The Fundamentals

Fundamentals of a New Movement


The overarching, basic fundamentals of a New Movement are listed here. The link leads to the relevant post below. Also see "The Fundamentals" post list to the lower right. This is our new path. If you agree with this direction, then join with us.


The Old Movement is dead. Let us instead build something that works, a New Movement, a fresh start.



Thursday, July 15, 2021

Holy Legionary Youth

Book review.  The Legionary Movement.

See this.

I have long been a supporter of the Legionary Movement, and try to read good quality material on this topic, avoiding “hit pieces” animated by anti-Legionary bias. Thus, this book looked like an attractive offering. Alas, I was disappointed with respect to this book being a purely objective approach by the author. Unfortunately, it wasn't.

The author is obviously some sort of simpering leftist (see his bias here) who has a footnote in the beginning of the book agonizing over the use of words like “Romanians” and “Jews”- terms linked to “racist” sources.  How dare you identify people by ethnicity!  What a buffoon this idiot is. First, subjectively, Jews have no problem self-identifying as Jews, distinct from Romanians (and vice versa) – so how is it “racist” to recognize that these identity groups exist?  Second, objectively, genetic analysis allows us to distinguish ethnic Jews from ethnic Romanians – so how is recognizing these differences something wrong and “racist?”

The author considers fascism to be a “social category,” one becomes a fascist, and does so through everyday activities, by action, one lives a fascist lifestyle, rather than following a specific ideology. There is some truth to that, but the author and others he cites follows that line too far, the idea that fascism has no ideology would certainly come as a surprise to, say, Gentile or Rosenberg.  But, again, fascism is more of a secular religion, a lived experience, an existential form of politics, rather than an extremely formalized rigid theoretical ideology.  One can of course move forward from that, thus underscoring the difference between authentic fascism and para-fascism. Can anyone imagine Franco and members of his conservative reactionary authoritarian regime living a fascist life, following a secular religion?  The idea is ludicrous. Many of the reactionary regimes classified by political retardates as “fascist” were no more “fascist” than Ronald Reagan or Donald Trump.  Fascism – contra leftist lies – is a revolutionary movement, and considering it as a “social category” and a lived experience is useful for distinguishing it from para-fascist reaction.

Putting aside the author's implied nonsense of nationalism being some sort of construct used by “social actors” to achieve goals independent of objective nationhood, we can observe how Romanian nationalism evolved, with "the other” being Ottomans, Greeks, etc., before Romanian nationhood, and then focused on the Jewish problem (Jews as "the other") afterward. Interestingly, after widespread Jewish immigration (invasion) into Romania, Romanian texts of that time characterized Jews as “sly, deceitful, ugly, smelly, cowardly, and lazy.” I’ll leave it up as an exercise to the reader to reflect on how these “stereotypes” - particularly those about “sly, deceitful,” and ugly” - seem consistent over time and space with respect to how those peoples thought about the Jews living amongst them. There does seem to be an element of consistency there.  If a wide variety of peoples have the same opinion, is it perhaps the target of the opinion that needs to be looked at as the problem, rather than all of the other, varied aggrieved peoples?  After decades of Holocaust propaganda and associated guilt-tripping, as well as intense social pricing against “anti-Semitism,” anti-Jewish hostility still exists, testament to the characteristics of Jews that continuously trigger these reactions among the vast array of the Gentile peoples.

As an example of the mendacious leftist approach to these issues, let us consider how the author evaluates the outbreak of aggressive nationalism and “anti-Semitism” among Romanian university students in the early 1920s.  We are told that this activism was an “outlet for their frustrations;” thus, the Romanians were poorly educated and ill-prepared for the university, and were also subject to sub-standard living conditions; thus, they picked on the poor, innocent, persecuted Jews. As a specific example of mendacity by omission and implication, we can consider the Jewish cadaver controversy. The author relates the following.  Jewish religious belief opposes, or at least opposed, the use of Jewish bodies for medical dissection. The Romanian students accused Jewish students of removing Jewish bodies from the school to prevent their use, but at the same time the Jewish students were very willing to dissect “Christian” (i.e., Gentile – presumably mostly ethnic Romanian) bodies. Presumably, the Romanian students, in contrast, made no distinction, and would use all bodies.  I note that the author doesn’t comment on whether this anti-Jewish accusation was true (likely, it was), but instead omits any analysis of the actual facts and implies that the incident reflects hateful Romanian racist “anti-Semitism” and the “frustrations” of the students.

But, we shall consider the situation here.  If the author acknowledges that Jewish religious belief is so opposed to the use of Jewish bodies for dissection (while having no such opposition for Gentile bodies), then isn’t it possible – likely even – that Jewish students would refuse to dissect Jewish bodies?  Isn’t it possible that the Romanian students noticed Jewish bodies missing and “put two and two together” to realize that the Jewish students were removing the Jewish bodies to prevent their use?  Isn’t it possible, and likely, that at least some Jewish students were actually removing the Jewish bodies? And isn’t it true that those same Jews would have no problem dissecting Romanian cadavers?  Isn’t it possible that there was strong evidence supporting the accusation?  And isn’t it reasonable that such Jewish behavior would fuel anti-Jewish feeling among Romanians?  Or are we to believe that the accusation was made up over nothing, that Jewish students happily dissected Jewish cadavers in opposition to their religion, and that the whole thing was nothing more than “dumb Romanians venting their frustrations?”

What do you think?

Interestingly, the issue was resolved by the school saying that Christian students dissect Christian cadavers and Jewish students dissect Jewish ones (dissection separatism), and if the Jewish students didn’t like it, they could go study anatomy in a museum.  Sure sounds to me like the medical school certainly believed that there was a problem with Jewish students refusing to allow Jewish bodies to be dissected.

Then, the author dismisses Romanian complaints of Romanians being attacked by Jews, because those attacks “were not reported by non-fascist sources,” while all instances of Romanians attacking Jews are accepted at face value by the author.  Looking at how the American media of today selectively reports news, and ignores Black-on-White crime, selectively reports only rare instances of the opposite, and harps on about almost non-existent “White supremacist” violence while ignoring Antifa/BLM rioting, you can judge for yourself the probability that Jewish-leftist-establishment Romanian newspapers of the interwar period were accurately reporting instances of inter-group violence.

Broad segments of Romanian society at that time supported even the most radical of the students, including the so-called Vacarestini, led by Codreanu and Mota, who were accused of plotting assassinations in 1923. This later evolved into the broad support given to the Legionary Movement.  This is contrasted to the complete lack of support given to even the most moderate pro-White activists in America, and throughout the “West.” 

The continued acquittals of Romanian student nationalists – even when obviously guilty; thus, they were political acquittals – was another sign of broad support. Indeed, not only students benefited from this; in one case, a Romanian peasant was acquitted for killing a Jewish landowner with an ax based on the fact that the murder was viewed as a legitimate protest against the Jewish danger. Thus, we can assume that “over-the-top” Romanian ultranationalist behavior, while perhaps sometimes regrettable, was often provoked by Jewish misbehavior. Further, elite individuals supported the nationalist cause, and the fact that so many students were on the Far Right – unlike the “West” today – is suggestive of a broad support for nationalism in Romanian society at that time. Also, we can consider the Legion's emphasis on youth. Now, I have been critical of the Alt Right and its "youth culture," but that's not the same thing as what the Legion did. The Legion appealed to youth on the Legion's terms, on the basis of high morals and the ideal of the New Man That was unlike the Alt Right associating itself with juvenile jackassery as its own manifestation of so-called "youth culture." The Legion appealed to the best aspects of Romanian youth, while the Alt Right catered to the lowest aspects of "youthful" behavior.

Even taking the author’s biases into account, it is clear that the ultranationalist students used “intimidation and violence” to influence events to their advantage. While the Sallis Groupuscule preaches peace and pacifism – I ooze with the milk of human kindness indeed! – we can ask whether any dissident movement can achieve its goals without a bit of “intimidation and violence.” Another interesting note is the intra-nationalist feuding and fighting going on in interwar Romania, particularly that between the Legionaries and the Cuzists, which makes one reflect on the bitter, but mostly non-violent and mostly memetic, feuding and fighting within the “movement” today.  At least back then, the nationalists were successful against the Left; today, it seems the only “victories” achieved are those against others on the Right. Interestingly as well, the author seems to have no problem with violence against Legionaries, such as gendarmes and other state actors attacking members of the Legion.

One can contrast the discipline and dedication of the Legionaries (even when they were being violent) with the defective freaks of Der Movement today. Codreanu exerted strict control over the behavior of the people in his movement, gave out punishments (some even arbitrary), and once, bizarrely, punished one prominent follower for no reason other than to “test” how that person “would react to an injustice that came from the head of the Legion.” Financial mismanagement and selfish enrichment, including stealing money, was harshly dealt with; this can be contrast to the grifters of the “movement” today.  In contrast to “the big tent” promoted by today’s Quota Queens (we must maximize “D’Nations” after all), Codreanu emphasized quality – he asserted, “As few Legionaries and as many friends as possible…for every twenty requests to join, nineteen will be rejected and one accepted. The best one.” Can you imagine the money-hungry grifters of today being so stringent with membership (cutting back on “membership dues”)?  Codreanu also made a distinction between the Legionaries who went through the persecutions of 1933 and others who joined later, when things were easier – the latter had to prove themselves with a long apprenticeship before being accepted as full-fledged Legionaries. Again compare to today’s “anything goes” attitude.

