The Fundamentals

Fundamentals of a New Movement

The overarching, basic fundamentals of a New Movement are listed here. The link leads to the relevant post below. Also see "The Fundamentals" post list to the lower right. This is our new path. If you agree with this direction, then join with us.

The Old Movement is dead. Let us instead build something that works, a New Movement, a fresh start.

Sunday, April 3, 2022

Transnational Fascism?

A leftist analysis of the failure to implement authentic transnational fascism.

Read the whole thing; here I examine excerpts and summarize my thoughts on the matter. To start with – the author.

See this.

Also see this.


To better understand cross-border fascist solidarity, this article suggests a new conceptual framework revolving around the term ‘pan-fascism’ and its ‘paradox’. It argues that the existence or non-existence of a pan-fascist ‘paradox’ in the minds of historical fascists is a matter of optics, as it all depends on who is mobilizing the notion of fascist transnationalism. 

It is always easy to identify pseudo-intellectual leftist pablum by reading such phrases as “mobilizing the notion of fascist transnationalism.”  And now we have “unpacked” - 

Because of such optical issues, which all must be unpacked historically...

…the conceptual framework of ‘pan-fascism’ does not offer a simple solution. It, rather, puts emphasis on a key question: how did certain fascists, at various moments in their lives, think about the possibility of fascist transnationalism? To demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach, this paper takes the work, thought, and practices of the French editors of Je suis partout as a case study, and demonstrates how they attempted to reconcile their commitment to French nationalism with fascist transnationalism.

If we overcome the Culture Retarding petty nationalism promoted by some on the Far Right, then there would be no need to “reconcile” national and transnational fascism.

Although these editors at JSP publicly engaged in collaboration with foreign fascist movements from mid-1936 onward, they never renounced their commitment to French nationalism. This, then, raises a thought-provoking question that transcends the particularities of these French fascists and their unique contexts: how do nationalist-minded fascists think transnationally?

The people best suited to answer that question are actual fascists, not snide leftists writing superficial analyses that use obfuscating language to hide the lack of intellectual heft.

This article sets out to answer this question. The first section examines the historiography on transnational fascism and argues that the current theoretical framework for understanding cross-border collaboration and interaction between fascists is limited. It, thereafter, demonstrates that cross-border connections between fascists can best be examined from the conceptual framework of ‘pan-fascism’. Pan-fascism, as defined in this paper, contains the capacity of a very distinct way of understanding fascism, seeing that it seems to bear a paradox within its own name: how does transnational fascism comport with nationalist and imperialist aspects inherent to many fascist ideologies?2 It is this friction which makes ‘pan-fascism’ inherently unstable.

Putting aside the irritating leftist jargon, the core point here is the assumption that a paradox exists because fascism is inherently hostile to the other, with self and other defined in strictly ethnic and national terms; therefore, any type of transnational ”pan-fascism” is “inherently unstable.” This fallacy – or is leftist wishful thinking – will be exposed by my critique and comments below. At this point, we can understand that is petty nationalist/ethnonationalist versions of fascism that results in the stereotype underlining the assumption leading to the “paradox.”  It should come as no surprise that the name “Yockey” does not appear, not even once, in this leftist screed.  After all, a certain agenda must be promoted and, hence, source material must be cherry picked to fit that agenda. The agenda is, of course, to delegitimize transnational fascism, and, by extension, pan-European racial nationalism, and promote division within the international Far Right. That the Left finds willing accomplices for this agenda among certain denizens of the Far Right supports the Yockey’s contention that petty nationalist Culture Retarders are, essentially, traitors to Europe and to the West.

The word ‘paradox’, here, helps to underscore that there is a tension between the desire to create a community of fascist nations, or perhaps even a supranational fascist community, and the seeming impossibility of achieving this.3 This goes beyond the question of how one could create an international movement out of national movements, as there are a multitude of examples from the eighteenth century onward where nationalism was not primarily organized around defeating other nationalisms, but where nationalist movements aimed to dismantle—for instance—absolute monarchies, and dynastic state formations. Buried in there was also a latent possibility for conflict, but ‘ideologically’ these forms of nationalism were mostly structured around a common enemy. A great deal of ‘fascist’ ideologues in the first half of the twentieth century, however, primarily structured their thinking about ‘nationalism’ around defeating other nationalisms, rather than implying that national movements in different countries could happily exist besides one another.

That’s the sort of petty nationalist ethnonationalist that treasonous filth like the Counter-Currents crew promotes.

Apart from a conceptual friction in the term ‘pan-fascism’, the existence or non-existence of a pan-fascist ‘paradox’ in the minds of historical fascists is clearly a matter of optics, as it all depends on who is mobilizing the notion of fascist transnationalism; as well as on their reasons for doing so. Because of such optical issues, which must all be unpacked historically, the conceptual framework of ‘pan-fascism’ does not offer simple solutions. Rather it puts emphasis upon several key questions: how did certain fascists, at various moments in their lives, think about the possibility of cross-border fascist solidarity? Why did they—or: why did they not—believe that fascist transnationalism was intrinsically paradoxical, and how did this affect them, their thinking, and their actions? This framework, in other words, offers a distinct perspective to analyze how fascists mediated the relationship between nationalism and transnationalism.

The preceding paragraph is essentially meaningless nonsense.  It has no explanatory power nor does it point to any direction leading to such power.

The second section of this paper employs this conceptual framework in a very practical sense. It takes the work, thought, and practices of the French editors of JSP as a case study, and demonstrates how they attempted to reconcile their commitment to French nationalism with fascist transnationalism. 

I’ll look at what this buffoon has to say about that, see below.  Essentially, the French were hoodwinked by the Germans, but the delusional French were complicit in their own hoodwinking.

The third section of this article argues that one should consider ‘pan-fascist romanticism’ to understand how individual fascists thought transnationally. By zeroing in on the relationship between these French editors and foreign fascists, it illustrates that most instances of ‘fascist transnationalism’ were driven by distinct ‘romantic’ narratives. 

I’m sure I will not like any of that nonsense.

Practically, this means that the ‘myths’ are altered to cater to a different ‘in-group’. These narratives could be grounded upon antisemitism, pan-Europeanism, various forms of transnational racialism (such as Aryanism or white supremacism), anti-Bolshevism, anti-capitalism, or a complicated combination and overlapping of these and other ideas. 

Note – “myths.”

This third section also examines cases of interaction between the editors of JSP and various representatives of the German National Socialist regime in the 1930s. 

This emphasis on “the German National Socialist regime in the 1930s” mirrors the “movement’s obsession with that regime. Given what we will learn here (see below), which is generally supportive of the known historical narrative of the Germans being selfishly focused on narrow ethnic – or at nest, pan-Germanic or subracial – interests, this obsession has been unfortunate and feeds into the “movement’s” Nordicism and culture-retarding ethnonationalism.

The fourth section of this paper demonstrates that the narratives of ‘pan-fascist romanticism’ could be employed to achieve contradicting goals. Whereas they could stimulate and facilitate interaction and collaboration between fascists, they could also be used to manipulate foreign fascist peoples, movements, and regimes. Certain representatives of the Nazi regime, for instance, fed into a specific narrative of cross-border fascist collaboration, as a vehicle to further their own ultra-nationalist, imperialist, goals. Some of these representatives saw ‘pan-fascist romanticism’ as a form of camouflage, which could be employed to—temporarily—conceal Nazi Germany’s drive for geographical expansion and physical struggle.9 Through the continuing assertion and dissemination of ‘pan-fascist romanticism’ in their communication with French fascists, these individuals hoped to implant ‘pan-fascist illusions’ in the minds of France’s ultra-right, and aimed to further ‘obscure’ something which these Nazis regarded as the irreconcilable paradox of fascist transnationalism.

This is important and exposes one reason why the “movement’s obsession with the Nazi experience is so destructive.  Rather than being authentic “pan-Aryan” fascists, with an interest in the well-being of all Europeans, the Nazis had a “drive for geographical expansion and physical struggle” against other Europeans, and faked an interest in transnational fascism. Indeed, it was only after the disaster of Stalingrad that the more pan-European elements of the SS dominated over the more strictly Nordicist faction and it is questionable how sincere even that pan-European faction really was.  Did they have an authentic attachment to the pan-European ideal, or was it a desperate expediency to mobilize anti-Bolshevik Europeans to “buy into” German war aims?

