From "On Genetic Interests," Table 7.1 shows the following "ethnic dispositions" in a polity:
1. Territorial ethnic strategy - Traditional nation states and ethnic states.
2. Territorial non-ethnic strategy - Majority ethnies in multicultural states.
3. Non-territorial ethnic strategy - Mobilized minorities in multicultural states, and traditionally endogamous diaspora peoples: Armenians, overseas Chinese, Gypsies, Jews, Parsis.
4. Non-territorial, non-ethnic strategy - Immigrants who assimilate.
Number three is an interesting case. From the standpoint of the majority, the long-term presence of type three groups in a polity is an ultimate and proximate disaster. Unassimilated - and in some cases, unassimilable - minority groups are present, strategizing against the majority, expanding demographically within the same territory, and practicing ethnic nepotism often with the full favor of the multicultural establishment, the same establishment which strongly inhibits any sort of similar behavior on the part of the majority, which must remain passive, atomized, and helpless.
In addition, if the minority in question is genetically distant from the majority, assimilation of the minority - even if desired and if possible - may be more of a blow to majoritarian genetic interests than the status quo. Thus, for genetically distant minority groups, separation is the best prescriptive option for the majority, while for genetically more similar groups, assimilation can be considered, if practical, while weighing the pluses and minuses. Note that some of the diaspora "middleman minorities" would be expected to resist assimilation even if the majority decided that such was the best course of action.
From the standpoint of the minority, strategy three has certain advantages, since it allows the group to continue as a genetically distinct, strategizing ethny, with the advantages of heightened minority mobilization and, in a multiculturalist regime, special advantages over the majority conferred by the establishment.
However, Salter critiques this option, even from the minority standpoint, as inherently unstable - even successful type three groups have suffered throughout their history as a result of not having their own territories. For groups long adjusted to such a "group evolutionary strategy," these negatives may be outweighed by the positives. However, for Western populations, type three is not a strategy we are adapted for, and would not be, long-term, likely successful at.
Further, type three groups have inherent differences in interests from all of the other three groups. A group cannot be, at the same time, in group three and in one of the other groups, AND there will always be an incompatibility of interests between group three and groups one, two, and four. Always. Those in group three will always be hostile to a society moving in the direction of strategy one, since strategy one will demand from group 3 assimilation, separation, or extreme marginalization. On the other hand, a type two society is optimal for the group three minority, but it hurts the majority. Again: incompatible.
Type four groups are those immigrants who assimilate. If these groups are relatively genetically similar to the majority, the long-term positives from a net EGI standpoint may outweigh the direct short-term gross EGI cost, for both majority and minority (however, if the groups are genetically distant - for example, inter, not intra, continental differences - then the costs are likely always to be too high, unless the numbers involved are very small). From the majority perspective, strategy four could work, therefore, given reasonable genetic similarity.
Salter notes that from the minority perspective, strategy four requires the group to give up the advantages of being a genetically distinct strategizing ethny. In addition, in a type two society, a type four strategy entails the assimilating group to become part of the majority that is being dispossessed and discriminated against. On the other hand, strategy three has its own problems, as stated above, and if a group is not suited for a type three group strategy and all that entails, then the option of assimilating to the majority is best. If the group wanted to remain distinct from the majority, then they could separate or have remained in their homelands. For Western populations as minorities in Western nations amongst a Western majority, type four is, generally, the best option. The trick is to attempt to move the society from the maladaptive type two to the adaptive type one. Thus, the interests of groups that are genuine "four" types coincide with that of the majority: move toward the type one strategy. Thus, group four is also at odds with the non-assimilating group three.
Although there is controversy about this among some areas of the web, I would say that "White ethnic" European Americans started out in group three (not necessarily by choice), but began moving into group four after the 1924 immigration restriction. Today, these "ethnics" are either totally in group two or are, at minimum, in the last stages of fully transitioning from group four into group two. They do, in the USA, suffer from the same problems as rest of the majority, and are generally considered as belonging to such.
Thus, the interests of all Euro-Americans are in belonging to a type one polity.