Fundamentals of a New Movement
The overarching, basic fundamentals of a New Movement are listed here. The link leads to the relevant post below. Also see "The Fundamentals" post list to the lower right. This is our new path. If you agree with this direction, then join with us.
The Old Movement is dead. Let us instead build something that works, a New Movement, a fresh start.
Thursday, July 14, 2016
Wednesday, June 22, 2016
Hitler had founded the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP or German Workers’ Party) in 1919, founded the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP or National Socialist German Workers’ Party) in 1920…
His relentless consistency in the attack on Marxists and November Criminals is in accord with the unalterable messages of the great Christian messiah or Islamic Prophet. The attribution of evil in Hitler's consistency because of excessive hatred of an enemy must be handled with care also. If Hitler is interpreted as messiah, or at least a man characterized most fundamentally as having the qualities of a messiah, then it was his mission to save the Germans from some enemy— presumably a considerable one. Given the dimensions of the enemy suggested by the size of Germany and its misfortune, it is difficult to imagine Hitler either as messiah or otherwise and not hating the enemy Did Jesus the Christ or Mohammed the Prophet hate Satan or merely disapprove of him? We do not have to answer this question to get further into Hitler, but we do have to point out that Hitler could be considered to be a messianic figure notwithstanding the presence of either hate or outrage in his presentation of the Marxist enemy.
Hitler would note with his characteristic knack for biting sarcasm that rather than a detraction, “it was only an attraction that these works of art were difficult to understand and on that account very costly: no one wished to admit lack of comprehension or insufficient means.”
Hitler's words indicate that he was in deadly earnest about immortal cultural achievements as the basis of a people's right to existence.
He would reiterate that any end for Germany short of the finality of an unassailably defensible state was not worth the effort.
From 1929 onward, Nuremberg became the site of the vast Party Day rallies and could be considered one of the four “Nazi cities.” Various masses of people would assemble as spectators and participants in presentations, demonstrations, speeches, and the like, during both day and night. Hitler intended that the brilliantly staged assemblies would pull Germans together into a sense of belonging to a single body mystically bound by a sense of common destiny.
We are left to wonder how history's arch enemy of “the Jews” interacted so easily with individual Jews under such circumstances. The conventional wisdom has assigned to Hitler a visceral— deep, organic, emotional— hatred of them. But his interactions with individuals suggests an entirely different kind of anti-Semitism based less on emotion and more on hard, emotionless logic. He would remark in a more general context that he would be known as the hardest man in history, not the most hate-filled.
This generalization demands the following reevaluation of Hitler: His decision to advance against Soviet Russia was correct and necessary Hitler could have made Germany impregnable only through seizure of the strategic resources and space of European Russia. His decision was so bold and fraught with consequence for history that it pressed him into the category of world-historical personality. His decision did not doom him to lose, rather it gave him clear and present opportunity to win. Within the ongoing campaign, Army Group Center had the striking power and physical location on August 14 to seize Moscow. There has always been a time and a place in history for everything. The time for Hitler and the Germans to have won World War II was in August, and the place was closely west of the enduring city of the vanished Dukes of Muscovy As concerns Hitler, he made the decision unwittingly to lose the war in surrounding diversions and eccentricities— Halder's aptly described zigzags. As concerns Hitler as world-historical personality, he alone created Barbarossa, and he alone, in the face of resistance and legion objection, destroyed it. His utter loneliness in decision making from Munich 1938 onward, and the world-altering consequences of that loneliness in the inception of Barbarossa, place him in a category distant from the tyrant of the great biographers. Barbarossa had possibilities and consequences so great that it demands a fundamental reevaluation of the course of World War II. The German army attacked Russia to win. The army had the capabilities to win. The army placed itself in geographic position to win. These are historical facts. But the German army failed to win reality of December. Historians have seen World War II as an exercise in early German victories followed by Hitler's alleged mistake of the attack on Soviet Russia and a gradual downhill slide into defeat. No historian has made the interpretive point that Hitler's mistake was not in attacking Russia but in failing to defeat it immediately— in six to ten weeks.
…he would cement the interpretation of himself as siege Fuehrer wedded to the proposition that German wars were fought to secure strategic resources.
Hitler's historical stature lies significantly in his putting Germany in position in August to win World War II. Hitler's interpretation as world-historical personality lies in his decision to lose World War II. The decision was single, lonely, and influenced by no other man. The Allies did not win the war; Hitler lost it.