The “New Man” was the key to Legionary ideology; hence, the author quotes Codreanu: 

This country is dying because it lacks men, not because it lacks [political] programs. That is our belief Therefore, we do not need to build programs, but men, new men.”  

And thus, the Legionary movement was, according to Codreanu:

...more a school and an army than a political party…Everything that our minds can imagine that is nobler in soul, everything that can make our race prouder, higher, more righteous, stronger, wiser, purer, harder working, and more courageous – that is what the legionary school must produce!

One can contrast that not only to other fascist groups of that period but especially to the Far Right of today, which excuses the abysmal, degenerate “quality” of many of its members and supporters by invoking “big tent,” and which is led by “leaders” many of whom are freaks, perverts, incompetents, grifters, frauds, and those with terminally poor judgment. One can compare the Legionary work camp, where constructive practical work was done to help build character, to today’s displays of homosexual flirting and harassment at Alt Right meetings, or to folks going to inept Alt Right rallies dressed in cosplay costumes. To those who claim that work camps today would be subject to persecution and thus activists are at a disadvantage compared to the Legionaries, I reply that they should recall that the Legionaries were getting their heads bashed in regularly by gendarmes, and they were being routinely jailed. The circumstances are not the same as today that is true; for example, the Legionaries enjoyed a degree of popular support that the Far Right of today can only dream of, but, still, there was still enormous risk in all of their endeavors.

The author, of course has to tell us that the work camps mostly benefited the Legion itself rather than being purely charitable – as if that were a bad thing, and then breathlessly tells us how the Legion leveraged kinship networks to make the family “fascist.”  If true, then…so? Sounds good to me. Legionary forays into business, cooperatives, restaurants, etc. was all for the good – helping the Legionaries support themselves and setting up an alternative economy competing against Jewish-owned businesses, and offering fair prices. Sounds excellent. Further, working in such restaurants there were lawyers and other professionals, who were serving lower-class customers, helping to break down intra-ethnic class barriers.

With respect to core aspects of the Legionary worldview, the author evaluates claims that the Legion, like fascism in general, was a “revolt against modernity,” and concludes that the description of “reactionary modernism” fits best – thus, the Legion promoted “traditionalist” values and a more or less specifically Romanian culture and ethos while, at the same time, accepting and utilizing modern technology. In some case, a superficial traditional veneer was plastered over modern life; thus, bride and groom would come to the wedding dressed in peasant garb, riding in a horse drawn cart, while guests would arrive by train or automobile, and the festivities would be recorded by motion picture equipment. But then the author talks about an affinity of Codreanu for a “rural utopia” and then defines “modernism” thus – “a revolt against widespread apathy in the face of the death of God and an attempt to imagine a new world of creative possibilities,” said possibilities including “chaos, violence, mysticism, and nihilism.” So, the author is all over the place here. For another view of the relationship between the Legion and technics, see this.

The author then attempts to solve these conflicts by asserting that the Legion was always more concerned with practical matters than with ideas (like “modernism”) despite that idea of the New Man being a cornerstone of Legionary ideology. Perhaps the author got lost in his own contradictions and this hand-waving “solution” was the easiest way for him to cut the “Gordian knot” of the “modernism” question.

Interestingly, some wealthy Jews contributed to the Legion, ostensibly to protect their business interests.  Also, what to make of the Romanian government outlawing the wearing of shirts of varied colors (each color affiliated with a different political movement) as part of anti-uniform laws?  So many colors were outlawed it is difficult to discern what Romanians were actually wearing that time – the stupidities of “liberal democracy” on full display. The book also discusses the Legion’s foray into electoral politics – so-called “fascist authoritarian democracy” – something they were more adept at than the freakshow rejects of today’s American “scene.” Unfortunately, the author does not discuss the Legion’s participation in the 1934 Montreux conference.

The book retells the end of the Legion, which underscores how vulnerable dissident social-political movements – even very popular ones – are to determined state force. The execrable King Carol declared a royal dictatorship, banned political parties, and superficially instituted some window-dressing ultra nationalist policies.  Codreanu disbanded the Legion, but was still arrested for “treason” and murdered. When the Legion made a brief comeback as part of the National Legionary State under Antonescu, a falling out with that leader led to the Legion being completely crushed with state force. Remaining Legionaries in Romania were later persecuted and tortured by the communist regime.  One remembers how quickly Mussolini’s regime fell as well.  One should never attempt to share power with a King or a military dictator; a movement must take complete control, as did Nazism is Germany.

Essentially, the author is correct in situating fascism more as a way of living, a worldview, a conception of human-political reality, rather than a strict dogmatic ideology – hence, the “protean” nature of fascism we hear so much about from so-called “experts” like Griffin.

I remember an issue of Resistance magazine from the mid-late 1990s that had a picture of some American national socialists, with at least one of them wearing a t-shirt saying “I am born again” (or something like that) with a swastika…you get the overall picture, even if I’m off with some minor details. That is of course why – the Legionary movement being an exception to some extent – there is always some tension between fascism and traditional religion, since fascism itself is a form of secular religion. One becomes a fascist, one lives as a fascist, one believes and acts as a fascist, but there is no one single, specific overarching ideology beyond the minimalist core of “palingenetic ultra-nationalism.” 

Now, in the section on the Legionary Movement and religion, the author states that one reason that Orthodox (and in some cases, Catholic) priests were attracted to the Legionary Movement was precisely because it was not a secular religion, but instead was a political movement with religious views congenial to the priests. However, I see the Legion’s emphasis on religion as an epiphenomenon of its core palingenetic values; thus, I can admire the Legion while myself being an anti-religious atheist. One must distinguish between the fundamental worldview of an entity and how that worldview is manifested in particular cultural contexts.

The book quotes Mota as advocated a life of “truth, justice, and virtue,” and one is reminded of this description of what I call “Type II fascists" -

The others did not have boots, they held up their skinny reformers’ heads severely, they wore glasses, they collected cards, and they made furious speeches.

This all fits with the Legionary emphasis on the New Man, on ethical behavior as opposed to ideology, and to “deeds, not words.”  The lived experience of fascism contrasts to the navel-gazing, nitpicking political-ideological debates of Marxists and other leftists. The Legion constituted an “aristocracy of merit” that transcended class and contrasts to the “degeneracy of ineptness” of today’s “movement.”

Some final criticism of the book is in order here. The book could have used some more careful editing and proofreading. For example, Table 6.1 is a tabulation of the number of Legionary “nests” and their members in Romania over time from 1933-1937, but the table is titled “Ethnic groups in Romania in 1930,” which was actually the (correct) title of Table 1.1. Thus, Table 6.1 had the wrong title.

The overall tone of the book, which was not smooth reading, was a bit of a self-important leftist academic putting “fascists” under the microscope in a manner that is supposed to be objective, but that reflects underlying biases. I didn’t think it possible for a book about the Legionary Movement to be boring, but this author handily accomplished this seemingly impossible task.  Congratulations!

Tuesday, June 22, 2021

Yockey in the 21st Century

Relevance of Yockey today.

What relevance does the work of Francis Parker Yockey have for the Far Right today, in the 21st century, after the drama of Trump, in the ruins of the Alt Right, after Brexit, and within the context of current-day nationalist activism?

Yockey’s work, including and especially Imperium, has genuine support from a small and very selective fraction of the Far Right, which includes some of its more thoughtful members. Unfortunately, Yockey’s work is also insincerely promoted by some who Yockey would have denounced as treasonous Culture Retarders – ethnonationalists, some of whom proudly self-described as “petty nationalists” and who oppose pan-Europeanism and Yockey’s Imperium idea. We have also seen a resurgence of another rightist paradigm that Yockey opposed – Nordicism (and other similar forms of divisive ethnic fetishism). Yet another extant rightist paradigm that Yockey would oppose, and that itself opposes Yockeyian pan-Europeanism, is the HBD cult, which worships IQ, divides Europeans against each other, and elevates Jews and East Asians as superior Herrenvolk. Indeed, all three branches of the anti-Yockeyian Right have formed an informal collaboration - the HBD-Nordicist-ethnonationalist alliance, which is particularly strong in the Anglosphere, even more particularly in America. So, while Yockey and his work has some cachet on the Right, in general, the current trends in Far Right "thought" are for the most part unalterably opposed to Yockey’s grand idea. In Europe itself, petty nationalist ethnonationalism dominates the Right; the only group related to Yockey’s ideal would be Norman Lowell’s Imperium Europa in Malta. The negative experience of the European Union (EU) has left a bitter taste in the mouth of many in the European Right, much of which is moving away from the idea of “Europe as a nation,” and some of the support these nationalist parties may get from abroad (Russia?) could have interests opposed to European unity.

