…Now, it happens that we meet together once every year, sometime about the 4th of July, for some reason or other. These 4th of July gatherings I suppose have their uses. If you will indulge me, I will state what I suppose to be some of them.We are now a mighty nation, we are thirty—or about thirty millions of people, and we own and inhabit about one-fifteenth part of the dry land of the whole earth. We run our memory back over the pages of history for about eighty-two years and we discover that we were then a very small people in point of numbers, vastly inferior to what we are now, with a vastly less extent of country,—with vastly less of everything we deem desirable among men,—we look upon the change as exceedingly advantageous to us and to our posterity, and we fix upon something that happened away back, as in some way or other being connected with this rise of prosperity. We find a race of men living in that day whom we claim as our fathers and grandfathers; they were iron men, they fought for the principle that they were contending for; and we understood that by what they then did it has followed that the degree of prosperity that we now enjoy has come to us. We hold this annual celebration to remind ourselves of all the good done in this process of time of how it was done and who did it, and how we are historically connected with it; and we go from these meetings in better humor with ourselves—we feel more attached the one to the other, and more firmly bound to the country we inhabit. In every way we are better men in the age, and race, and country in which we live for these celebrations. But after we have done all this we have not yet reached the whole. There is something else connected with it. We have besides these men—descended by blood from our ancestors—among us perhaps half our people who are not descendants at all of these men, they are men who have come from Europe—German, Irish, French and Scandinavian—men that have come from Europe themselves, or whose ancestors have come hither and settled here, finding themselves our equals in all things. If they look back through this history to trace their connection with those days by blood, they find they have none, they cannot carry themselves back into that glorious epoch and make themselves feel that they are part of us, but when they look through that old Declaration of Independence they find that those old men say that "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal," and then they feel that that moral sentiment taught in that day evidences their relation to those men, that it is the father of all moral principle in them, and that they have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh of the men who wrote that Declaration, (loud and long continued applause) and so they are. That is the electric cord in that Declaration that links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving men together, that will link those patriotic hearts as long as the love of freedom exists in the minds of men throughout the world.
All men dream: but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dreams with open eyes, to make it possible. - T. E. Lawrence
The Fundamentals
Fundamentals of a New Movement
The overarching, basic fundamentals of a New Movement are listed here. The link leads to the relevant post below. Also see "The Fundamentals" post list to the lower right. This is our new path. If you agree with this direction, then join with us.
The Old Movement is dead. Let us instead build something that works, a New Movement, a fresh start.
Monday, March 20, 2023
Lincoln's Electric Cord Speech
Sunday, October 3, 2021
Nietzsche vs. Melville
Apparent vs. true worlds.
See this from Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, a quote that I consider the philosophical core of the book:
Hark ye yet again—the little lower layer. All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. But in each event—in the living act, the undoubted deed—there, some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask. If man will strike, strike through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall? To me, the white whale is that wall, shoved near to me. Sometimes I think there’s naught beyond. But ’tis enough. He tasks me; he heaps me; I see in him outrageous strength, with an inscrutable malice sinewing it. That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate; and be the white whale agent, or be the white whale principal, I will wreak that hate upon him. Talk not to me of blasphemy, man; I’d strike the sun if it insulted me. For could the sun do that, then could I do the other; since there is ever a sort of fair play herein, jealousy presiding over all creations. But not my master, man, is even that fair play. Who’s over me? Truth hath no confines.
So, what is Melville, speaking through Ahab, saying here? Everything that we can perceive through our senses, the material world – “visible objects”- is just surface veneer, a façade, “pasteboard masks,” which conceals the true, hidden reality beneath it. This hidden reality is manifested in, or simply is, some “unknown but still reasoning thing” (God?). Events, acts, and deeds can sometimes reveal the presence of this hidden, unknown thing – it “puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask.” So, if one wants to strike out at this hidden force, this manipulator of events, one has to “strike through the mask!” After all, if the mask is hiding the true driving force behind events, and if some events reveal the presence of that hidden force, then one can access the hidden force, attack it, harm it, by striking through the mask behind which it hides. Or, our perceived reality is akin to a prison, and to reach out beyond it to strike out against that which imprisons us - our jailor - we need to thrust “through the wall” of that prison. To Ahab, the event which revealed the presence of the “unknown but still reasoning thing” was the loss of his leg, and Moby Dick is the wall that forms part of Ahab’s prison.
Ahab is unsure if Moby Dick is just the agent of the unknown force - thus, the whale is a “pasteboard mask” - or if the whale is actually the principal, the hidden force itself (e.g., “Sometimes I think there’s naught beyond"). It seems to me that, according to Ahab’s epistemology of reality, it makes more sense for the whale to be the agent of something else. Besides the absurdity of a whale being the principal of which Ahab speaks, the animal is hardly an “unknown thing." How could Moby Dick be both the wall and the jailor, the pasteboard mask and that behind it? It makes more sense for the whale to be the agent of another force that Ahab opposes and that he strikes at that “unknown but still reasoning thing” by hunting and killing Moby Dick (thus, striking through the mask). But in the end, it doesn’t matter to Ahab; either way, he hates and must kill the whale and what it represents: “But ’tis enough. He tasks me; he heaps me; I see in him outrageous strength, with an inscrutable malice sinewing it. That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate…”
Ahab then further displays his Faustian nature by: “I’d strike the sun if it insulted me” and that he has no master and that he represents truth: “But not my master, man, is even that fair play. Who’s over me? Truth hath no confines.” For moralpathy and Ahab as moralpath, see here.