And here is another important point. Is it possible that the “movement” learned from the Nazis too well? Just as the German Nationalists used transnational fascism as a camouflage to mask their narrow national imperialist agenda, and thus hoodwinked foreign fascists into accepting Germanocentric agendas under the guise of “unity,” so do modern White nationalists who are really Nordicist hoodwink Southern and Eastern Europeans to follow an agenda that exclusively serves Northwest European interests, with those narrow interests camouflaged behind a mask of “White unity.”  Thus, exposing the Nazi scam may assist in exposing the modern one, and pointing sincere pan-Europeanists away from the modern scam and toward an authentically pan-European movement.

The goal of this article, ultimately, lies beyond discussing the particularities of its case study.10 It demonstrates that approaching case studies from the perspective of ‘pan-fascism’ and its ‘paradox’ can make sense of the ideological flexibility found in the work, thinking, and practices of historical agents involved in fascist connections and collaboration across borders. It might stimulate scholars to turn, or stay, away from one-dimensional approaches to fascist transnationalism. And instead of trying to replace these inflexible perspectives with a new, global, or more complicated theory of fascist transnationalism, this paper—again—points towards ‘the pan-fascist paradox’. It does so for one reason in particular: fascism as a clearly defined body of ideas does simply not exist. 

That last part is really a stretch. Fascism may be protean but there is always a core present.  Whether one wants to deny that core id “a clearly defined body of ideas” depends upon one’s “optics” – to borrow the phraseology of this author.

The Heterogeneity of Fascist Transnationalism

Fascist politicians and intellectuals have often been depicted as ideologues who espoused extreme nationalism, condemned cross-border collaboration, and preached cultural parochialism.12 As a result, many scholars have approached fascism from a ‘national’ lens, and investigated their historical subjects in the context of national histories. Scholars of ‘international fascism’, in contrast, predominantly aimed to discern characteristics to differentiate between fascist ideologies and movements in time and space. Rather than examining fascist parties and practices in their unique historical contexts, they focused on constructing abstract typologies.13 A recent strand of research on ‘transnational fascism’, however, foregrounds cross-border cooperation and intellectual exchange between fascists. Certain scholars affiliated with this emerging school of thought have started emphasizing the pan-European elements of fascism, to challenge the conception that right-wing movements were purely driven by nationalism.14

Those “certain scholars” are on the right track, at least for fascisms other than the German variety.

One example of this is Arnd Bauerkämper’s article ‘Ambiguities of Transnationalism’ (2007) in which he effectively employed the idea of pan-Europeanism to emphasize the vital role of cross-border exchange and collaboration between European fascists.15 Recently, Bauerkämper published a collection of thirteen essays on the same topic with Grzegorz Rossollinski-Liebe, entitled Fascism without Borders (2017). The editors argued against the idea that fascism is inseparable from nationalism. Instead, they focused on ‘transnational connections and cooperation between movements and regimes in Europe’ and urged scholars to recognize the pan-European aspects of fascism.16 But while setting out to show that fascism transcended borders, the underlying thought that connected all the contributions in this collection was that a small group of right-wing politicians and intellectuals, to a certain extent, had substituted national borders with European borders. Rather than truly dismantling the logic of ‘thinking in borders’, and the nationalist sentiments underlying fascism, they simply displaced them.

So?  Leftists are offended that the fascist ingroup is limited to Europeans and does not include their favored Colored populations of African and Asian racial descent? I realize that leftist academics become hysterical over borders and any exclusion, but an ideology based in part on “ultra-nationalism” needs to define some sort of “nation” – be it ethnic or racial. A “nation” encompassing all of humanity loses any substantive meaning.

Studies that approach fascism from this pan-European fascist paradigm are particularly effective in elucidating the limitations of ‘national’ approaches to fascism. When trying to analyze the transnational dimensions of fascism, however, this perspective is limited in its own right, as it heavily relies on one particular possibility of transnationalism: pan-Europeanism.

Again, so?

Firstly, this notion of pan-Europeanism deals awkwardly with fascism outside Europe or collaborations between ‘European’ and ‘non-European’ fascists. One thing that comes to mind is South African right-wing nationalism in the 1930s. Whereas many members of the Ossewabrandwag felt closely related to the Netherlands and Belgium as their Stamlande [‘root-countries’], some of them supported the Nazis in their occupation of these countries, as they felt that it was a necessary step to defeat the British and dismantle their empire. Other examples are how the leaders of the Chinese government in Nanjing had become particularly enchanted by Italian and German fascism, or how a group of predominantly white and Dutch settlers in the Dutch East-Indies wanted to establish an Indonesian ‘fatherland’ independently from the Netherlands; for which they employed anti-Dutch and anti-European fascist language and attempted to mobilize native nationalism among the population of Indonesia. To examine such complicated cases of fascist transnationalism, the prism of pan-Europeanism falls short.

It doesn’t “fall short,” you mendacious retard, if you realize that “pan-European” includes Europeans in the Diaspora, and not only in Europe itself.  If that excludes your precious Chinese, then that is just too bad (HBDers weep).

Of course, no author seems to defend the position that fascist transnational solidarity was exclusively about European categories…

Why do non-fascist (typically leftist) academics feel the need to “defend the position” of fascists?  Isn’t that the obligation of fascists themselves?

This is insufficient, as it perpetuates Eurocentrism…

Do you need any more evidence of the biases of this author?  If academics objectively study the reality that White fascists are concerned with White people, then acknowledging that reality is perpetuating “Eurocentrism.”  On the one hand, it is a good thing that anti-fascist academics are so deluded, but it does make much of their work more or less useless for our purposes.

Secondly, the pan-European paradigm sheds a very narrow light on the thought and work of fascists—both outside and within the presupposed borders of Europe—because it primarily fixates on the extent to which these fascists dreamt about (the rebirth of) a ‘Europe’ for the ‘Europeans’. It does not give much room to recognize that the thought and work of most fascists was only abstractly related to this pan-European perspective, that pan-European language was often employed to convey disparate meanings, and that most fascists evoked more complicated possibilities of transnationalism.18

A mostly meaningless paragraph, the only agenda of which is to be anti-“Eurocentric.”

There was a seemingly paradoxical relationship between France and Nazi Germany in Cousteau’s analysis of the contemporary political situation, as Hitler was regarded both as a threat to France, as well as its savior…What needs to be made clear, here, is that the JSP editors were not primarily driven by Germanophilia. They did not choose Germany’s nationalism over France’s. Instead, they regarded German officials as natural allies in their struggle against the Third Republic and the French government, while remaining loyal to a mythical image of France. 


In contrast to Cousteau, Brasillach—who functioned as JSP’s editor-in-chief from June 1937 onward—was skeptical about collaboration between France’s ultra-right and the German National Socialists.30 Brasillach openly affiliated himself with fascism, but with ‘Latin fascism’ in particular. 


While being particularly fond of Spanish fascism, he had also praised Benito Mussolini for being a Latin poet, and he recognized ‘the Latin fascist traditions’ in the Belgian politics of the French-speaking Léon Degrelle.31 Brasillach asserted that France, historically, had always been the primary guardian of the ‘Latin culture’. 

Durocher weeps.

German fascism, however, was inherently different. Brasillach wrote in the early 1930s that he was worried about Hitler’s ‘primary racism’, that he regarded Hitler’s speeches as the work of ‘a sort of enraged teacher’, and that he believed that Nazi Germany was the greatest political threat to France.32


Brasillach still asserted that the German National Socialism could function as a model for French fascism. He admired the fascist aesthetics of Nazi Germany, as well as the ‘social’ impact of National Socialism. In the Third Reich, according to Brasillach, people were energetic and joyful. There, people had a sense of sacrifice and honour. He wanted to reproduce this in France. But, to succeed, ‘the French must find their poetry, their myths, their French images, as well as confidence in themselves and in a national ideal’. He concluded that ‘we can make it ours, not by a useless copy or imitation but by a more developed knowledge of who we are’.37

That seems reasonable to me.

Brasillach’s early engagement with fascism was primarily intellectual, seeing that his journalism and writings mostly discussed aesthetics and racism, without putting forward a political, social, or economic program. His dreams and hopes, however, were of a political nature. He wanted France to arise ‘Phoenix-like’ from the political and cultural decadence of its time, but rather than pushing for this to happen, he believed that it would be the result of spontaneous combustion. 

Passiveness never accomplishes anything.

Brasillach believed that the existence of a uniquely French fascism, grounded in French culture, would be enough to spark a fascist revolution. The fact that it did not, made him increasingly more disillusioned.

He should have blamed himself. You need to work for change.  The greater the change, the more work and effort required.  Nothing comes easy, least of all, a new society.