Indeed, the EU has been a double-edged sword with respect to Yockey’s Imperium ideal.  On the positive side, it demonstrated an inherent European desire for cohesiveness, and it neatly refutes one of the (asinine) arguments of the petty nationalists – e.g.., “how can Europeans be together in the same state when you can’t even get Czechs and Slovaks to stay together in the same state,” or some (moronic) variation thereof. Well, Czechs and Slovaks are no longer in the same nation state, but they are both members of the EU, demonstrating that intra-European ethnic rivalries may be best managed as part of an overarching political structure. On the negative side – and it is a large negative – the way the EU has actually been implemented, as an anti-European, anti-White, and anti-Western globalist monstrosity, enabling genocidal race replacement migration and restricting free speech and the political ability of native Europeans to defend their own group interests, has, to many minds, delegitimized the very idea of a “European Union.” Even a pro-Imperium pan-Europeanist such as myself opposes the current EU and cheered Brexit.  But one must distinguish the fundamental idea of union from the distorted and flawed implementation of the idea. The fact that many on the European Right still support the idea of the EU, at least in principle, despite is horrific actualization, suggests, along with support for the EU across the rest of the political spectrum, broad support, among a large proportion of the European population, for the idea of at least some type of union. In this sense, at the most fundamental level, Yockey has been vindicated.

The future, in the short-term and medium-term, does not look bright for Yockeyism. Obviously, the Left, Center, and Mainstream Right reject a key element of his core message – a European Imperium for Europeans and European interests as opposed to a EU that privileges aliens - and to the extent that Europeans have legitimized part of Yockey’s ideal by embracing the EU, that project has been so mismanaged, has been so hijacked into the antithesis of an authentic Imperium, that it has delegitimized the "Europe as Nation" idea for large swathes of both the Right in general and the Far Right in particular.  In America, Yockeyism has always taken a back seat to Nordicist Nutzism, and even many who superficially promote Yockey’s work actually promote a petty nationalism that Yockey himself would denounce as culture retarding treason. The main currents of Nordicism, HBD, and ethnonationalism inherent in much of American activism is opposed to everything Yockey believed in, fought for, and died for. 

In addition, some individuals who are Yockeyists, or say they are, seem to focus more on the “spiritual” and esoteric aspects of Yockey the man and Yockey the ideologue, and seem uninterested in the hardcore pragmatic political ideals that formed the basis of the Imperium worldview.  Despite the fact that Yockey’s name is often mentioned on the Far Right, and in many ways mentioned positively (but not always positively, of course), the fact also remains that the Far Right for the most part rejects and unalterably opposes Yockeyian pan-Europeanism, and rejects and defames those who actually are pan-Europeanists in a real, genuine sense.

Long-term practical prospects are unknown and I will not speculate on those here. I neither want to be a delusional “victory is assured” fascist of the type Roger Griffin mocks, nor do I want to be equally dogmatic in asserting the inherent impossibility of achieving Yockey’s vision. We can merely be realistic and look ahead, forward to a reasonable time frame, and say that things do not look good at all.

That is all from a descriptive basis. What about prescription?  Here, I suppose I have nothing to say that will be much of a surprise to long time readers of my work. Obviously, I favor, in general, the Yockeyian pan-European perspective, although I of course disagree with Yockey on some fundamental details of epiphenomena associated with his work, the details of which, again, long time readers of my own material should be familiar with. The superiority of the broad Yockeyian perspective should be (but, alas is not for many activists) self-evident, compared to the “competition.”  HBD is transparent Jew-worship and Asian-worship, and is openly hostile to White nationalism and kinship-based racial politics. Nordicism is a factually incorrect, outdated, and needlessly divisive childish ideology, akin in many ways to Afrocentrism, and works against broader White interests. Ethnonationalism is to a large extent responsible for creating the existential race problems Whites face today; further, ethnonationalists typically reveal themselves to be ethnoimperialist hypocrites. Everything Yockey said about “vertical racists” and “culture retarders” fits the Nordicists and ethnonationalists; Yockey couldn’t imagine the stupidity of HBD, but I suppose if you stretch some of his comments against a self-destructively hyper-rationalistic materialist outlook (“it’s all IQ!"), then there would be grist for the mill there. Certainly, one could only imagine what Yockey would think about prioritizing Jewish and Asian interests over those of ethnic Europeans, or what he would think about White “Yellow Supremacists” or “The Arctic Alliance” or “Jeurasian” mongrelization.

We see more and more that the Clash of Civilizations endangers the West.  The threat of the Global South, Islam, China, the culture retarders and other traitors in our own ranks, all of this comes down to the hatred of those opposed to the High Culture of the West, and the treason of those within the West with a vested interest in its downfall, or, at least, a vested interest in perpetuating the intra-West fissures that have led to our sorry state. Against all of this the Yockeyian perspective stands like a colossus.  We also observe that basing White resistance solely on a pure materialist basis not only runs the risk of degenerating into HBD and Nordicism, but lacks the proper motivating passion, the idealism that has always underpinned the self-sacrificial fervor of the leftist enemy. Yockeyism and its objectives - even if possibly “irrational” from the purely empirical perspective - remedies that.  The fact that petty nationalist enemies of Yockey’s Imperium ideal find themselves trying to associate with Yockey, find themselves attracted to his work, even promoting and selling that work (that they actually oppose), attests to that work's power. The EU, for all its faults, points to an inner recognition of European organic solidarity, of White comity, and recent events creates more and more an idea of White solidarity and comity in the European Diaspora, as anti-White forces gather their strength.

Hence, Yockeyism is more relevant than ever, and has more to offer than ever. It is only because of the inherent defects of the “movement” – in America, Europe, and elsewhere – that the descriptive, on-the-ground prospects for Yockeyism is so poor, so disheartening, and why, regardless of what attractiveness “The Cult of Saint Francis” holds for some activists, they reject Yockey’s fundamental message.

The problem is not with Yockeyism; the problem is with the “movement,” broadly defined. Hence, the paradox - in the 21st century, Yockeyism is more relevant than ever, yet it is ignored and disregarded, at least with respect to its practical fundamentals, more than ever. That is a world historical crime for which the “movement” – and the Right more generally – can never be forgiven.


Wednesday, May 12, 2021

The Moral State

Considerations.

See here.

Salter rightfully criticizes the pure utilitarian ethic from the standpoint of justice.  He provides a theoretical example that I can paraphrase here. Imagine a murder committed in a town, and the local vagrant is suspected.  The police chief then discovers the vagrant is innocent and that the murder was committed by the mayor, who has been an upstanding citizen and a long-standing important member of the town community.  The crime was one of passion and will be unlikely to ever be repeated, while the vagrant is a constant troublemaker. Convicting the vagrant on the basis of partial or invented evidence would be best for the long-term well-being of the town, while arresting and convicting the mayor would cause social upheaval in the town, damage the town’s nascent tourist industry, and cause widespread economic dislocation and hardship for residents.  A purely utilitarian reading of the situation is to let the vagrant hang and let the mayor off Scott-free, but, as Salter notes, this offends our sense of justice (for most of us anyway).  That being so, the utilitarian ethic needs to be balanced by individual rights, and by certain normative values. Pure utility is not sufficient for a truly just ethic.

Thus, Salter suggests a “mixed ethic” where the pursuit of ethnic genetic interests (EGI) is constrained by ethics based on some sort of moral standards. We observe the requirement for moral standards, an ethical code, which should be independent of pure adaptive interests.

There are other potential problems here as well. A purely rational utilitarian state, for example, one dedicated to optimizing EGI as the highest priority and as the overarching imperative, is unlikely to inspire in the people the sort of dedication required to achieve societal objectives. Consider this.

Salterism has two weaknesses. First, a call to “preserve our distinctive genetic information” is unlikely to motivate most Western individuals to defend their genetic interests against the titanic forces arrayed against them. It almost certainly will not motivate the masses, who, as Michael O’Meara rightfully points out, are always induced to act by “myths” that encompass a cohesive worldview. Even rational activists can often become more motivated by these “myths” (which may of course constitute objective facts to a considerable degree) than to a pure empiricism. Thus, the “myth” of Yockeyan “High Culture” may be needed to motivate the defense of rational Salterian EGI.

Thus, some type of "irrational" spiritual, ethical, and moral code, in this case associated with "Yockeyism," can serve as the basis of a worldview that motivates and unifies the populace, and inspires adherence to conduct conducive to EGI.

A purely utilitarian focus on pure EGI can also run into other problems:

Second, genetic interests are based upon differences and distinctions, and all individuals (except identical twins, if we ignore certain subtleties) differ in their genetic information. Therefore, the potential exists for an unrestrained focus on genetic interests to itself degenerate into a maladaptive genetic atomization—with the natural organic solidarity of particular ethnies, and of the West as a whole, disintegrating under an ever more fine series of biological divisions.

