacity for change. (Hence, presumably, its history of colonisation and
exploitation by European powers, and later Japan.)
This is interesting in a couple of ways.
First, we can consider that today, the dissident Right are the non-herd free
spirits, who bring the new dawn, as opposed to the politically correct
globalist herd animals. Second, note the anti-HBD assessment of China as a
conformist, herd-like non-creative entity – an accurate description, since
today’s “rise of China” is merely a default condition of them filling the niche
space left by a dying, degenerate, multicultural “West.”
Thus,
whereas the factory owner is mostly seen by his workers as nothing but ‘a
cunning bloodsucking dog of a man’, the military leader is often treated with
respect. The crucial point is that the leader should have some kind of
nobility, should appear to be of a ‘higher race’ than the led. ‘The masses are
basically prepared to submit to any kind of slavery provided that the superiors
constantly legitimize themselves as higher, as born to command, through refined
demeanour’.
Here we see another “fail” for the
“movement’s” (affirmative action) “leadership.”
Nobility? Higher race? Laughable!
With
the abruptness of a deranged, born-again Christian (as well, perhaps, as the
relief of speaking after ten years of silence), Zarathustra spews out the sum
of his decade of wisdom-gathering. Man, he shouts, is a ‘rope stretched between
beast and superman’. The superman is the ‘meaning of the earth’. Beloved are
those who take the dangerous path of dedicating themselves to making the world
a ‘house for the superman’. Man needs an ‘ideal’. But since the supernatural is
a delusion, we must reject all other-worldly ideals. Our ‘greatest hour’ is
when we see that we fall as far short of the superman as the ape does of us.
The real meaning of the Earth: human
over-coming, not worshiping a dead Jew on a stick.
This,
then, is why the motleyness of European modernity threatens its ‘death’:
lacking a shared ‘game plan’, it lacks the capacity for effective collective
action, in particular, for action directed at its own preservation and
expansion.
The diagnosis of multiculturalism and
the cult of diversity killing the West.
Nietzsche
takes it as self-evident that the death of European humanity would be a bad
thing. Those with a more jaundiced, more guilty, view of the European tradition
might think otherwise.
That’s great. Is the latter idea Young’s view? Why must it be mentioned? Why must it be accepted as a viable
alternative? If the word “European” was
replaced by “Jewish” or “African” would Young dare cite those who “might think
otherwise?” That I very much highly
doubt.
Master
morality was, then, self-focused. Slave morality, by contrast, was
other-focused. It was based on hatred and fear of the slaves’ oppressors. So it
was that the hate-filled word ‘evil’ replaced ‘bad’, the expression, merely, of
contempt. In the ethical ‘revolt’ of the slaves the good–evil dichotomy came to
replace the good–bad dichotomy of the masters. The hard qualities of the
masters were given new names – ‘self-confidence’ becomes ‘arrogance’,
‘resoluteness’ becomes ‘ruthlessness’, and so on…The second disastrous
consequence of the triumph of Christianity is that it ‘keeps the type “man” on
a low…level’… It does this in two ways: by preserving life's ‘failures’ and by
disabling its potential ‘successes’. It preserves failures on account of the
supposed virtue of compassion. Compassion means that a Christianized culture
preserves ‘too much of what should have perished’ Though there is no reason to
think of the extermination camps, here, there is no getting away from the
harshness of this view. What Nietzsche is talking about, I believe, is the
eugenics – ‘breeding.’…Christian morality disables life's potential successes
because it ‘throw[s] suspicion on delight in beauty, skew[s] everything
self-glorifying, manly, conquering, autocratic, every instinct that belongs to
the highest and best-formed type of “human”, twist[ing] them into uncertainty,
crisis of conscience, self-destruction at the limit’.
Thus, we see a summary of a principled
critique of Christianity – one that should be kept in mind as popes, priests,
and other Christian religious figures speak out in favor of immigration,
refuges, minority rights, and speak out against racialism, nationalism, and
eugenics. Christianity: a creed for losers, for weaklings, for slaves.
…‘socialism’
(a term covering both social democracy and communism), and finally, and
particularly vociferously, feminism. All these movements are applications of
the doctrine of ‘equal rights’, which makes them ‘heirs’ to Christianity's
doctrine of the equality of all souls before God.
Yes, indeed, all the leftist “isms” are
derived from Christianity. Crush the infamy!
If
Nietzsche treats ‘lower’ types as mere means, if he treats them as things
rather than people, then he really is an immoral (and ontologically blind)
thinker.