It made Brasillach’s later work—from mid-1938—more dismissive about France’s culture and people. 


It, at the same time, prompted his thinking about foreign fascist movements to become progressively heroic and romantic; as many foreign peoples, in contrast to the French, had brought about profound social and national revolutions. 

And their leaders worked to make it happen; they did not assume it would occur automatically.

To instigate a French fascist revolution, some editors at JSP even considered asking the Nazis, once the exotic other, for military assistance. Rebatet, at one point, publicly invited Hitler to invade France. 


While diagnosing the decline and decay of France on countless fronts, these JSP editors prophesied that fascism could bring about a spiritual and cultural renewal. Fascism, for them, was the antidote to the decadency of democracy, capitalism, liberalism, and Marxism. According to them, a fascist revolution would—undoubtedly—lead to the cultural, spiritual, and national rebirth of France. They found proof of this in other countries, such as Nazi Germany. Although Brasillach, throughout the 1930s, kept regarding Nazi Germany as the ‘other’, due to the ‘foreign’ content of its national symbols and myths, the JSP editors consistently presented this country as a magical and safe place, untouched by the corruption of democracy, Judaism, capitalism, liberalism, and Marxism. It was depicted as a place where the Jews and Bolshevists could not impose their decadent ways. Germany, in other words, was sculptured into a purer mirror of an impure France.

More Germany worship from the Far Right. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

While agreeing on the goal, the editors of JSP employed different strategies to spark a fascist revolution: Cousteau warned the French people that they had to eliminate the ‘internal enemies’ and overthrow the French government themselves, in order to prevent Nazi Germany from invading France to eradicate the Judeo-Bolshevists. Brasillach, in contrast, asserted in his early work that intellectual engagement with a uniquely French fascism, grounded in French culture, would be enough to trigger a French revolution. 

Cousteau was right.

Before thinking about the specific relationship between these French fascist editors at JSP and the German National Socialists, one must first recognize that the Nazis themselves were quite hesitant to export their ideology abroad. Hitler himself strongly doubted that exporting National Socialism would be possible, because he regarded it as an exclusively German phenomenon. 

The man was an idiot, despite whatever other virtues he had. National Socialism as an ideology can be applied to virtually any ethny, at least in theory.  It is a form of fascism that stresses biological race, in the form of a collectivist people’s community in which biological-genetic-racial-eugenic principles and interests are paramount.  Now,the particular German manifestation of this ideology was “an exclusively German phenomenon” but not the ideology itself. It is like saying that communism was specifically Russian (or, more properly, Jewish).

He, however, also believed it to be counterproductive, as it ‘would only lead to a strengthening of nationalism in other countries’, which ‘leads to a weakening of Germany’s position’ on the world stage. 

There you go, the self-centered petty nationalist culture retarding ethnonationalist par excellence.  And how did that work out for Germany?  In actuality, Germany’s long term stability and well-being would have been optimized as part of a strong and secure Europe in which all peoples enjoyed the protection of fascistic and national socialist principles.  By attempting to selfishly grasp too much, Hitler and the Nazis lost all.  It is analogous to a billionaire who destabilizes his host society by greedily trying to get more and more money of low marginal value, instead of protecting his already sufficient wealth by supporting a stable society to live in.

Hitler, therefore, was glad that the Nazi parties in other countries had ‘not produced leaders of his own calibre’, who were often ‘mere copyists’ without ‘original or new ideas’. As ‘they only imitated us and our methods slavishly’, he believed that they ‘would never amount to anything’.44 

Wonderful. Some pro-White leader he was.

The primary issue here, for Hitler, was ‘belatedness’. Much of Hitler’s contempt for foreign fascist movements seems to come from the fact that they come late, making them inevitably minions and imitators. For this reason, Hitler did not expect much from most foreign fascists: ‘in every country you have to start from different premises and change your methods accordingly’.45

So?  One could adopt basic principles to each people’s particular traits.

This, however, did not stop the Nazis from interacting with foreign fascists, nor from spreading ‘pan-fascist romanticism’. Already on 16 November 1933, Hitler proclaimed in an interview with the French journalist Fernand de Brinon that he wanted to start conversations ‘between the good French and the good Germans, between the good Poles and the good Germans, and between 100 % English people and 100 % German ones’. He asserted that cross-border collaboration between all ‘superior human races’—such as the ‘Aryan’ French and German races—could lead to a strengthening of the social, cultural, and political position of these peoples in their respective countries.46 People of ‘mixed race’ and ‘internationalists’, in contrast, had to be kept outside of these conversations.

Truth or lies?

This Nazi narrative of pan-fascist romanticism, drenched in transnational racialism, was fundamentally at odds with the core message of most of Hitler’s German-language speeches and writings, which was shamelessly German-nationalist. Hitler, for instance, consistently depicted the French as irredeemable since they had gone too far in their degenerative process of ‘Vernegerung’ [‘negrification’]. In his German speeches and writings, the Führer consistently repeated throughout the 1930s that the inferior status of the French people and race posed a lurking danger to ‘white humanity’ and ‘the white race’.47 

So, the previous comments were lies.  One could imagine his attitude toward Italians. Well, there's a passage in Mein Kampf about Southern Italy that makes the disdain clesr.

For the translation-process of Mein Kampf…This narrative, obviously, contrasted greatly from what Hitler wrote and said to his German audience. There, Hitler continued to argue that France as a country should be perceived as ‘a sin against the existence of white humanity’… Mein Kampf’s original narrative of German-nationalist, fascist, romanticism was thus substituted by a narrative of non-national, racialized transnationalism. Hitler’s book was profoundly altered to lead a second life as a carrier of pan-fascist romanticism.

So the Nazis were lying to non-Germanic Europeans about Nazi attitudes toward intra-European ethnoracial differences, camouflaging the real Germanocentric racial contempt with a false mask of transnational fascism. This is similar to how the “movement” lies to White ethnics, pretending to believe in “White unity” while in actuality the real attitude is contempt for White ethnics.

After Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, Nazi propaganda originally aimed to cultivate and establish amicable relations with French ministers and diplomats. Until early 1936, the Nazis kept close ties with various French officials.56 To help these negotiations, and to further their cause, the Nazis deemed it advisable to deemphasize the ideological and political significance of Hitler’s blatantly anti-French statements in Mein Kampf. 

More fundamental dishonesty.

Seduction, Deception, and Self-Delusion

That sounds like the relationship of the “movement” with White ethnics.

The relationship and interaction between certain members of the Nazi regime and the editors of JSP, however, cannot be fully explained by noting that these French fascists were solely passive recipients of ‘Nazi’ narratives of pan-fascist romanticism. The story, of course, was a whole lot more complicated. In the thought of a handful of Nazi officials including Hitler, Himmler, and Goebbels, there was a certainly a strong belief that the nationalist and transnationalist dimensions of fascism were irreconcilable, or, in other words, that transnational fascism was intrinsically paradoxical. So, in their minds there was not really so much a ‘paradox’ as, rather, the recognition of a pattern of delusion on the side of the other fascist peoples and movements that they wished to exploit. 

That shows how absolutely despicable the Nazis were with respect to their relations with non-Germanic peoples, and is akin to how today’s “movement” treat White ethnics.

Consider what non-German fascists tried to do.

The conference was not able to bridge the gulf between those participants who proposed achieving national integration by a corporative socio-economic policy and those who favored an appeal to race.[9] Pretensions to "universal fascism" could not survive this rift, and the movement did not meet its goal of acting as a counterbalance to international communism.

If true, that analysis suggests that one reason for the failure of inter-war transnational fascism was ideological, not any “instability” due to the “paradox” of “ultra-nationalists” trying to engage across national identities.  Also, the German resistance to transnational fascist cooperation and Mussolini’s capture as a vassal of Germany (another hoodwinked fascist) meant that such conference were no longer being promoted by an established fascist state.

Back to the original essay:

Because they were convinced that they saw through the paradox of transnational fascism, and believed they understood where German interests really lay, they attempted to manipulate foreign fascist peoples and movements by feeding into the narrative of ‘pan-fascist collaboration’, and feeding into the ‘delusion’ through a continuing assertion and dissemination of pan-fascist romanticism. This, for them, served the purpose of implanting ‘pan-fascist illusions’ in the minds of foreign fascists to further obscure, what they regarded as, the paradoxical nature of transnational fascism.

The paradox was not inherent, it was due to the petty nationalist tendencies of ethnonationalist filth.

There was, however, a lot of conflict among Nazi officials regarding the desired treatment of France. Himmler and Goebbels were especially hostile to the idea of collaborating with France’s ultra-right, and Hitler was initially hesitant as well. 