There needs to be a moral structure to the state, independent of pure adaptive utilitarianism. Now, that moral structure can (and should) be used instrumentally to favor adaptive, EGI-focused ends. But the moral structure should exist not only for the purpose of promoting a racial state and for making the pursuit of EGI, of adaptive fitness, more palatable to the population – keeping in mind that humans are apparently evolved to benefit from some sort of religious/spiritual beliefs – but has benefits in its own right. Indeed, there needs to be a balance between a "pure ethic" of unrestrained pursuit of genetic interests, and morality that constrains the unrestrained pursuit of absolute EGI, a pursuit that can lead to “maladaptive genetic atomization.” Certainly, as alluded to in that The Occidental Quarterly piece, Yockeyism can be part of the equation; we should remember that a “rebirth of Faith” was cited by Yockey as an integral part of his predicted, and promoted, Imperium.

What can we say about this sense of morality?

Morality can be independent of religion, although, historically, in the Western civilization (and in Late Antiquity), The Moral State was associated with Christianity. Readers of this blog know that I am hostile to Christianity. However, there are certain elements in (Europeanized) Christianity that can be of benefit to society if – and only if – these ideals are limited to one’s own people, rather than to all of humanity (in other words, particularism vs. universalism), and are tempered by adaptive interests and pragmatic prudence. Brotherhood, if limited to ethny, can be positive, as can be charity, similarly limited, restraint of hatred of (personal) enemies and a degree of forgiveness, again limited to the ethny, etc. Aspects of these positive characteristics of Christianity can be incorporated into the moral ideas of a secular moral state.

This is in no way incompatible with an anti-Christian appeal to higher, Nietzschean values; there is nothing that says that such values have to be “immoral” or “amoral” based on the innate human moral sense, but we can, and should construct, our own morality, independent of the dogmas of the past, including that of Christianity, while incorporating whatever was good and just from those past dogmas.

What I suggest is that a proper state based on principles of the Sallis Groupuscule should have a foundation of EGI and adaptive fitness, with the edifice of Yockeyism built upon it, with these two poles of activity and of interest synergizing in the manner described in The Occidental Quarterly article linked to above. 

But there needs to be a moral underpinning for both poles; Salter describes moral, ethical, and philosophical justifications for EGI in Part III of On Genetic Interests, while Yockey, in contrast, considers his Imperium to derives organically from a Spenglerian view of history, as well as the destiny of Western Man. But Yockey does consider Faith as a key part of the authoritarian future of the West. He assumed this will be religious, I suppose in the Christian sense, but we can instead substitute a secular form of morality.  Intra-racial brotherhood, the Golden Rule, respect for oneself and for others (who deserve it), self-overcoming, discipline, hard work, futurist progress, a rejection of free-riding and a more disinterested willingness to invest in collective social goods, a healthy balance between helping oneself and an adaptively-informed “altruism,” avoiding socially destructive behaviors, the list can go on, but the point is that Christianity has no monopoly on “righteous behavior” (however defined). The moral standards that define European culture, both before and after the advent of Christianity, can assist in the development of the secular Moral State. Inherent moral and spiritual characteristics of European Man – see the works of Duchesne to observe how we differ from others – can serve as the basis of Good vs. Bad, independent of old religious dogma. There may very well be some overlap with that dogma, in the cases in which that dogma was formed by the same inherent impulses; in other cases, the morality will be quite different. But it will be suited for our people and their destiny, not something imposed by alien peoples and cultures.

The Moral State will be based on the moral standards of the populace, its leaders, and culture; conversely, The Moral State itself can help direct and guide the development of the moral standards of the people and their culture. Codreanu's Legionary Movement, and its emphasis on the "New Man," and a high moral and ethical culture, can also inform the development of the characteristics of The Moral State.

A non-Christian basis for The Moral State may also be informed by considerations such as described here. Indeed, The Moral State may become the seed of a new beginning, a new High Culture, on in which Faustian impulses are achieved, but with the constraints of an overarching morality that directs activity in the direction of principles consistent with beauty, knowledge, and higher goals.

And the type of individuals who should be prominent in the leadership of such a state is described here. The type of “leaders” found in today’s (American) “movement” – meritless affirmative action hacks, money-hungry grifters, gaslighting liars, inept incompetents with no sense of personal responsibility or accountability, shameless hustlers and mountebanks, sweaty obsessive fetishists, conspiracy theorists, drug addicts, sexual perverts, the chronically impaired with piss-poor judgment – these need to be eschewed. There is no place in The Moral State for failed “leaders” such as that. We deserve better. Our people, our race, and our civilization deserve better. We can and must do better.


Monday, March 29, 2021

Universal Nationalism: Blueprint for the Future

It is necessary.

Salterian Universal Nationalism is the way forward for humanity, despite opposition from both the Left, who want to submerge the White world under the rising tide of color, and elements of the Far Right, who have fantasies of race wars and actual White supremacy.

A world of racially segregated civilizational blocs, each being left alone to develop according to its own destiny, peacefully competing, with survival assured for all, will allow humanity  - or at least the civilized elements of humanity – to focus on other issues, like long-term human survival and advancement, space exploration, and advancing science and technics, including genetics and novel energy production.  Freed from the constraints of endless existential group conflict, human dynamism can be unleashed to ponder great thoughts and actualize great deeds.

Far better this future than an endless spiral of "wokeness,” with racial navel-gazing benefitting the least among humanity, while sacrificing the best. The least among humanity (and we need to be honest enough to recognize enormous differences in achievement and potential between groups) should stop complaining and realize that whatever “suffering” that they imagine they have endured in the past was necessary to birth the world of today and the potential world of tomorrow, just as a woman endures pain in childbirth to bring forth new life. And they should not worry about “justice” – the least, the lowest, among humanity, together with their allies among the higher peoples, have been inflicting endless suffering on the rest of us for many decades now, so they have had, and continue to have, full revenge for whatever injustices that they believe has been done to them. Non-Europeans have had justice galore, they have feasted on justice past the point of engorgement, past the point of any reasonable compensation, and their continued harassment of Europeans is now a manifest injustice. And they always fail to balance the books, and fail to recognize that the dynamism of Western man, that led to whatever episodes that fuel their never-ending grievances, is what has led to the highest standard of living for humanity in our species’ history, and it is the only thing that would allow for humanity's next step upward.

The past is prelude to the future. We have seen that peoples of European stock, and only they, have proven capable of the higher level of civilization, of science, and technics, required to advance humanity to its next level. Universal Nationalism offers a way out of our current morass, an approach that can end the wasteful misappropriation of human material and human resources in endless conflicts, and in fruitless quests to transform sow’s ears into silk purses, and will instead allow us to unlock the full potential of humanity, particularly that potential inherent in European Man.

And if the Colored peoples of the Earth truly believe that they are capable, and if they truly believe that they have been held back by “White racism,” then Universal Nationalism offers a way out for them as well. On the other hand, if they openly acknowledge, or secretly suspect, that they are truly dependent on the White Man, then for that reason they should accept Universal Nationalism, which would preserve the people upon whom they depend.  In either case, Universal Nationalism should be embraced by all peoples. 

We cannot let self-destructive racial envy and vindictiveness, bioleninist rages, and selfish inter-group free-riding, interfere with the attainment of the last and best hope of humanity – a stable world order in which every group is guaranteed the right to exist, given the opportunity to achieve its destiny, and, if it is capable of doing so, contribute to the forward march of human progress.


Sunday, March 14, 2021

Ethnic Rights

"Ethnic" as in "ethny." Individual to group.

Read this as a starting point.

I reject Rand’s Semitic flim-flam, and call her out as a member of a highly collectivist ethny preaching the “merits” of anti-group atomized individualism to a competing ethny already prone to individualism.

I maintain that, at minimum, the group as a whole must have all the rights of its constituent members, particularly if those members identify as members of the group in question (but remember that they still have genetic interests in their fellow ethnic group members even if they refuse to acknowledge group identity).

If individuals are said to have certain rights, then those rights do not disappear if the individuals are part of a group with a common ethnic identity and a common fate. If an individual has rights X,Y, and Z, then it stands to reason that a group of, say, one million like individuals also has rights X,Y, and Z. Here we are looking at the question as a minimal realization of the additive nature of interests; we shall look at emergent group interests at the end of this essay.

If an individual White has a right to live and prosper, then a nation of millions of such Whites, identifying as members of that ethny, also has the right to live and prosper. The philosophical underpinning of the Sallis Groupuscule includes the premise that rights are not limited to the individual but also apply to the ethny. Indeed, humanists would assert both individual rights as well as rights for humanity as a whole; I would suppose that most people (except radical environmentalists, anti-natalists, etc.) would not object to the premise that humanity has a right to exist as well as do individual humans. The “sticking point” is at the intermediate level, between that of individuals and humanity – the ethny.  Non-European ethnies typically are acknowledged to have ethnic rights, but these are specifically denied to European-derived ethnies, as if these are some sort of sub-human existence bereft of the same considerations given to all others.