Once again, Young interjects his
opinions as facts.
‘If we
win’, he writes, ‘we have overcome the absurd boundaries between race, nation,
and classes (Stände): there exists from now on only order of rank (Rang)
between human beings.' The difference between rank and class is the
difference between ability and birth. What Nietzsche seeks, as we shall see in
detail in discussing The Antichrist, is a hierarchy not of blood but of natural
ability and aptitude.
Obviously, we must vehemently disagree
with Nietzsche here. While blood alone is not all, it is the prerequisite. The
hierarchy must be confined to one people. Within that people, we have rank and
hierarchy; outside the people, there should be nothing but enemies. After all, didn’t Nietzsche also state
elsewhere the importance of the organic solidarity of a culture? How can that solidarity be maintained with
elites consisting of alien peoples?
Consistent with this, Young reminds us:
As we
have seen, in order to survive in a competitive, Darwinian environment, a
community must have a morality which provides the ‘hardness, uniformity and
simplicity’ of, as I put it, a shared ‘game plan.'.
A “shared game plan” requires shared
blood, whether Nietzsche (and Young) want to admit it or not.
‘Woman
as such’, the ‘eternal feminine’, lacks the capacity for ‘manly’ pursuits.
Women have no concern for truth – their great talent is in the (slavish)
practice of lying. They have no capacity for ‘enlightenment’ (rational
objectivity) and so should be silent on religion and politics – and on the question
of ‘woman as such’. Women do not even know how to cook, though they have been
at it for millenni…Is this just a mass of prejudices – or, at best, ‘period
errors’ – or is there a serious point mixed in with this, as it now seems,
unintentionally comic rave?
Once again, Young interjects his
liberal, feminist sensibilities here, smugly assuming we all consider
Nietzsche’s reasonable views on the female to be “comic.” No, Young, the idea of gender equality is
what is indeed comic.
For
ultimate value attaches not to the ‘tree of knowledge’ but rather to ‘the tree
of life’.
If true, that is an endorsement of
ultimate interests, of EGI, of Salterism. If promoting the interests of life is
important, and if life is about genetic continuity (It is, insofar as we can
tell), then ultimate value holds there. Would Young accept that argument? I doubt it. Should he accept it? Should you accept it? Yes, most definitely. After all, what use knowledge if not to
promote the interests of life? Then we
see the next step – whose life? Step by step we come to the racial
nationalist EGI agenda.
The
West is, then, in a parlous condition. In its ‘motley’ state it lacks the
‘hardness, uniformity and simplicity of form’ of a shared, as I called it,
‘game plan’ possession of which is necessary to survive and
thrive in a competitive world. But the situation is not hopeless. For one
thing, for all the difficulties it creates, the collapse of Christianity, since
it made our culture sick, is fundamentally a cause for celebration. For
another, we possess a secret ‘faith’, a vision of what should and must redeem
us from the present and the past.
For the West to survive, the rotting
corpse of Christianity must be swept away, and we must make way for the Overman High Culture.
…he
will not support any anti-Semitic undertaking, he does not trust her any more,
he hopes all the anti-Semites will leave Germany and join them, and he hopes
that the Jews come to power in Europe.
This view of Nietzsche was unfortunate
but nevertheless we must be honest: he was not a budding anti-Semitic Nutzi.
Quite the opposite. But that was the
Nietzsche of the 1880s, a time of European world dominance. Would the Nietzsche
of the 2010s be a radical racial nationalist national socialist? Quite possibly.
What
does ‘questioning’ the will to truth, turning it into an issue, mean for
Nietzsche? It means elevating life, healthy life, into a higher value than
truth. If self-deception, illusion, is what best promotes your psychic health
that is what you should go for.
Ultimate interests over all?
However:
At the
end of the story, therefore, the unconditional will to truth becomes the
criterion of psychic health.
Salterians would argue that ultimate
interests and EGI have the added advantage of being true (to the extent that we
humans can perceive truth).
What
the passage does, it seems to me, is to endorse modernity's unlimited will to
power over both nature and human nature. It is one of those things which used
to be considered ‘bad’ – ‘playing God’ – but is really good. And here, it
seems, Nietzsche offers us a new ‘one goal’ to override all other goals, an
ultimate goal to replace the ‘one goal’ of Christianity: making ourselves
masters of the universe. A glance into the notebooks of the period makes this
clear. So we read, for example, that ‘what is necessary’ in place of the old
morality is a ‘reversal of values’ which will produce ‘a morality that has the
intention of breeding a ruling caste – the future masters of the earth’. In The
Gay Science Napoleon is admired for wanting to make Europe ‘mistress of the
earth’, an admiration which incorporates the desire for the domination of the
globe by European culture that goes back to Human, All-Too-Human.