When looking at the position of the French fascists working at JSP, one should not forget that they had actively sought out rapprochement with the Nazis themselves. They did so for a couple of reasons. The JSP editors had been extremely hostile to the French government from mid-1936 onward, which caused them to create two dissociated conceptions of France. In their minds, it was their mission to defeat France as a ‘political entity’ to save their ‘ideal’ and ‘mythical’ conception of France. From mid-1938 onward, however, they became profoundly frustrated after they believed that a uniquely French fascist revolution was postponed indefinitely due to the ‘weakness’ and ‘unmanliness’ of the French population. In addition to their racial disillusionment, they were jealous about supposedly successful ‘social’ and ‘national’ revolutions in other countries and hoped to learn—and to receive inspiration—from foreign fascists. At the same time, they understood their position as a relatively powerless minority group in France, which meant that their collaboration with the German regime and officials was grounded upon an asymmetrical power relationship…For the longest time, the JSP editors also kept explaining away anything that contradicted their ‘illusory’ convictions. Whenever Cousteau, for instance, was confronted with the anti-French sentiments from Hitler’s Mein Kampf, he asserted that these statements were simply outdated.

That is all perfectly consistent with the delusions White ethnics have with the “movement.”  When confronted with ingoing “movement” Nordicism and disdain for Southern and Eastern Europeans, many ethnics try to convince themselves (and others) that it is “simply outdated” and doesn’t mean anything.

This logic, of course, was of a circular kind. To explain why they had omitted the anti-French passages in Ma Doctrine, the JSP editors referred to the Nazi’s pan-fascist narrative of the last years to illustrate and prove that Hitler had changed his attitude towards France and the French people, even though their Nazi-authorized publication, at the same time, propounded exactly the same pan-fascist narrative, and was produced and disseminated to re-assert it. Rather than regarding such examples of crooked logic as failed attempts to defend themselves against allegations from negative reviews, it seems to be emblematic of what the JSP editors themselves believed in from mid-1938 onward. 

Sound familiar?  I suppose I was guilty of doing the same in the past as well.

Reality be damned.


Conclusion…many fascists often incorporated countless combinations of contradictory elements into their thinking and constantly kept modifying their ideas, definitions, and principles throughout their careers. Seeing that tackling their self-defined problems was usually seen as a matter of life and death, many fascists, and this is, of course, particularly the case for ‘fascists’ who had not managed to secure the support of their ‘target groups’, and who had become disillusioned by the social, cultural, and political realities of their time, were also overly flexible in their choice of allies. 

Too much flexibility makes you snap, as what has happened to many in the “movement” today.

How did certain individual fascists, at specific moments in their lives, think about the possibility of cross-border fascist solidarity? How did they mediate the relationship between nationalism and transnationalism; and how did these fascists—in other words—‘think transnationally’?

For example, if one does regard nationalism as a core element of fascism, then that logically seems to mean that transnational fascism is—at least partially—paradoxical. 

Again, this describes the ethnonationalist error. True White nationalism – the fascism that makes sense today – has race as nation (what this author decries as “Eurocentric”) and can eliminate the “paradox."

The thought, work, and practices of fascists, however, almost never followed simple logical assumptions. Fascist thinking, instead, is all too often molded by resentment, fear, and shame…

Typical leftist ad hominem.

When doing so, one will easily find that many individual fascists do not regard nationalism as a core element of fascism; and, because of this, most of them will not regard transnational fascism as inherently paradoxical. 


…especially after 1945, it is apparent that distinguishable groups of fascists have substituted nationalism with racism.

That’s my whole point.  So much for the “paradox?”

For many of them, ‘the white race’ …

Note the scare quotes. Leftist alert!

…has become the common denominator, which is inherently transnational. The claim to defend ‘white superiority’ ..

Liar.  Who on the Far Right (apart perhaps Spencer) talks about “white superiority?”

The main takeaway from this paper on the usefulness of ‘pan-fascism’ for future historical studies on transnational fascism is that it all boils down to optics. 


As regards footnotes:

This paper maintains Roger Griffin’s definition of ultra-nationalism, namely that it is essentially xenophobic and is known to legitimize itself ‘through deeply mythicized narratives of past cultural or political periods of historical greatness or of old scores to settle against alleged enemies’. Cyprian P. Blamires, ed., World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 452.

The definition is palingenetic ultra-nationalism, you mendacious leftist scum.

In 2020, Anson Rabinbach wrote that fascism should be understood as an ‘ethos or Gesinnung, a willingness to adhere to the general precepts of a worldview, which was vague and indistinct enough to embrace a variety of related perspectives’. Somewhat similarly, Sven Reichardt argued that one should think about fascism as seven distinctive ‘processes’, because ‘fascism as a movement, acting within a democratic system, should be understood as fundamentally different from a state carrying out a genocide in the exceptional situation of the Second World War’. Sven Reichardt, ‘Fascism’s Stages: Imperial Violence, Entanglement, and Processualization,’ History of Ideas 82, no. 1 (2021): 85–107; Anson Rabinbach, Staging the Third Reich: Essays in Cultural and Intellectual History, eds. Stefanos Geroulanos and Dagmar Herzog (London, etc.: Routledge, 2020), 121, 160, 174.

There’s some truth in that, given that flexible and protean nature of fascism, but shouldn’t be taken too far.

Some individual fascists at various moments in time, however, were primarily committed to the ‘pan-European’ idea. As Roger Griffin wrote: ‘certain strands of interwar fascism were actively concerned with resolving the decadence brought about by the status quo as a whole, not just in a particular nation, and thus thought of rebirth in pan-European or even Western terms’. Roger Griffin, ‘Europe for the Europeans: Fascist Myths of the European New Order 1922–1992,’ in A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Griffin, ed. Matthew Feldman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 132–181.

And that’s a good thing.

My bottom line – genuine pan-Europeanism eliminates the so-called “paradox” in fascist thought, and the “paradox” lingers on today because of the culture-retarding ethnonationalists who divide Whites and who proudly self-identify as petty nationalists (e.g., Greg Johnson).

Wednesday, January 12, 2022

Yockeyian Genetics

Constructing a more cohesive pan-European genetic identity.  Emphasis added.

We all know Yockey’s somewhat questionable views on the issue of biological race, which I have written about multiple times (one example here).  Instead of focusing on that, here I look at another issue – the possible genetic (biological racial) consequences of a Yockeyian Imperium, a subject that I term “Yockeyian Genetics.”

In some ways, this is related to my essay on the convergence of the Yockeyian and Salterian perspectives, but here I consider it from the more specific perspective of how a Yockeyian Imperium could affect the genetics of the European peoples constituting such a geopolitical entity.

Let us consider this post, which is based on this paper, from which the following is extracted:

Population stratification caused by nonrandom mating between groups of the same species is often due to geographical distances leading to physical separation followed by genetic drift of allele frequencies in each group. In humans, population structures are also often driven by geographical barriers or distances; however, humans might also be structured by abstract factors such as culture, a consequence of their reasoning and self-awareness. Religion in particular, is one of the unusual conceptual factors that can drive human population structures. This study explores the Levant, a region flanked by the Middle East and Europe, where individual and population relationships are still strongly influenced by religion. We show that religious affiliation had a strong impact on the genomes of the Levantines. In particular, conversion of the region's populations to Islam appears to have introduced major rearrangements in populations' relations through admixture with culturally similar but geographically remote populations, leading to genetic similarities between remarkably distant populations like Jordanians, Moroccans, and Yemenis. Conversely, other populations, like Christians and Druze, became genetically isolated in the new cultural environment. We reconstructed the genetic structure of the Levantines and found that a pre-Islamic expansion Levant was more genetically similar to Europeans than to Middle Easterners.

The last part – “a pre-Islamic expansion Levant was more genetically similar to Europeans than to Middle Easterners” – has some relevance with respect to putative “Levantine immigrants and slaves” in Ancient Rome, who may have been much more “genetically similar to Europeans” than are Middle Easterners today. Note also that post-Islamic expansion Muslin influx into Southern Europe may have been mostly Berber types (and that, with a net effect of only a few percentage points of ancestry, at the greatest). But those are details.  

The main point is that cultural similarity can influence genetics to bring culturally similar people to become more genetically similar, and more genetically distant and distinct from culturally alien peoples, even if the cultural aliens are geographically close and not much genetically different to begin with. The same principle can extend to the realm of politics and High Culture-Politics as that of a Yockeyian Imperium. Thus, we can understand how cultural-civilizational-political boundaries can influence genetic boundaries between peoples.