Let us consider individual rights and how they can apply to Whites as a group.

The right to life

Thus, White genocide is wrong. Whites, as a group, have a right to exist and a right to fight to secure the means of their existence.

The right to liberty and freedom

Whites have a right to liberty and freedom; they are denied this by the System and its de jure and de facto laws and regulations and policies that deprive Whites of their basic human rights.

The right to the pursuit of happiness

The right to live your life free of discrimination

Whites are actively discriminated against both de jure (affirmative action, “hate speech” laws, selective prosecution, immigration policy) and de facto (“woke” culture, “woke” capital, racial double standards, etc.). This prevents the White “pursuit of happiness” – Whites are not allowed to have their own homelands or their own culture.

The right to control what happens to your own body and to make medical decisions for yourself

Whiteness itself – the White genotype and phenotype – is becoming de facto a crime. De jure eventually?

The right to freely exercise your religion and practice your religious beliefs without fear of being prosecuted for your beliefs

The right to be free from prejudice on the basis of race, gender, national origin, color, age or sex

Whites are discriminated against in every way.

The right to grow old

Elderly Whites are targeted for attack by younger Coloreds. Elderly Whites are denied vaccines, which are preferentially given to coloreds.

The right to a fair trial and due process of the law

Selective prosecution of Whites. The entire System is used de jure to politically persecute White activists. De facto persecution of Whites by extra-governmental actors who are protected by the government.

The right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment

The entire existence of Whites in “vibrant diversity” as part of the System is “cruel and unusual punishment.”

The right to be free from torture

See all above. Multiracialism and multiculturalism is torture. “Diversity training” and other forms of “woke” indoctrination are torture.

The right to be free from slavery

White taxpayers support Colored tax recipients – de facto slavery.

The right to freedom of speech

 Non-existent in Europe. Dying in America (de facto almost gone, de jure in jeopardy).

The right to freely associate with whomever you like and to join groups of which you'd like to be a part.

Freedom of association for Whites does not exist; in America, it has been eliminated by civil rights laws.

The right to freedom of thought

The right not to be prosecuted from your thoughts

In today’s “woke” dictatorship with its dogmatic enforced belief system, there is no freedom of thought for Whites.

We can therefore see that the list of individual rights, which should apply to Whites as a group, are being violated for Whites – as both individuals and as a group – making Whites into a persecuted stateless pariah people.

One can go further and assert that the group has rights specifically as a group that goes beyond rights derived from those of its constituent individuals. First, as a larger reservoir of individuals and of the genetic interests of those individuals, the survival and interests of the group must take precedence over any one individual, or small groups of individuals, within the group. Libertarians may object, but enforced military conscription throughout human history indicates an evolved preference for individual sacrifice – even if compelled – to service the interests of the greater number. Second, the group has emergent properties that go beyond a simple additive summation of the interests of each individual. A group can actualize a High Culture and has, or potentially can have, a civilizational destiny; individuals cannot be so described. Any grouping of atomized individuals does not constitute a High Culture, only the integrated group does so. A nation is, properly, an integrated group of an ethny, not a random constellation of individuals from any and all ethnies that happen to co-exist in the same territory. Thus, we can observe that a group has characteristics as a group that go beyond that of merely adding together sets of individual interests, each unrelated to the other.

So, to all the rights listed above are added to the group the right of interest prioritization over the individual as well as the right to actualize the group’s collective destiny.


Wednesday, October 14, 2020

Racial Existentialism

For authentic authenticity and against Heidegger.

In this post I begin – the very beginning - the process of outlining a philosophical basis for the worldview of the Sallis Groupuscule.  A side-effect, if you will, is criticism of Heidegger, who is favored by the traditionalist faction of the “movement.”

My major weakness here – that I am an empiricist STEM person lacking any formal training in philosophy – may actually be a strength: What is needed is direct, simple, plain-talk, not hundreds of pages of abstract theorizing.  The ultimate aim of philosophy is, or should be, to place man within the scope of the universe, to advise on how to live a good and proper life, how to situate man within the scope of his existence…not to demonstrate one’s “intellectual bonafides” by taking a whole chapter to express an idea that could have been more efficiently expressed in a single sentence (here’s looking at you, Heidegger).

I’d like to point out as well that those who automatically privilege the views of Heidegger over that of Sallis are essentially arguing by “appeal to authority” – what about Der Right’s complaints about “credentialism?”  Interesting that “credentialism” is always brought up with respect to STEM, which at least has some objective basis, and not for philosophy, which is mostly subjective.  Hypocritical much?

The key point is this analysis, ultimately, is authenticity. What is it? Who decides what it is?  For individuals?  For groups?  As regards the latter, is it proper to ascribe authenticity to entire populations?

Authenticity cannot be dictated from the “other;” that by definition invalidates claims of authenticity. Authenticity can only come from self, with that “self” being the individual or the group.

How does a person or group know that they are behaving in a manner truly authentic?  Can there be any objective confirmation of that?

Let’s consider some writings by myself and others on this topic, before briefly summarizing at the end.

See this.

…it was clear that Heidegger initially thought that National Socialism was an alternative to modern technological nihilism, but eventually he came to see it as just another expression of the same underlying worldview. For Heidegger, nihilism is basically having a false vision of man as being uprooted from nature and history and capable of controlling and consuming them.

Why is that a false vision?  Who decides?

The only way to avoid this trap is to move the battle from the political to the metapolitical plane. We need a fundamental transformation of our view of ourselves and our relationship to history and nature. But it is not as simple is manufacturing and promulgating a correct alternative worldview, for such a project itself is a form of technological nihilism. It assumes that the human mind and its machinations can stand behind culture and history and manufacture them according to its designs. Whereas the truth is that history and culture stand behind us. We are shaped by cultural and historical forces we can neither understand nor control.

Not very Faustian, is it?  

But once we recognize this fact, i.e., that we are finite beings, rooted in a particular time and place, rather than rootless cosmopolitan citizens of nowhere, the spell of nihilism is broken, which clears a space in which a new dispensation — a new fundamental worldview — can emerge.

If only we can clear a space so a New Movement can emerge, eh?

Thus Heideggerian metapolitics is not the construction of systems of ideas, ideologies, or -isms. Any worldview we can construct is simply an expression of nihilism, not an alternative to it. But that does not mean that we are impotent. We might not be able to manufacture an alternative, but we can still help one to emerge, first and foremost by owning up to our finitude and rootedness, then by clearing away the detritus of nihilism to create a space in which an alternative might grow.

One can create political policies. One can create legal codes. One can build the damned wall. But it is not in our power to manufacture a new culture.

Because Johnson says so!  QED!

But neither can we manufacture a simple tomato. 

Give genetic engineering a chance.

We can, however, work with forces we ultimately do not understand or control — nature itself — to grow tomatoes. 

Certainly, traditionalists hiding in their hobbit holes (*) cannot understand or control nature.

We can clear a space, plant a seed, weed, water, and fertilize — and then wait. We can do the same in the metapolitical realm: clear spaces by deconstructing false ideas, plant identitarian and ethnonationalist seeds, and tend what grows.

Translation: do nothing and rattle the tin cup for “D’Nations.”

That’s what we do here at Counter-Currents. We help people envision new answers to the questions “Who are we?” “What is the right way to live together?” and “How can we get there from here?”

No, actually they beg for money and engage in ethnoimperialist hypocrisy.

Heidegger did not believe that philosophers or poets are the hidden legislators of mankind, whose machinations create history. 

That’s good, since Heidegger was an idiot and shouldn’t be the “legislator” of anything.

But that doesn’t mean we have to shut up and let history do the talking, or sit back and let history do the work. Rather, Heidegger believed that history speaks and acts through us. Philosophers and poets are the first people to become aware of fundamental changes in the Zeitgeist. 

Alternatively, they create those fundamental changes and then slyly assert that they became “aware” of some underlying self-actualizing process.

Thus dissident thinkers and artists proceed historical change not as its creators but as its prophets, awakening and leading people to changes that are already underway. The very fact that we can conceive of fundamentally different ideas may mean that a new dispensation is nearing.

To be fair, Yockey had a similar idea – that there is a “spirit of the age” that manifests as a natural evolution of the lifecycle of the High Culture – so I cannot be too harsh here. However, this seems hand-waving or passing the buck; there is no explanation of why a “new dispensation” occurs, except there is the a prior assumption that “historical change” and “a new dispensation” cannot be in any real way influenced by people ,and certainly not created. I do not like a priori assumptions nor just shrugging off the question of the actual mechanism of historical change.

Let’s see what I wrote before about the possibilities of guiding historical change.

Although the Jewish author Isaac Asimov may not be popular among many white gentile racial nationalists, his Foundation series can provide a useful analogy here. “The Foundation” was meant to jumpstart a new civilization after the collapse of the “Galactic Empire,” so that the post-collapse “era of barbarism” would be a mere thousand years, instead of 30,000. Facing as we do the collapse of the West through the Winter of the Faustian age, it may be prudent to lay the seeds of a new emergent white, Western civilization for the long term, as we also fight the more short-term and medium-term battles to preserve the white race and save as much of Western Faustian civilization as possible. Without these shorter range objectives, the long term civilizational (re)birth will not be possible. Conversely, without a civilizational (re)birth, long-term white preservationism would be questionable.