That sounds a lot like Sallis’ Overman
High Culture and Yockey’s Western Imperium to me. Of course, the despicable
Young has to throw cold water over all of it:
Perhaps
the best that can be said for him is that if he were alive now he would
certainly classify the unlimited will to power as one of those things that used
to be considered ‘good’ but is now ‘bad’.
Here, Young predictably gets it
backwards by imposing his own liberal morality on Nietzsche. I say the opposite: if alive today, Nietzsche
would be disgusted at the weakness and worthlessness of European Man, he would
be shocked that Europeans are letting themselves be colonized and dispossessed by
inferior cultures, he would redouble his emphasis on ‘will to power,” but now
give it more of an explicitly racial-cultural “blood and soil” basis.
Re:Twilight of the Idols:
What Is the Nature of Reality? The fourth of the work's eleven parts,
which runs to half a page, is titled ‘How the True World Became a Fable’. There
are six stages. First the ‘true’ (the term is of course ironic), supernatural
world of ‘being’, the opposite of this natural world of pain and ‘becoming’,
was immediately accessible to the sage's – Plato's – mental gaze.
Then it became something to one had to wait for; Christianity postponed the
true world, transmuted it into the future home of the virtuous. With Kant it
receded further, since it could no longer be known to exist. Yet as a consoling
hope and as something we had to believe in for morality to make sense, it
lingered on in a twilight state. But then came the ‘cockcrow of positivism’,
the thought that something unknown could hardly be consoling. ‘Gray morning’,
Nietzsche's stage direction, as it were, reads at this point, ‘first yawn of
reason, cockcrow of positivism’. This lead to the coup de grâce. Positivism,
when it finally arrives, abolishes the true world (denies it, one might say,
‘rights of citizenship in science’). Nietzsche applauds from the sidelines:
‘Bright day; breakfast; return of good sense; Plato blushes in shame;
pandemonium of all free spirits’. And now the conclusion arises that since
there is no ‘true’ world, it makes no sense to call ‘this’ one a merely
‘apparent’ world. There is only one world and ‘this’ is it. As Ecce Homo puts
the conclusion: the ‘true world’ is a ‘made up world’, so that what used to be
called ‘the world of appearances’ is, in truth, ‘reality’.
An excellent summary of the nature of reality.
And
Nietzsche's idea, here, looks to be something like what we would now call
genetic determination: the idea that an individual ‘is’ the sum of the genes
inherited from both parents, which they have inherited from their parents, and
so on. Notice that this idea explains Nietzsche's continued belief in the
importance of eugenics.
But
Nietzsche by no means rejects the notion of freedom as such. ‘My idea of
freedom’, he writes, is that it is a matter of ‘being responsible for oneself’,
maintaining one's ‘distance’, ‘becoming indifferent to hardship’, ‘being
prepared to sacrifice people to your cause, yourself included’. To be free
means that ‘the instincts which take pleasure in war and victory have gained
control over the other instincts’, the instinct to ‘happiness’, for instance,
happiness, at least, as conceived by ‘grocers, Christians, cows, females,
Englishmen, and other democrats’. Freedom is not a birthright. Rather one
‘becomes free’ by being a ‘warrior’ on the internal battlefield of the soul.
The degree of freedom one possesses is measured by the degree of ‘resistance
one has overcome, the amount of effort it costs to stay on top.'
Indeed, as I have often said:
superiority is not anyone’s birthright; it needs to be earned. Likewise,
freedom. Thus, this view differs from mainstream “movement” “thought” in which
all positive human traits are embodied by certain ethnies – Bill Clinton and
Angela Merkel as superhuman demigods.
Such a laughable image is directly derived from “movement” values.
As I
emphasised earlier, a great deal of Nietzsche's philosophy has been a
preparation for this validation of Dionysian feeling, for validation of the
idea that one's ‘true’ life is universal, that individual life is ‘untrue’: the
persistent theme of the individual as the summation of the causal history of
the universe to date, the individual as nothing substantial but rather a
temporary conglomeration of forces that will soon reconfigure itself, a
momentary ‘wave in the necessary wave-play of becoming’.