See this, which is based on this.

…during the last 1,000 generations there are more coalescences between Beijing Chinese and Japanese rather than Beijing Chinese and southern Chinese; in more recent times, there are more coalescences between Chinese groups. This makes some sense, if we suppose that -as seems likely- Mongoloids spread north-to-south across China during prehistory; the Japanese are thus linked -in older times- with northern Chinese, both of which are mostly descended from the northern Mongoloids; in more recent times, especially after the emergence of a uniquely Chinese polity and culture, the Chinese tend to marry other Chinese, hence they share more recent common ancestors within the country itself.

The take home point of this:

The same can apply to Europe and any (relatively small) potential kinship overlap that may currently exist between Europeans and non-Europeans.  Once a “Western Imperium” is established, and gene flow from outside is stopped, over time, genetic distance between those groups within the Imperium and those outside will increase.  Thus, even if there is no increase in gene flow within the Imperium, the fact that a genetic division will be established with the “outer groups” will ensure that Europeans will, over time, form an ever more cohesive genetic grouping, more clearly separated from non-Europeans.  Thus, proximate influences ultimate, and genetic boundaries can become increasingly well matched with political-cultural-civilizational boundaries once gene flow between civilizational groups is stopped.  And there is more than enough genetic diversity within each civilizational bloc to satisfy biological requirements in the absence of any inter-continental and inter-civilizational gene flow.

Genetic drift, selection, and other such processes would take place, with the within vs. without distinction further pushing Europeans and non-Europeans farther apart. There would also be, to an extent, increasing cultural distinctiveness to mirror that of the genes/biology. The last part about "biological requirements" refers to an adequate amount of genetic diversity to enhance fitness, avoid inbreeding depression, and to provide the genetic variation to deal with changes in the environment (broadly defined).

So, we see that a political-cultural entity, the Yockeyian Imperium, would affect the genetics of its constituent peoples in such a manner as to support the underlying foundation of the Imperium entity itself, the organic solidarity of the European peoples.

Consider this PCA figure.  By tightly restricting any possible gene flow strictly to the European Imperium, one would expect, over time, the European and non-European areas to be more distinct and segregated than they are presently, with the European PCA likely becoming more concentrated within a space of the two major axes (PC1 and PC2).  Certainly, any tendency of greater intra-European dispersion and European/non-European convergence – the latter of which is no doubt being facilitated by alien immigration into Europe – would be repressed, and the aforementioned opposing trends promoted.  Any possibility that a given European and non-European ethny would be genetically closer than two European ethnies would also be eliminated over time by the processes inherent in restricting gene flow strictly within the European family of nations. Thus any such kinship overlap, if such exist, between, say, Europeans and non-European Caucasians, would be eliminated, as discussed above.

Cypriots are found in between Southern Italians and Near Easterners, thus, between Southern Europeans and non-European Caucasians. If Greek Cypriots are included in the Imperium while Turkish Cypriots are excluded, then the former group will, over time, converge with Southern Europeans in PCA while the latter will drift in the direction of Turks – as a result of restricting any (low level, see below) gene flow to the proper categories.

Now, one could speculate that the EU, and freedom of movement within it, would promote an increasing convergence and concentration of European PCA, but then the introduction of alien elements, not always evenly distributed among EU members) would counter-act that to an extent (e.g., a large number of Turks in Germany would, in the event of admixture, move Germans away from other Europeans infested with alien types other than Turks - with the alien invaders being less interested in moving away from their favorite host nations than are natives willing to move elsewhere).  So, the current EU, which combines both freedom of movement within and porous borders without, is not optimal for the proposed “Yockeyian Genetics.”

Now, one can argue that from the strict perspective of so-called Yockeyian genetics, the optimal situation would be an internal European-only panmixia, with complete internal freedom of movement and significant inter-marriage, coupled to a complete lack of movement and admixture with non-Europeans.  While true, that would have the negative effect of erasing established European ethnic identities, and creating a generalized European type, which is not the objective of pan-Europeanism (regardless of what its opponents claim). Thus, the objective of Yockeyian genetics is not the optimal, and most rapid, creation of a generalized pan-European genetic type (with a highly concentrated PCA). Indeed, the type of Imperium I have in mind would have less internal movement than the current EU, in order to safeguard the uniqueness of specific European types. Instead, I propose to completely shut off outside influences, while allowing for, over time, low level intra-European gene flow to result in an increased European/non-European separation, and a degree of concentration of the European PCA, while still preserving the overall PCA (genes correlated with geography) structure and the uniqueness of the European types. A slow and modest “tightening” of the PCA over time with respect to Europeans, coupled to increased distance to non-Europeans is the objective, with the concomitant, desired elimination of any possible European/non-European kinship overlap. Thus, in every case, genetic distances between any chosen European ethnies would always be less than genetic distances between any European and non-European ethnies (in most cases, this is true today, but there may be some breakdown of that between the farthest ends of the genetic spectrum).

Thus, this would NOT be any panmixia, but the normal low level gene flow that has always occurred in history between distinct peoples, but in this case, restricted in the manner described above. Of course, if some European ethny wants to follow its own evolutionary path, and be completely genetically isolated from all other groups, in order to promote divergence, that’s fine; freedom of association would be respected (but the opposite, bringing in racial and cultural aliens from outside the European sphere, would not be tolerated).  But, given the behavior of people within the EU today, I suspect the opposite would be more of an issue – people clamoring for free movement between Imperium nations, a movement that would need to be restricted (to some significant degree) in order to preserve ethnic distinctiveness. These are details that would need to be worked out.

The consequences with respect to Salterian EGI would be supportive of the Imperium idea.  Eliminating potential kinship overlap with groups outside the Imperium, and concentrating (to a natural extent over time, again, not a panmixia that would harm the more local specific EGI of individual ethnies) the European genepool, the EGI cost/benefit ratio would ever increasingly move into the direction of maximizing benefits and minimizing costs of the Imperium idea.  Genetic distance to groups outside the Imperium would increase, making it more and more beneficial to exclude such groups and minimizing costs that would have obtained if kinship overlap across the Imperium boundaries existed.  Genetic distances within the Imperium would in all cases be less than any case of cross-boundary genetic distance, again maximizing benefits and minimizing costs.  Not only would net EGI benefit from the Imperium arrangement (in that any significant EGI costs would be more than compensated by counterbalancing benefits), but by eliminating much of the costs, gross EGI would be maximized as well.  This would particularly be the case if the uniqueness of individual ethnies is maintained, so the best of both worlds occur – individual ethnic group EGI is preserved, while pan-European EGI is maximized as well.

To summarize, in outline form:

  • 1. A pan-European state (Imperium) would be set up that would have the effect of an enhancement of net EGI, by advancing the interests of the group of peoples and thus the interest of each constituting group.
  • 2. In order to safeguard the uniqueness of the constituent groups, movement and mixture between these groups would be restricted, preventing any panmxia and loss of biological and cultural ethnic distinctiveness. Of course, there would be some (limited) movement and gene flow, consistent with what has occurred throughout European history.
  • 3. At the same time, movement and mixture from without the Imperium, from biologically and culturally alien non-European peoples, would be strictly forbidden and absolutely restricted.
  • 4. Thus, what would obtain over historical, evolutionary time is a complete absence of gene flow from the outside, coupled with continuous, low level, internal gene flow. Genetic drift, selection, and other such processes would take place, with the within vs. without distinction further pushing Europeans and non-Europeans farther apart.
  • 5. These processes would have the effect, over time, of increasing the genetic distance of groups within vs. without the Imperium (European vs. non-European), while genetic distances within the Imperium would be maintained and/or slowly decreased (to an extent) over time.
  • 6. Kinship overlap within/without would be eliminated due to these processes (particularly the strict isolation from outside gene flow).  Thus, in every possible case, any European ethnies chosen for comparison would be genetically closer (measured with genetic kinship/gene sharing, Fst, or whatever) than would be any European ethny compared to a non-European one. In PCA, European groups would be more separated from non-Europeans, and the European groups may be expected to slowly concentrate around a narrower core grouping along the major axes of genetic variation – Europeans less spread out among themselves, but more isolated from others.
  • 7. These processes would take place naturally over long time frames, with ethnic distinctiveness being maintained, preserving local EGI while enhancing group EGI, leading to not only an increase in net EGI but gross EGI as well, a more optimal profile of genetic interests with costs minimized.