So, there are two things that need to be going on here. First is the ongoing struggle for white racial preservationism and to save as much of the Faustian culture as possible, to serve as a knowledge base and building blocks for the new High Culture of the West. Second, an effort must be initiated to begin the process of laying the groundwork for this new High Culture. As indicated above, of course a High Culture is an organic phenomenon that cannot be created in a pre-planned form and artificially imposed on a people. However, it is possible to plant the seeds and to have some choice as to which seeds are planted. And then, we can nurture the seedling as it grows, and as it develops according to its own inherent character. This we can do and this we must do.

This is a serious matter requiring forward-thinking strategy of an extreme visionary character, not something that can be productively “discussed” on “blog threads” or other (typically inane) public forums. It is not something that can occur overnight. This is a long-term, multi-generational project that needs to be undertaken by dedicated individuals who wish to lay the foundation of something great and noble for posterity. This will not be not any “quick fix” whose results may be seen in a decade or two; instead, this is a project that has the potential to influence the course of human history and it must be conducted on that higher level.

Therefore, this essay is simply a call for action and an initial and cursory consideration of the possibilities. If such a project is ever initiated, it should not, and must not, devolve into the mundane “movement” minutiae that many obsess over, nor can it be linked to the more serious, yet short-term, necessary “stop-gap” activism required to save our people and culture today. This is another matter, on another level, entirely.

Many are called; few are chosen. The Future Awaits.

So, I’m not stating that historical change can be fully and directly influenced, the way one would drive a car, nor am I saying that a “new dispensation” can be created out of nothing, but I am saying that there is a role for higher men to guide and influence the process so as to significantly affect the final outcome.

See this, with an emphasis on Heidegger and technology.

Heidegger's flagship example of technology is a hydroelectric plant built on the Rhine river that converts that river into a mere supplier of water power. Set against this “monstrousness” (Question Concerning Technology 321) is the poetic habitation of the natural environment of the Rhine as signalled by an old wooden bridge that spanned the river for hundreds of years, plus the river as revealed by Hölderlin's poem “The Rhine”. 

Here we contrast the Futurist view as promoted by the Sallis Groupuscule vs. the “traditionalist” view championed by the likes of Counter-Currents (itself promoting Heidegger’s views).  Objectively speaking, why isn’t an “old wooden bridge” not a “monstrous” ruination of the “poetic habitation of the natural environment?” Who decides that the wooden bridge is below the threshold of “monstrousness” but the hydroelectric plant is above? Just because Heidegger is comfortable with the former and not the latter?

In these cases of poetic habitation, natural phenomena are revealed to us as objects of respect and wonder. 

Twigs and branches!

One might think that Heidegger is over-reacting here, and that despite the presence of the hydroelectric plant, the Rhine in many ways remains a glorious example of natural beauty. 

Uh, yes.

Heidegger's response to this complaint is to focus on how the technological mode of Being corrupts the very notion of unspoilt areas of nature, by reducing such areas to resources ripe for exploitation by the tourist industry. 

So, if Heidegger visits the Rhine as a tourist to visit that “old wooden bridge” then that is corrupting?

Turning our attention to inter-human affairs, the technological mode of Being manifests itself when, for example, a friendly chat in the bar is turned into networking (Dreyfus 1993). And, in the light of Heidegger's analysis, one might smile wryly at the trend for companies to take what used to be called ‘personnel’ departments, and to rename them ‘human resources’. Many other examples could be given, but the general point is clear. The primary phenomenon to be understood is not technology as a collection of instruments, but rather technology as a clearing that establishes a deeply instrumental and, as Heidegger sees it, grotesque understanding of the world in general. 

Technology is one thing, how people use it, and let it affect society, is another.  At one point in time, even “wooden bridges” were disruptive to the established order.

Of course, if technological revealing were a largely restricted phenomenon, characteristic of isolated individuals or groups, then Heidegger's analysis of it would be of limited interest. The sting in the tale, however, is that, according to Heidegger, technological revealing is not a peripheral aspect of Being. Rather, it defines our modern way of living, at least in the West.

At this point one might pause to wonder whether technology really is the structure on which we should be concentrating. The counter-suggestion would be that technological thinking is merely the practical application of modern mathematical science, and that the latter is therefore the primary phenomenon. Heidegger rejects this view, arguing in contrast that the establishment of the technological mode of revealing is a necessary condition for there to be mathematical science at all, since such science “demands that nature be orderable as standing-reserve” by requiring that “nature report itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remain orderable as a system of information” (Question Concerning Technology 328). 

What stupidity.  The Ancient Greeks were doing mathematics in the absence of any high scale technics (Archimedes aside).

Either way, one might object to the view of science at work here, by pointing to analyses which suggest that while science may reduce objects to instrumental means rather than ends, it need not behave in this way. 

No kidding.

Moreover, if science may sometimes operate with a sense of awe and wonder in the face of beings, it may point the way beyond the technological clearing, an effect that, as we shall see later, Heidegger thinks is achieved principally by some great art.

Great art, historically in the Western civilization, has meant cities and city life, and the most highly developed technics for that particular time and place.

By revealing beings as no more than the measurable and the manipulable, technology ultimately reduces beings to not-beings (Contributions 2: 6). This is our first proper glimpse of the oblivion of Being, the phenomenon that, in the Contributions, Heidegger also calls the abandonment of Being, or the abandonment of beings by Being (e.g., 55: 80). 

Nonsense.  This is purely subjective.

Secondly, recall the loss of dwelling identified by Heidegger. Modern humankind (at least in the West) is in the (enframed) grip of technological thinking. Because of this promotion of instrumentality as the fundamental way of Being of entities, we have lost sight of how to inhabit the fourfold poetically…

To be or not to be, that is the Dasein.  What convoluted nonsense.

Heidegger was no eco-warrior and no luddite. 

You could have fooled me.

Although he often promoted a romantic image of a pre-technological age inhabited by worthy peasants in touch with nature…

To the hobbit hole!  De facto anarchy in the provinces!  Hail Tolkien!

We need to transform our mode of Being into one in which technology (in the sense of the machines and devices of the modern age) is there for us to enjoy and use, but in which technology (in the sense of a mode of Being-in-the-world) is not our only or fundamental way of encountering entities. And what is the basic character of this reinhabiting? It is to shelter the truth of Being in beings (e.g., Contributions 246: 273), to safeguard the fourfold in its essential unfolding. In what, then, does this safeguarding consist?

One wonders how long technology will continue once we start dabbling in mysticism. All these types believe – tacitly – that technology falls from the sky with no underlying underlying epistemological structure – or else they demonize that structure and believe that we can “enjoy and use” technology without putting the effort in required to produce it.

See this, with an emphasis on Heidegger and authenticity.

The term ‘authentic’ is used either in the strong sense of being “of undisputed origin or authorship”, or in a weaker sense of being “faithful to an original” or a “reliable, accurate representation”. To say that something is authentic is to say that it is what it professes to be, or what it is reputed to be, in origin or authorship. But the distinction between authentic and derivative is more complicated when discussing authenticity as a characteristic attributed to human beings. For in this case, the question arises: What is it to be oneself, at one with oneself, or truly representing one’s self? 

Good question.  It is difficult to ascertain how anyone other than the person in question can answer that; on the other hand, obviously, if we believe that many or most people are living “inauthentic” lives (by whose standards?), then perhaps most people lack the self-awareness and intelligence required to figure out what authenticity means for them? This is a paradox, partially resolved perhaps by helping guide people – or at least those with sufficient brainpower and motivation – to an answer that seems to “fit” (defined how?), but never really knowing what the correct answer is.

The multiplicity of puzzles that arise in conjunction with the conception of authenticity connects with metaphysical, epistemological, and moral issues (for recent discussion, see Newman and Smith 2016; Heldke and Thomsen 2014). On the one hand, being oneself is inescapable, since whenever one makes a choice or acts, it is oneself who is doing these things. But on the other hand, we are sometimes inclined to say that some of the thoughts, decisions and actions that we undertake are not really one’s own and are therefore not genuinely expressive of who one is. Here, the issue is no longer of metaphysical nature, but rather about moral-psychology, identity and responsibility.

But therein lies part of the paradox. Who decides if the “decisions and actions that we undertake are not really one’s own and are therefore not genuinely expressive of who one is?” If the person themselves does so then fine – but how do we know that they are judging correctly and not engaging in self-deception – but if another person interjects themselves into the process then isn’t that part of the paradigm of “decisions and actions” being imposed from the outside of self?