But is this universalism the same as
that preached by the Left? It cannot be
so:
One
values one's enemies, Nietzsche continues, because one only discovers one's
identity when faced with opposition. This is as true of individuals as of
political parties.
Having enemies is a bit inconsistent
with the sort of universalism promoted by the Left. If opposition is so important to Identity,
then Nietzsche’s universalism is not that of globalist multiculturalism, but
instead more akin to William Pierce’s cosmotheism.
So
what, then, does Nietzsche have to say about such ‘healthy monsters’? Do they
not represent a counter-example to his claim that no healthy person knowingly
does evil, that a well-formed person, a ‘happy’ one, never knowingly performs
harmful actions? I think not. For Borgia, Napoleon, the Vikings, though healthy
and happy, are not, in Nietzsche's sense, ‘well-formed’.
That is an effective answer to retarded Christian
criticism that Nietzsche would support serial killers, that Ted Bundy was a
Nietzschean superman. What should one do with such stupidity?
It is
no mere coincidence that, with the arrival of German power, German spirit, German
culture, has disappeared. For, as we know, there is an ‘either–or’ choice to be
made. If – either as an individual or a nation – one expends all
one's energy on ‘economics, world commerce…power, and power politics’, one will
have none left for culture.
This seems to be a Spenglerian argument
and one that I do not necessarily agree with.
Notice
the rationale, here, for authoritarian conservatism – as his reviewers
thought, a kind of ‘Junker philosophy,' for all Nietzsche's
loathing of Bismarck. Without it, the capacity for resolute collective action
disappears, so that the community degenerates and eventually disappears.
Hello, multiculturalism!
Whatever
morality the new society possesses, it will have differential rights and duties
for different kinds of people. Though hierarchical, it will be the opposite of
homogeneous.
This puts the mature Nietzsche firmly on
the political Right. Although the part on "the opposite of homogeneous" shouldn't imply racial diversity.
Looked
at psychologically the Jews are the people with the toughest life force; when
transplanted into impossible conditions they took sides with all the instincts
of décadence…out of the most profoundly shrewd sense of
self-preservation – not because they were dominated by these instincts,
but because they sensed that these instincts had a power that could be used to
prevail against ‘the world’.
Interesting how the anti-anti-Semite
Nietzsche, through his pursuit of (subjective?) truth, found his way to the
same criticisms of Jews thoughtful and honest people make today.
The
real Jesus was no metaphysician, had no supernatural beliefs whatsoever. For
him, ‘the kingdom of heaven’ is a ‘state of the heart’. It lies neither ‘above
the earth’ nor ‘after death’ but is achieved here and now in the practice of
universal love. Jesus taught by parable and by example. His death was not an
expiation of human sins but rather the ultimate demonstration of his doctrine
of nonresistance. He was, in short, a kind of Buddhist, Buddhism being also a
non-metaphysical life-practice engendered by hypersensitivity to pain. Jesus represented
a ‘Buddhistic peace movement.' This true, original Christianity represents a
‘life that is still possible today, for certain people it is even a necessity’.
Possible and in the 1960s, surely, actual.
The deepest essence of Christianity: a
1960s-style, hippie-like renunciation of force, of will, of power – the
sissification of humanity. Guess which
race has swallowed that poison?
Young summarizes Nietzsche’s criticism
of Christianity as outlined in The Antichrist; there is no need to rehash all
of that once again. However, this is
interesting:
Sixth,
modern Christian theologians lie through their teeth. They know ‘there is no
“God” anymore’, that the ‘God-hypothesis’ is incompatible with all the other
furniture of the modern, educated mind. Everyone knows that there is no ‘last
judgment’, no ‘sin’, and no ‘redeemer’, yet everything goes on as before. It is
notable that the ‘Law against Christianity’ that concludes The Antichrist
reserves the harshest punishments for liberal Christians, on the grounds that
‘the criminality of being Christian increases with one's proximity to science’.
I believe that the higher one goes up
any religious hierarchy (at least in the West), the less degree of true belief
in the metaphysics there is. Thus, the
pious Christian washerwoman truly believes Jesus was the Son of God, believes
it all in every last detail, while the Popes and Bishops and Cardinals know
better – it is all a “happy fiction” to impose Christian morality on the
masses.
‘The
Antichrist’ delivers his judgment that Christianity is the worst disaster ever
to have befallen the human race. In promulgating his concluding ‘Laws against
Christianity’ he condemns it to having all its priests either expelled or imprisoned,
along with all preachers of chastity. All its churches are to be razed to the
ground with farms for poisonous snakes erected on their sites (‘holocaust’
memorials, as it were).