Would this process take centuries and millennia? Yes. An enduring structure is required, with an elite caste whose mission is to monitor and guide the process of directing European genetics. One would expect sampling of genetic metrics over time to evaluate the process, make sure all is going as planned, and to make adjustments as necessary. Some formula needs to be designed to make sure the process is politically and evolutionarily stable over time, that it is not hijacked or discarded, and does not become subject to elite free riding.  Considerations of “freedom” need to be put into context – the ultimate freedom is the freedom to exist and to pursue genetic interests. Further, as an elite project, this would not interfere with the day-to-day life of most people, with the exception of restrictions on movement between nations (and more so, in/out of the Imperium). But how many people actually relocate to other nations?  And if one’s nation is an orderly nationalist state, as would be under this scheme, why would they want to?

Sunday, October 3, 2021

Nietzsche vs. Melville

Apparent vs. true worlds.

See this from Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, a quote that I consider the philosophical core of the book:

Hark ye yet again—the little lower layer. All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. But in each event—in the living act, the undoubted deed—there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask. If man will strike, strike through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall? To me, the white whale is that wall, shoved near to me. Sometimes I think there’s naught beyond. But ’tis enough. He tasks me; he heaps me; I see in him outrageous strength, with an inscrutable malice sinewing it. That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate; and be the white whale agent, or be the white whale principal, I will wreak that hate upon him. Talk not to me of blasphemy, man; I’d strike the sun if it insulted me. For could the sun do that, then could I do the other; since there is ever a sort of fair play herein, jealousy presiding over all creations. But not my master, man, is even that fair play. Who’s over me? Truth hath no confines.

So, what is Melville, speaking through Ahab, saying here?  Everything that we can perceive through our senses, the material world – “visible objects”- is just surface veneer, a façade, “pasteboard masks,” which conceals the true, hidden reality beneath it.  This hidden reality is manifested in, or simply is, some “unknown but still reasoning thing” (God?). Events, acts, and deeds can sometimes reveal the presence of this hidden, unknown thing – it “puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask.”  So, if one wants to strike out at this hidden force, this manipulator of events, one has to “strike through the mask!”  After all, if the mask is hiding the true driving force behind events, and if some events reveal the presence of that hidden force, then one can access the hidden force, attack it, harm it, by striking through the mask behind which it hides. Or, our perceived reality is akin to a prison, and to reach out beyond it to strike out against that which imprisons us - our jailor - we need to thrust “through the wall” of that prison.  To Ahab, the event which revealed the presence of the “unknown but still reasoning thing” was the loss of his leg, and Moby Dick is the wall that forms part of Ahab’s prison.  

Ahab is unsure if Moby Dick is just the agent of the unknown force - thus, the whale is a “pasteboard mask” - or if the whale is actually the principal, the hidden force itself (e.g., “Sometimes I think there’s naught beyond"). It seems to me that, according to Ahab’s epistemology of reality, it makes more sense for the whale to be the agent of something else. Besides the absurdity of a whale being the principal of which Ahab speaks, the animal is hardly an “unknown thing." How could Moby Dick be both the wall and the jailor, the pasteboard mask and that behind it?  It makes more sense for the whale to be the agent of another force that Ahab opposes and that he strikes at that “unknown but still reasoning thing” by hunting and killing Moby Dick (thus, striking through the mask).  But in the end, it doesn’t matter to Ahab; either way, he hates and must kill the whale and what it represents: “But ’tis enough. He tasks me; he heaps me; I see in him outrageous strength, with an inscrutable malice sinewing it. That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate…”  

Ahab then further displays his Faustian nature by: “I’d strike the sun if it insulted me” and that he has no master and that he represents truth: “But not my master, man, is even that fair play. Who’s over me? Truth hath no confines.”  For moralpathy and Ahab as moralpath, see here.

Ahab’s discourse, in which he contrasts the visible world of our perception and the unknown thins lurking behind it, reminds one of the distinction between the apparent and true world paradigms analyzed by Nietzsche in Twilight of the Idols.  For Ahab (and Melville), the world of our perception is the apparent world, but there is underlying this a true (or more true) world of the “unknown but still reasoning thing.” Let’s see what Nietzsche has to say about this.

The true world -- we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one

The full quote:

It will be appreciated if I condense so essential and so new an insight into four theses. In that way I facilitate comprehension; in that way I provoke contradiction.

First proposition. The reasons for which "this" world has been characterized as "apparent" are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable.

A very positivist, materialist, empiricist, scientific view. I say that as praise, not condemnation.

Second proposition. The criteria which have been bestowed on the "true being" of things are the criteria of not-being, of nothingness, the "true world" has been constructed out of contradiction to the actual world: indeed an apparent world, insofar as it is merely a moral-optical illusion.

Third proposition. To invent fables about a world "other" than this one has no meaning at all, unless an instinct of slander, detraction, and suspicion against life has gained the upper hand in us: in that case, we avenge ourselves against life with a phantasmagoria of "another," a "better" life.

Christianity in a nutshell.  Also, much of the nonsense about a superior Golden Age of the “traditionalists” (Nietzsche denounced this view, recognizing that the past was an age lower than that of the present).

Fourth proposition. Any distinction between a "true" and an "apparent" world -- whether in the Christian manner or in the manner of Kant (in the end, an underhanded Christian) -- is only a suggestion of decadence, a symptom of the decline of life. That the artist esteems appearance higher than reality is no objection to this proposition. For "appearance" in this case means reality once more, only by way of selection, reinforcement, and correction. The tragic artist is no pessimist: he is precisely the one who says Yes to everything questionable, even to the terrible -- he is Dionysian.

The full reasoning:

How the “True World” Finally Became An Fable:

The History of an Error

1. The true world -- attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it.

(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.")

The Classical Civilization.

2. The true world -- unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for the sinner who repents").

(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible -- it becomes female, it becomes Christian.)

Christianity = feminine, subtle, insidious, incomprehensible.

3. The true world -- unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it -- a consolation, an obligation, an imperative.

(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian [i.e., Kantian].)

The characterization of “Nordic” is amusing here given certain connotations in the “movement.” Gregor associated Nordicism with an ideology of despair, as Guntherite Nordicism harkened back to a better past of pure Nordics that have become mongrelized and degraded; somewhat differently, but with a similar tone, modern Nordicists aver that pure Nordics still exist but are always endangered by mixture with inferior peoples. Nordicism is also associated with Traditionalism and its obsession with a past Golden Age. So, in a sense, Nordicist narratives are “a consolation, an obligation, an imperative” but, on the other hand, modern Nordicists would object to the characterization of their ideology as “unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable” since they will argue that Nordic, or “Nordish,” preservationism is attainable, demonstrable, and promisable.

4. The true world -- unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?

(Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)

5. The "true" world -- an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating -- an idea which has become useless and superfluous -- consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!

(Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens [“good sense”] and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.)

6. The true world -- we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.

(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA. [“Zarathustra begins”])

So, the argument is, there is no “true world” and no “apparent world” but only the world, the reality that we inhabit (and realization of this is the first step toward the Overman).

This would seem to be incompatible with the Melville/Ahab view.

An interpretation of Nietzsche’s views on this this subject:

Nietzsche’s How the ‘Real World’ at Last Became a Myth appears in Twilight of the Idols (1889). In this short, sequential, text he outlines what he subtitles as the “History of an Error”. The genealogy traces the notion of the division of the world into reality and appearance from its original mystic formulation (“I, Plato, am the Truth”), through the Platonic cave, the neo-platonist Christian interpretation, onto the Kantian noumenon and suprasensible ground of morality. From there, after it finds its most pure expression in the sterile Kantian thing-in-itself, the notion becomes increasingly suspect, culminating in its dismissal, and with it, the entire dichotomy of apparent/real, representation/thing-in-itself. Both the suprasensible “real world” and the apparent world of representation are overcome.

Nietzsche, with characteristic modesty, concludes that it is precisely at the moment when this millennia old metaphysical error has been completely eviscerated, with humanity now free from the specter of an all powerful beyond, that his text Thus Spoke Zarathustra truly begins.

Again, it would seem that Nietzsche is in opposition to Melville (I would have liked to see Nietzsche analyze Moby Dick).