When used in this latter sense, the characterization describes a person who acts in accordance with desires, motives, ideals or beliefs that are not only hers (as opposed to someone else’s), but that also express who she really is. Bernard Williams captures this when he specifies authenticity as “the idea that some things are in some sense really you, or express what you are, and others aren’t” (quoted in Guignon 2004: viii).

Who decides?  

Besides being a topic in philosophical debates, authenticity is also a pervasive ideal that impacts social and political thinking. In fact, one distinctive feature of recent Western intellectual developments has been a shift to what is called the “age of authenticity” (Taylor 2007; Ferrarra 1998). Therefore, understanding the concept also involves investigating its historical and philosophical sources and on the way it impacts the socio-political outlook of contemporary societies.

When modern politics intrudes, you can rest assured that “authenticity” for Whites equates to self-destruction and race-treason. No thanks.

The most familiar conception of “authenticity” comes to us mainly from Heidegger’s Being and Time of 1927. The word we translate as ‘authenticity’ is actually a neologism invented by Heidegger, the word Eigentlichkeit, which comes from an ordinary term, eigentlich, meaning ‘really’ or ‘truly’, but is built on the stem eigen, meaning ‘own’ or ‘proper’. So the word might be more literally translated as ‘ownedness’, or ‘being owned’, or even ‘being one’s own’, implying the idea of owning up to and owning what one is and does (for a stimulating recent interpretation, see McManus 2019). Nevertheless, the word ‘authenticity’ has become closely associated with Heidegger as a result of early translations of Being and Time into English, and was adopted by Sartre and Beauvoir as well as by existentialist therapists and cultural theorists who followed them.[1]

So Heidegger will guide us?  Why him?  Why this intrusion into self?

Heidegger’s conception of ownedness as the most fully realized human form of life emerges from his view of what it is to be a human being. This conception of human Dasein echoes Kierkegaard’s description of a “self”. On Heidegger’s account, Dasein is not a type of object among others in the totality of what is on hand in the universe. Instead, human being is a “relation of being”, a relation that obtains between what one is at any moment (the immediacy of the concrete present as it has evolved) and what one can and will be as the temporally extended unfolding or happening of life into an open realm of possibilities. To say that human being is a relation is to say that, in living out our lives, we always care about who and what we are. Heidegger expresses this by saying that, for each of us, our being (what our lives will amount to overall) is always at issue. This “being at stake” or “being in question for oneself” is made concrete in the specific stands we take—that is, in the roles we enact—over the course of our lives. It is because our being (our identity) is in question for us that we are always taking a stand on who we are. Since the German word for ‘understanding’, Verstehen, is etymologically derived from the idea of ‘taking a stand’, Heidegger can call the projection into the future by which we shape our identity ‘understanding’. And because any stand one takes is inescapably “being-in-the-world”, understanding carries with it some degree of competence in coping with the world around us. An understanding of being in general is therefore built into human agency.

Babbling nonsense with no real-world applicability.

To the extent that all our actions contribute to realizing an overarching project or set of projects, our active lives can be seen as embodying a life-project of some sort. 

See this about true freedom embodied in personal overcoming and in being part of a community with organic solidarity (which does not merely have to mean an interdependence of services, but a complete interdependence, emphasizing ethnic and cultural ties, common interests, and social cohesion).

On Heidegger’s view, we exist for the sake of ourselves: enacting roles and expressing character traits contribute to realizing some image of what it is to be human in our own cases. Existence has a directedness or purposiveness that imparts a degree of connection to our life stories. For the most part, having such a life-plan requires very little conscious formulation of goals or deliberation about means. It results from our competence in being members of a historical culture that we have mastered to a great extent in growing up into a shared world. This tacit “pre-understanding” makes possible our familiar dwelling with things and others in the familiar, everyday world.

To some extent this view is Yockeyian; the rootedness of a person as part of a High Culture or as part of barbarians against the Culture, or as part of a fellah people.  That is fine as far as it goes, but this limits the scope of action of Faustian Man. What would Nietzsche say? Heidegger the camel – what about lion and child?

It should be obvious that this conception of authenticity has very little to do with the older idea of being true to one’s own pregiven feelings and desires. But there is still a clear respect in which the idea of “being true to oneself” has a role to play here. What distinguishes this conception from the conceptions of pop psychology and romantic views of authenticity is the fact that the “true self” to which we are to be true is not some pre-given set of substantive feelings, opinions and desires to be consulted through inward-turning or introspection. On the contrary, the “true self” alluded to here is an on-going narrative construction: the composition of one’s own autobiography through one’s concrete ways of acting over the course of a life as a whole. 

Acta non verba.

Others argue that Heidegger uses authenticity in both evaluative-normative and purely descriptive senses. In the descriptive use of the term, inauthenticity is simply the default condition of everyday life, in which our self-relations are mediated by others. In this sense, authenticity involves no judgment about which mode of being is superior for Dasein. 

Can these “others” include Heidegger himself? One gets the inescapable feeling that what these pontificating philosophers really want is the precise opposite of authenticity – they want to dictate to people what “their” “true authentic selves” really are. If you believe that you are being authentic by doing X, Y, Z but The Grand Philosopher believes that your true authenticity is doing A, B, C. then, certainly, you are “lying to yourself” about X, Y, Z and the only way to undo this self-deception and engage your authentic self is to do A, B, C. The utter mendacity of this, and the dangerousness of this for manipulation, should set off alarm bells.

See this.

In an endnote, Polt explains who these “neofascist” intellectuals are: “Heidegger is a popular figure on counter-currents.com, home of Counter-Currents Publishing, purveyor of books by racists and neofascists. In Russia, political theorist Alexander Dugin has enlisted Heidegger in his project of a ‘Eurasianism’ that is profoundly antiliberal, although he denies that it is fascist” (p. 250, n15). Although Polt does not mention me by name, I am the primary person at Counter-Currents writing about Heidegger and political philosophy. Naturally, I am flattered that one of the express purposes of Polt’s book is to intellectually combat people like me.

After all, it’s all about ego for your “leaders.”

Heidegger’s political thought basically went through two phases. Early on, Heidegger was what one might call a humanistic historicist. He was historicist because he believed that our thought is rooted in concrete historical traditions and ways of life. He was a humanist because, following Nietzsche, he believed that great philosophers, poets, and statesmen create these traditions and ways of life. 

What a self-serving hypocrite. On the one hand, we are rooted in a particular historical culture. But, you see, people like Heidegger can help “create these traditions and ways of life.”  On the other hand, we must have authenticity, with the implication that simply following others is not consistent with living a fully authentic life. I suppose that the exception to the latter are our demigods (didn’t Nietzsche say that the philosopher was both god and beast?) like Heidegger, whose pontifications create the culture we find ourselves boxed into, and, thus, following those pontifications, in the context of that cultural creation, is properly “authentic.”

His hope was that National Socialism would bring about a new inception, legislating a new culture and way of life.

This viewpoint is, however, implicitly totalitarian and nihilistic. Creating a new culture means setting up new standards of truth and goodness. Which means that such decisions are unconstrained by prior standards of truth and goodness. This implies that the legislator can do anything he wishes and call it true or good.

And those prior standards of truth and goodness are created by who? Legislators like Heidegger?  Which standards should we be constrained by?  Christian ethics?  Isn’t that part of our historical cultural tradition?  I object. 

Later, as Heidegger became disillusioned with Nietzsche and National Socialism, he came to see humanistic historicism as another form of nihilism and unbounded technological machination. 

Jump back into your hobbit hole!  Enjoy the spectacle of the old wooden bridge.

Heidegger’s mature philosophy is resolutely anti-humanist. Human subjectivity is not “behind” history, not even the subjectivity of great men. Rather, history is “behind” human subjectivity. Which means that human beings cannot take control of our own destinies and change the course of history. 

Because he says so. But, hey, while we are all passive, “great men” like Heidegger will be creating our cultural norms for us, have no fear!

That is the error of all forms of modern technological nihilism, including National Socialism. Instead, we can only wait as modern nihilism burns itself out and a new inception emerges.

Ride the tiger in the Kali Yuga!  Traditionalist nonsense and passive defeatism.

Heidegger sums up the course of his thinking in a 1939 entry in his Black Notebooks:

In his Black Notebooks from the Third Reich and other contemporary posthumously published works like Mindfulness (Besinnung) and The History of Beyng, Heidegger systematically dismantles such National Socialist ideas as the people (Volk), nationalism, dictatorship, leadership, struggle (Kampf), cultural politics, Lebensraum, eugenics, and anti-intellectualism, connecting them all to nihilism, machination, brutality, and criminality. Thus, as Polt concludes, “It seems safe to say that by the late thirties, [Heidegger] was no Nazi anymore” (p. 153).

Heidegger was obviously a cuck. Whatever criticism is justified of National Socialism, it is an ideology that had to function in the real, modern world, not a philosophical dream of peasants and old wooden bridges.

Surprisingly, though, even though Heidegger came to see National Socialism as an expression of nihilism rather than as an alternative to it, he still believed there were grounds to affirm it: “On the basis of the full insight into the earlier deception about the essence and historical essential force of National Socialism, there results the necessity of its affirmation, and indeed on thoughtful grounds” (p. 135).