Excellent, excellent: exactly what we
need. Root out the Christian disaster, destroy it, and salt the earth under it
so the poisonous brew of self-destruction can never rise again.
…the
superman ‘is a superman specifically when compared to the good ’ – he
stands ‘super’, above, their morality. Nietzsche adds, recalling the
Genealogy's point that most free spirits will be ‘martyred’ by the forces of
social conservatism, that ‘the good and just would call
[Zarathustra's]…superman a devil.’
The racial nationalist as a “White devil
evil supremacist” – would Young agree with that? Young of course is very choosy as to which of
Nietzsche’s pronouncements in his (insane) last letters were sane or not;
thus:
Entirely
sane, too, is the idea that war can only finally be overcome through the
abolition of national and dynastic egoisms, an abolition that requires European
unification and, in the end, world government. These ideas, Nietzsche's
cosmopolitanism and his understanding that only the abandonment of armed
nationalism can produce genuine peace, are paragons of sanity…
Young agrees with those sentiments, so
they are – of course! – “paragons of sanity.”
Is this fellow Young really a
serious academic?
…it
follows that morals are just, as it were, an instruction manual for the
‘preservation and growth’ of either of an individual or a community.
Salterian morals as the basis for the
(re)growth of the European community.
In a nutshell, the lesson Jünger took from Nietzsche was: If you cannot mould the world to fit your morality you must mould your morality to fit the world.
The Left tries to alter reality to
conform to ideology; the Right tries to conform ideology to conform to reality. Of course, Young waves away The Will to Power
as just a misuse of Nietzsche’s notes by his sister. Maybe it was, but there nonetheless are
underlying themes there consistent with his overall mature philosophy – which
Young actually is later forced to admit. Nietzsche was not a Nazi, but a very embryonic form of Nazi? Perhaps. Certainly a Nietzsche around today, observing
the nightmarish hell of multiculturalism, would likely have shifted much
farther to the right. Of course, liberals would have asserted that the world
wars and the “holocaust” would have shifted “Fritz” to the left, but why
discuss the past rather than today’s present?
In Young’s favor, he does critique
Nietzsche favoring a “will to power” over a “will to life,” and he also
critiques Nietzsche’s later misunderstanding of Darwinism (Yockey made similar
mistakes):
Darwin's
theory is not a theory of cultural evolution, and in any case he claims not
that species become more ‘perfect’ but only that they become more adaptive.
Another example of Young the political/social
activist being unable to separate his leftist morality from an academic work is the following:
Nietzsche's
heart, then, is in the right place. Violence, brutality, and barbarism ought to
be expelled from human life.
Question for Young: is the ongoing biological
and cultural genocide and destruction of Europeans a manifestation of
“violence, brutality, and barbarism?” If
you say no, what justification can you have?
And here is an amusing aside:
Almost
from the beginning, the Försters’ Paraguayan venture found itself in deep
trouble. Based on Aryan ideology rather than skill and planning, it soon found
itself short of water and, with no roads or railways, unable to transport the
timber that was to have been its economic foundation to any market.
Der Movement in a nutshell! Affirmative action in action!
And here we see Young the plagiarist
further discredit himself as a serious academic:
(In
the 1930s she welcomed many of the Nazi bigwigs, including Hitler himself, to
the house (see Plate 32) – their stench somehow remains to this day. There is
no trace of Nietzsche.)
Can such things be possible? Is this what Western “scholarship” has fallen
to? And then:
Though
Nietzsche's philosophy was likely produced by a manic-depressive (as, probably,
were the works of Plato, Newton, Mozart, Hölderlin, Coleridge, Schumann, Byron,
Van Gogh, Geog Cantor, Winston Churchill, Silvia Plath, John Lennon, Leonard
Cohen and many other great human beings), there is nothing ‘pathological’ about
it – apart from the views on women.
Note the last phrase. Young, you are absolutely despicable. Have you no shame? I guess Cate would say: no.
Young's interpretation that Nietzsche's mental breakdown was completely psychological is not the last word on the subject. It may be true - however, Young is very selective of the physiological mechanisms he refutes - essentially restricting it to syphilis and a brain tumor. Looking at the biomedical literature, one can see alternative neurological diagnoses. We cannot know which is "true" (Nietzsche I suspect would approve), but, nevertheless, one should show a bit of reserve instead of making dogmatic statements on the matter.