As a STEM empiricist, I have an affinity for Nietzsche’s view. On the other hand, I still see value in Melville’s formulation. How to square the circle? Perhaps we need to review Melville’s description of the “unknown” as a “reasoning thing.” What if the known and unknown are both part of the same actuality?  The known is part of reality that we currently are able to perceive and the unknown is that we are currently unable to perceive but is still a real part of that same reality, something that could in theory be perceived if we had the power to do so (whether or not it is realistically possible for humans to ever have this power is itself currently an unknown).  What if this “unknown” is not so much a “reasoning thing” but some manifestation of nature and nature’s laws that we cannot yet perceive?  But, then again, maybe there is some “reasoning thing” involved but something that is not supernatural or part of a hidden “true” world but, again, is a manifestation of a reality that is hidden from us simply because we currently do not have the power to perceive it. Modern scientific philosophy has some interesting ideas related to this approach to Melville's views.  See this.  And this. 

Thus, is the “unknown but still reasoning” thing a part of our reality that has an inherent consciousness of which we have heretofore been unaware?

So, Nietzsche is, in my opinion, correct that there is a reality that is material and that could in theory be empirically determined, that there is no “true” vs “apparent” world, but as part of reality are things that we cannot (yet) perceive and that act (or seem to act) towards us in ways akin to Ahab’s complaint about hidden actors whose presence can make themselves known through certain events.

Thursday, July 15, 2021

Holy Legionary Youth

Book review.  The Legionary Movement.

See this.

I have long been a supporter of the Legionary Movement, and try to read good quality material on this topic, avoiding “hit pieces” animated by anti-Legionary bias. Thus, this book looked like an attractive offering. Alas, I was disappointed with respect to this book being a purely objective approach by the author. Unfortunately, it wasn't.

The author is obviously some sort of simpering leftist (see his bias here) who has a footnote in the beginning of the book agonizing over the use of words like “Romanians” and “Jews”- terms linked to “racist” sources.  How dare you identify people by ethnicity!  What a buffoon this idiot is. First, subjectively, Jews have no problem self-identifying as Jews, distinct from Romanians (and vice versa) – so how is it “racist” to recognize that these identity groups exist?  Second, objectively, genetic analysis allows us to distinguish ethnic Jews from ethnic Romanians – so how is recognizing these differences something wrong and “racist?”

The author considers fascism to be a “social category,” one becomes a fascist, and does so through everyday activities, by action, one lives a fascist lifestyle, rather than following a specific ideology. There is some truth to that, but the author and others he cites follows that line too far, the idea that fascism has no ideology would certainly come as a surprise to, say, Gentile or Rosenberg.  But, again, fascism is more of a secular religion, a lived experience, an existential form of politics, rather than an extremely formalized rigid theoretical ideology.  One can of course move forward from that, thus underscoring the difference between authentic fascism and para-fascism. Can anyone imagine Franco and members of his conservative reactionary authoritarian regime living a fascist life, following a secular religion?  The idea is ludicrous. Many of the reactionary regimes classified by political retardates as “fascist” were no more “fascist” than Ronald Reagan or Donald Trump.  Fascism – contra leftist lies – is a revolutionary movement, and considering it as a “social category” and a lived experience is useful for distinguishing it from para-fascist reaction.

Putting aside the author's implied nonsense of nationalism being some sort of construct used by “social actors” to achieve goals independent of objective nationhood, we can observe how Romanian nationalism evolved, with "the other” being Ottomans, Greeks, etc., before Romanian nationhood, and then focused on the Jewish problem (Jews as "the other") afterward. Interestingly, after widespread Jewish immigration (invasion) into Romania, Romanian texts of that time characterized Jews as “sly, deceitful, ugly, smelly, cowardly, and lazy.” I’ll leave it up as an exercise to the reader to reflect on how these “stereotypes” - particularly those about “sly, deceitful,” and ugly” - seem consistent over time and space with respect to how those peoples thought about the Jews living amongst them. There does seem to be an element of consistency there.  If a wide variety of peoples have the same opinion, is it perhaps the target of the opinion that needs to be looked at as the problem, rather than all of the other, varied aggrieved peoples?  After decades of Holocaust propaganda and associated guilt-tripping, as well as intense social pricing against “anti-Semitism,” anti-Jewish hostility still exists, testament to the characteristics of Jews that continuously trigger these reactions among the vast array of the Gentile peoples.

As an example of the mendacious leftist approach to these issues, let us consider how the author evaluates the outbreak of aggressive nationalism and “anti-Semitism” among Romanian university students in the early 1920s.  We are told that this activism was an “outlet for their frustrations;” thus, the Romanians were poorly educated and ill-prepared for the university, and were also subject to sub-standard living conditions; thus, they picked on the poor, innocent, persecuted Jews. As a specific example of mendacity by omission and implication, we can consider the Jewish cadaver controversy. The author relates the following.  Jewish religious belief opposes, or at least opposed, the use of Jewish bodies for medical dissection. The Romanian students accused Jewish students of removing Jewish bodies from the school to prevent their use, but at the same time the Jewish students were very willing to dissect “Christian” (i.e., Gentile – presumably mostly ethnic Romanian) bodies. Presumably, the Romanian students, in contrast, made no distinction, and would use all bodies.  I note that the author doesn’t comment on whether this anti-Jewish accusation was true (likely, it was), but instead omits any analysis of the actual facts and implies that the incident reflects hateful Romanian racist “anti-Semitism” and the “frustrations” of the students.

But, we shall consider the situation here.  If the author acknowledges that Jewish religious belief is so opposed to the use of Jewish bodies for dissection (while having no such opposition for Gentile bodies), then isn’t it possible – likely even – that Jewish students would refuse to dissect Jewish bodies?  Isn’t it possible that the Romanian students noticed Jewish bodies missing and “put two and two together” to realize that the Jewish students were removing the Jewish bodies to prevent their use?  Isn’t it possible, and likely, that at least some Jewish students were actually removing the Jewish bodies? And isn’t it true that those same Jews would have no problem dissecting Romanian cadavers?  Isn’t it possible that there was strong evidence supporting the accusation?  And isn’t it reasonable that such Jewish behavior would fuel anti-Jewish feeling among Romanians?  Or are we to believe that the accusation was made up over nothing, that Jewish students happily dissected Jewish cadavers in opposition to their religion, and that the whole thing was nothing more than “dumb Romanians venting their frustrations?”

What do you think?

Interestingly, the issue was resolved by the school saying that Christian students dissect Christian cadavers and Jewish students dissect Jewish ones (dissection separatism), and if the Jewish students didn’t like it, they could go study anatomy in a museum.  Sure sounds to me like the medical school certainly believed that there was a problem with Jewish students refusing to allow Jewish bodies to be dissected.

Then, the author dismisses Romanian complaints of Romanians being attacked by Jews, because those attacks “were not reported by non-fascist sources,” while all instances of Romanians attacking Jews are accepted at face value by the author.  Looking at how the American media of today selectively reports news, and ignores Black-on-White crime, selectively reports only rare instances of the opposite, and harps on about almost non-existent “White supremacist” violence while ignoring Antifa/BLM rioting, you can judge for yourself the probability that Jewish-leftist-establishment Romanian newspapers of the interwar period were accurately reporting instances of inter-group violence.

Broad segments of Romanian society at that time supported even the most radical of the students, including the so-called Vacarestini, led by Codreanu and Mota, who were accused of plotting assassinations in 1923. This later evolved into the broad support given to the Legionary Movement.  This is contrasted to the complete lack of support given to even the most moderate pro-White activists in America, and throughout the “West.” 

The continued acquittals of Romanian student nationalists – even when obviously guilty; thus, they were political acquittals – was another sign of broad support. Indeed, not only students benefited from this; in one case, a Romanian peasant was acquitted for killing a Jewish landowner with an ax based on the fact that the murder was viewed as a legitimate protest against the Jewish danger. Thus, we can assume that “over-the-top” Romanian ultranationalist behavior, while perhaps sometimes regrettable, was often provoked by Jewish misbehavior. Further, elite individuals supported the nationalist cause, and the fact that so many students were on the Far Right – unlike the “West” today – is suggestive of a broad support for nationalism in Romanian society at that time. Also, we can consider the Legion's emphasis on youth. Now, I have been critical of the Alt Right and its "youth culture," but that's not the same thing as what the Legion did. The Legion appealed to youth on the Legion's terms, on the basis of high morals and the ideal of the New Man That was unlike the Alt Right associating itself with juvenile jackassery as its own manifestation of so-called "youth culture." The Legion appealed to the best aspects of Romanian youth, while the Alt Right catered to the lowest aspects of "youthful" behavior.