Heidegger’s rationale for this affirmation is a form of accelerationism. The clash of National Socialism vs. communism and liberal democracy may just be a family quarrel between different forms of technological nihilism, but the greater the conflict, the more likely the downfall of all forms of modernity, which would clear the ground for the emergence of a new inception. 

“New inception” – Luddite reactionary backwardness. In your hobbit hole, while the Chinamen rocket off to the stars.

If so, this is a clear example of Heidegger using techniques of “esoteric” communication, since his private conception of “inner truth and greatness” is sharply different from what his audience would have taken him to mean.

Evola!  Guenon!  Savitri Devi! The Men Who Can’t Tell Time in The Age of Aluminum.  Nonsense.

But neither are we in total thrall to these traditions, for they are ultimately practices for understanding and coping with what is new. The moment of application gives ample space for creativity. Moreover, it is both natural and noble to want to improve one’s heritage before passing it on to the next generation. 

Doesn’t that possibly include the need for technology and a scientific mindset?

If you want to halt globalization, the most natural boundary for doing so is the nation-state. If you think place, history, and roots matter, then the best kind of state is the ethnostate. 

Can John Morgan leave Magyar Hungarians alone to enjoy an ethnostate?

Polt discusses three ways in which Heidegger’s political thought can be said to be irrationalist.

Oh indeed.

Polt recognizes that if Heidegger is right about human existence, all politics is inescapably identity politics. But identity politics is a complicated thing. Heidegger regards the identity of a people as a complex mix of race, language, culture, and history. Beyond that, he holds that the identity of a people is never finished and fixed but is instead an ongoing form of life that we should pass on to future generations better than we found it. Moreover, part of who we are is our future, which is in part a set of possibilities.

Hmmm…you mean we can leave our hobbit holes and help influence the future?

When diverse peoples stop talking about their identities and actually try to live together in the same system, there are tensions that can lead to violent conflict. 

Like John Morgan in Hungary?

The worst-case scenario is genocide, which Polt describes as the attempt to “settle the ‘who’ question in the worst possible way: by murdering those who ‘we’ are not?” (p. 170). To avoid genocide, warring tribes need to separate, preferably into their own sovereign states. This is why the New Right advocates ethnonationalism. It is the best way to avoid needless hatred and violence between peoples and ensure their ability to live by their own lights without outside interference.

Hungarians living without John Morgan’s interference.

Polt also takes Heidegger to task for his lack of appreciation for negative freedom, including freedom of association and speech (pp. 181, 193). Heidegger, however, did not reject negative freedom unthinkingly. Instead, his views were very much in the German idealist tradition of positive freedom. He emphasized that freedom is only real if concretized in finite institutions….It is misguided to think one understands freedom most purely in its essence if one isolates it as a free-floating arbitrariness. . . . The task is precisely the reverse, to conceive freedom in its finitude and to see that, by providing boundedness, one has neither impaired freedom nor curtailed its essence.[2]

Please see my take on true freedom.  You can compare that to Heidegger.  If “finitude” means exercising freedom and authenticity while being rooted in a genuine racial-cultural folk community, then I approve, as the True Freedom piece makes clear. If it instead means hiding in a hobbit hole (*), then I vehemently disagree.

*All these references to “hobbit holes,” mocking Greg Johnson’s traditionalist Tolkien fetish, is meant to describe a traditionalist, reactionary,” twigs and branches,” anti-scientific and anti-technics – and anti-Futurist most of all – mindset, in which we are all to “go back to the forest” and turn our backs on the stars.

The debate about the costs of technology and the technological mindset to the human soul reminds me of the tale of the machines in Gene Wolfe’s The Book of the New Sun. To paraphrase and summarize – humanity reached the stars by giving away the wild part of themselves – essentially becoming emotionless technocrats – and then the thinking machines (AI), who hated their human creators, decided to ruin those human creators by re-introducing to humanity paradigms that would rekindle humanity’s interest in those “wild things.” Thus, humanity became distracted away from pure science and technics and the galactic empire collapsed.  The lesson here is that – besides not trusting AI – humanity should not give up its “wild” side, its human soul, for the sake of technology; instead, humans need to achieve their objectives – “reach the stars” – while remaining fundamentally human. Thus, in relation of Heidegger’s whining, we need not become entrapped into a technological spiritual mindset – pure instrumentality (**) – in order to “be scientific.”  On the other hand, we cannot evade the price that must be paid for science and technology – while science is a tool, it is an expensive tool, and what has to invest in a degree of rationality and empiricism to achieve science and technics. One must strike a balance – the mind must be scientific while the soul remains human.  But we cannot hide in the hobbit hole, while others reach the stars. The White Man cannot give up his Faustian birthright because of fearful, backwards-looking traditionalists.

**Amusingly, see this.

After attaining power and the expansion of humans in space, they eventually entered a somewhat stagnant phase…This somewhat empty and sterile system was reformed and enlivened by the "Rediscovery of Man"…

Of relevance, see this post about Salterian ethics. This is relevant with respect to the role of authenticity and the idea that True Freedom can, and should, mean the rights people to defend and promote their genetic interests, up to and including at the level of ethny (EGI).

As Salter emphasizes, morality is basically an approach for adjudicating conflicts of interests…This is in accord with the view – promoted by Salter and myself - that genetic interests are ultimate interests. How could it be otherwise for evolved organisms whose reproduction – indeed, whose representation among the informational content of reality – is essentially dependent upon and constituted by “genetic material?”  Or more basically by the information encoded in that “genetic material?”…

…If someone has a value system in which self-destructive values are prized then that is their prerogative; others who value continuity of both their bioculture and their values would be well served to promote their genetic interests.  Salter also notes that proximate interests are best optimized rather than maximized; for example, a person who is “too happy” may become less prudent, jeopardizing well-being.  On the other hand, ultimate interests are different; these interests are adaptive when maximized (note: maximized in the net sense).  Thus, Salter states: “One cannot be too well adapted.” 

Salter notes that people “who do not consider peaceful genetic replacement to be a moral issue will have no moral objection to their own painless genetic extinction.” Well, there are Whites with pathological altruism who do not personally reproduce as to “save the planet” (and who advocate the same to other Whites, but typically not to non-Whites), but typically the situation is that of a targeted attack against White interests. Especially, non-White activists will be among those who attempt to convince Whites to accept genetic extinction, while these non-Whites themselves continue their own genetic lines.  

A few concluding comments are appropriate at this point.  Salter believes that “evolved organisms” will not for long accept a “social order that weeds out their lineages.” Well, so far, Whites have been generally accepting of such a social order; we shall see how things evolve (no pun intended).  It is part of the proper ethics of EGI to educate people on the important of adaptive behavior; one can view Salter’s book, and my current post, as part of such efforts.

Let us finish with the following Shakespearean quote that Salter includes in this section of his book, with respect to conflicts between sets of genetic interests:

KING HARRY

Therefore take heed how you impawn our person,

How you awake our sleeping sword of war.

We charge you in the name of God, take heed,

For never two such kingdoms did contend

Without much fall of blood, whose guiltless drops

Are every one a woe, a sore complaint

'Gainst him whose wrong gives edge unto the swords

That make such waste in brief mortality.

May I with right and conscience make this claim? 

Shakespeare, Henry V, 1500, Act I, Scene I

That KING HARRY quote also applies to situations in which anyone attempts to suppress True Freedom by preventing Whites from pursuing adaptive fitness though EGI. It also applies to charlatans like Heidegger who believe they have the right to dictate authenticity to others.

Finally, see this about an empirical racial soul.

Summary: Racial Existentialism

While it is reasonable to assert that True Freedom is constrained by rootedness in a specific community and by belonging, or not, to a High Culture, I object to any artificial constraints put on a person’s freedom or their idea of authenticity, whether from Heidegger or anyone else (e.g., Johnson or any other “traditionalist” Quota Queen).

I am a Futurist, and object to the anti-scientific and anti-technics mindset of the hobbit hole crowd, and I laugh at those fools who believe you can have maintain and create technology while at the same time rejecting the scientific mindset.

We need a form of racial existentialism, in which authenticity revolves around True Freedom, which has the dual aspect of both (1) being limited in the sense of rootedness in a racial-cultural community and belonging or not to a High Culture, and (2) allowing for personal overcoming and cultural creation not limited to specific constraints

Life has meaning given by individuals themselves, not from some sort of outside source (including Heidegger).  Living an authentic life is crucial, but who or what decides what authenticity is open to debate (see above). All I can say at this point is that the choices individuals make should be informed choices, including knowledge of one’s genetic interests and the facts about race. The foundation of authenticity needs to be truth, facts, knowledge; it is best not to make decisions out of ignorance.

Racial Existentialism is the choice – the free choice of the individual – to give meaning to one’s life by defending one’s race and civilization, to defend and promote genetic interests, and to actualize self-overcoming to be a better representative of one’s people and a better fighter for one’s people.