Even taking the author’s biases into account, it is clear that the ultranationalist students used “intimidation and violence” to influence events to their advantage. While the Sallis Groupuscule preaches peace and pacifism – I ooze with the milk of human kindness indeed! – we can ask whether any dissident movement can achieve its goals without a bit of “intimidation and violence.” Another interesting note is the intra-nationalist feuding and fighting going on in interwar Romania, particularly that between the Legionaries and the Cuzists, which makes one reflect on the bitter, but mostly non-violent and mostly memetic, feuding and fighting within the “movement” today.  At least back then, the nationalists were successful against the Left; today, it seems the only “victories” achieved are those against others on the Right. Interestingly as well, the author seems to have no problem with violence against Legionaries, such as gendarmes and other state actors attacking members of the Legion.

One can contrast the discipline and dedication of the Legionaries (even when they were being violent) with the defective freaks of Der Movement today. Codreanu exerted strict control over the behavior of the people in his movement, gave out punishments (some even arbitrary), and once, bizarrely, punished one prominent follower for no reason other than to “test” how that person “would react to an injustice that came from the head of the Legion.” Financial mismanagement and selfish enrichment, including stealing money, was harshly dealt with; this can be contrast to the grifters of the “movement” today.  In contrast to “the big tent” promoted by today’s Quota Queens (we must maximize “D’Nations” after all), Codreanu emphasized quality – he asserted, “As few Legionaries and as many friends as possible…for every twenty requests to join, nineteen will be rejected and one accepted. The best one.” Can you imagine the money-hungry grifters of today being so stringent with membership (cutting back on “membership dues”)?  Codreanu also made a distinction between the Legionaries who went through the persecutions of 1933 and others who joined later, when things were easier – the latter had to prove themselves with a long apprenticeship before being accepted as full-fledged Legionaries. Again compare to today’s “anything goes” attitude.

The “New Man” was the key to Legionary ideology; hence, the author quotes Codreanu: 

This country is dying because it lacks men, not because it lacks [political] programs. That is our belief Therefore, we do not need to build programs, but men, new men.”  

And thus, the Legionary movement was, according to Codreanu:

...more a school and an army than a political party…Everything that our minds can imagine that is nobler in soul, everything that can make our race prouder, higher, more righteous, stronger, wiser, purer, harder working, and more courageous – that is what the legionary school must produce!

One can contrast that not only to other fascist groups of that period but especially to the Far Right of today, which excuses the abysmal, degenerate “quality” of many of its members and supporters by invoking “big tent,” and which is led by “leaders” many of whom are freaks, perverts, incompetents, grifters, frauds, and those with terminally poor judgment. One can compare the Legionary work camp, where constructive practical work was done to help build character, to today’s displays of homosexual flirting and harassment at Alt Right meetings, or to folks going to inept Alt Right rallies dressed in cosplay costumes. To those who claim that work camps today would be subject to persecution and thus activists are at a disadvantage compared to the Legionaries, I reply that they should recall that the Legionaries were getting their heads bashed in regularly by gendarmes, and they were being routinely jailed. The circumstances are not the same as today that is true; for example, the Legionaries enjoyed a degree of popular support that the Far Right of today can only dream of, but, still, there was still enormous risk in all of their endeavors.

The author, of course has to tell us that the work camps mostly benefited the Legion itself rather than being purely charitable – as if that were a bad thing, and then breathlessly tells us how the Legion leveraged kinship networks to make the family “fascist.”  If true, then…so? Sounds good to me. Legionary forays into business, cooperatives, restaurants, etc. was all for the good – helping the Legionaries support themselves and setting up an alternative economy competing against Jewish-owned businesses, and offering fair prices. Sounds excellent. Further, working in such restaurants there were lawyers and other professionals, who were serving lower-class customers, helping to break down intra-ethnic class barriers.

With respect to core aspects of the Legionary worldview, the author evaluates claims that the Legion, like fascism in general, was a “revolt against modernity,” and concludes that the description of “reactionary modernism” fits best – thus, the Legion promoted “traditionalist” values and a more or less specifically Romanian culture and ethos while, at the same time, accepting and utilizing modern technology. In some case, a superficial traditional veneer was plastered over modern life; thus, bride and groom would come to the wedding dressed in peasant garb, riding in a horse drawn cart, while guests would arrive by train or automobile, and the festivities would be recorded by motion picture equipment. But then the author talks about an affinity of Codreanu for a “rural utopia” and then defines “modernism” thus – “a revolt against widespread apathy in the face of the death of God and an attempt to imagine a new world of creative possibilities,” said possibilities including “chaos, violence, mysticism, and nihilism.” So, the author is all over the place here. For another view of the relationship between the Legion and technics, see this.

The author then attempts to solve these conflicts by asserting that the Legion was always more concerned with practical matters than with ideas (like “modernism”) despite that idea of the New Man being a cornerstone of Legionary ideology. Perhaps the author got lost in his own contradictions and this hand-waving “solution” was the easiest way for him to cut the “Gordian knot” of the “modernism” question.

Interestingly, some wealthy Jews contributed to the Legion, ostensibly to protect their business interests.  Also, what to make of the Romanian government outlawing the wearing of shirts of varied colors (each color affiliated with a different political movement) as part of anti-uniform laws?  So many colors were outlawed it is difficult to discern what Romanians were actually wearing that time – the stupidities of “liberal democracy” on full display. The book also discusses the Legion’s foray into electoral politics – so-called “fascist authoritarian democracy” – something they were more adept at than the freakshow rejects of today’s American “scene.” Unfortunately, the author does not discuss the Legion’s participation in the 1934 Montreux conference.

The book retells the end of the Legion, which underscores how vulnerable dissident social-political movements – even very popular ones – are to determined state force. The execrable King Carol declared a royal dictatorship, banned political parties, and superficially instituted some window-dressing ultra nationalist policies.  Codreanu disbanded the Legion, but was still arrested for “treason” and murdered. When the Legion made a brief comeback as part of the National Legionary State under Antonescu, a falling out with that leader led to the Legion being completely crushed with state force. Remaining Legionaries in Romania were later persecuted and tortured by the communist regime.  One remembers how quickly Mussolini’s regime fell as well.  One should never attempt to share power with a King or a military dictator; a movement must take complete control, as did Nazism is Germany.

Essentially, the author is correct in situating fascism more as a way of living, a worldview, a conception of human-political reality, rather than a strict dogmatic ideology – hence, the “protean” nature of fascism we hear so much about from so-called “experts” like Griffin.

I remember an issue of Resistance magazine from the mid-late 1990s that had a picture of some American national socialists, with at least one of them wearing a t-shirt saying “I am born again” (or something like that) with a swastika…you get the overall picture, even if I’m off with some minor details. That is of course why – the Legionary movement being an exception to some extent – there is always some tension between fascism and traditional religion, since fascism itself is a form of secular religion. One becomes a fascist, one lives as a fascist, one believes and acts as a fascist, but there is no one single, specific overarching ideology beyond the minimalist core of “palingenetic ultra-nationalism.” 

Now, in the section on the Legionary Movement and religion, the author states that one reason that Orthodox (and in some cases, Catholic) priests were attracted to the Legionary Movement was precisely because it was not a secular religion, but instead was a political movement with religious views congenial to the priests. However, I see the Legion’s emphasis on religion as an epiphenomenon of its core palingenetic values; thus, I can admire the Legion while myself being an anti-religious atheist. One must distinguish between the fundamental worldview of an entity and how that worldview is manifested in particular cultural contexts.

The book quotes Mota as advocated a life of “truth, justice, and virtue,” and one is reminded of this description of what I call “Type II fascists" -

The others did not have boots, they held up their skinny reformers’ heads severely, they wore glasses, they collected cards, and they made furious speeches.

This all fits with the Legionary emphasis on the New Man, on ethical behavior as opposed to ideology, and to “deeds, not words.”  The lived experience of fascism contrasts to the navel-gazing, nitpicking political-ideological debates of Marxists and other leftists. The Legion constituted an “aristocracy of merit” that transcended class and contrasts to the “degeneracy of ineptness” of today’s “movement.”

Some final criticism of the book is in order here. The book could have used some more careful editing and proofreading. For example, Table 6.1 is a tabulation of the number of Legionary “nests” and their members in Romania over time from 1933-1937, but the table is titled “Ethnic groups in Romania in 1930,” which was actually the (correct) title of Table 1.1. Thus, Table 6.1 had the wrong title.

The overall tone of the book, which was not smooth reading, was a bit of a self-important leftist academic putting “fascists” under the microscope in a manner that is supposed to be objective, but that reflects underlying biases. I didn’t think it possible for a book about the Legionary Movement to be boring, but this author handily accomplished this seemingly impossible task.  Congratulations!