Ahab’s discourse, in which he contrasts the visible world of our perception and the unknown thins lurking behind it, reminds one of the distinction between the apparent and true world paradigms analyzed by Nietzsche in Twilight of the Idols. For Ahab (and Melville), the world of our perception is the apparent world, but there is underlying this a true (or more true) world of the “unknown but still reasoning thing.” Let’s see what Nietzsche has to say about this.
The true world -- we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one
It will be appreciated if I condense so essential and so new an insight into four theses. In that way I facilitate comprehension; in that way I provoke contradiction.
First proposition. The reasons for which "this" world has been characterized as "apparent" are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable.
A very positivist, materialist, empiricist, scientific view. I say that as praise, not condemnation.
Second proposition. The criteria which have been bestowed on the "true being" of things are the criteria of not-being, of nothingness, the "true world" has been constructed out of contradiction to the actual world: indeed an apparent world, insofar as it is merely a moral-optical illusion.
Third proposition. To invent fables about a world "other" than this one has no meaning at all, unless an instinct of slander, detraction, and suspicion against life has gained the upper hand in us: in that case, we avenge ourselves against life with a phantasmagoria of "another," a "better" life.
Christianity in a nutshell. Also, much of the nonsense about a superior Golden Age of the “traditionalists” (Nietzsche denounced this view, recognizing that the past was an age lower than that of the present).
Fourth proposition. Any distinction between a "true" and an "apparent" world -- whether in the Christian manner or in the manner of Kant (in the end, an underhanded Christian) -- is only a suggestion of decadence, a symptom of the decline of life. That the artist esteems appearance higher than reality is no objection to this proposition. For "appearance" in this case means reality once more, only by way of selection, reinforcement, and correction. The tragic artist is no pessimist: he is precisely the one who says Yes to everything questionable, even to the terrible -- he is Dionysian.
The full reasoning:
How the “True World” Finally Became An Fable:
The History of an Error
1. The true world -- attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it.
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.")
The Classical Civilization.
2. The true world -- unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for the sinner who repents").
(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible -- it becomes female, it becomes Christian.)
Christianity = feminine, subtle, insidious, incomprehensible.
3. The true world -- unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it -- a consolation, an obligation, an imperative.
(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian [i.e., Kantian].)
The characterization of “Nordic” is amusing here given certain connotations in the “movement.” Gregor associated Nordicism with an ideology of despair, as Guntherite Nordicism harkened back to a better past of pure Nordics that have become mongrelized and degraded; somewhat differently, but with a similar tone, modern Nordicists aver that pure Nordics still exist but are always endangered by mixture with inferior peoples. Nordicism is also associated with Traditionalism and its obsession with a past Golden Age. So, in a sense, Nordicist narratives are “a consolation, an obligation, an imperative” but, on the other hand, modern Nordicists would object to the characterization of their ideology as “unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable” since they will argue that Nordic, or “Nordish,” preservationism is attainable, demonstrable, and promisable.
4. The true world -- unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?
(Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)
5. The "true" world -- an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating -- an idea which has become useless and superfluous -- consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens [“good sense”] and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.)
6. The true world -- we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA. [“Zarathustra begins”])
So, the argument is, there is no “true world” and no “apparent world” but only the world, the reality that we inhabit (and realization of this is the first step toward the Overman).
This would seem to be incompatible with the Melville/Ahab view.
An interpretation of Nietzsche’s views on this this subject:
Nietzsche’s How the ‘Real World’ at Last Became a Myth appears in Twilight of the Idols (1889). In this short, sequential, text he outlines what he subtitles as the “History of an Error”. The genealogy traces the notion of the division of the world into reality and appearance from its original mystic formulation (“I, Plato, am the Truth”), through the Platonic cave, the neo-platonist Christian interpretation, onto the Kantian noumenon and suprasensible ground of morality. From there, after it finds its most pure expression in the sterile Kantian thing-in-itself, the notion becomes increasingly suspect, culminating in its dismissal, and with it, the entire dichotomy of apparent/real, representation/thing-in-itself. Both the suprasensible “real world” and the apparent world of representation are overcome.
Nietzsche, with characteristic modesty, concludes that it is precisely at the moment when this millennia old metaphysical error has been completely eviscerated, with humanity now free from the specter of an all powerful beyond, that his text Thus Spoke Zarathustra truly begins.
Again, it would seem that Nietzsche is in opposition to Melville (I would have liked to see Nietzsche analyze Moby Dick).
As a STEM empiricist, I have an affinity for Nietzsche’s view. On the other hand, I still see value in Melville’s formulation. How to square the circle? Perhaps we need to review Melville’s description of the “unknown” as a “reasoning thing.” What if the known and unknown are both part of the same actuality? The known is part of reality that we currently are able to perceive and the unknown is that we are currently unable to perceive but is still a real part of that same reality, something that could in theory be perceived if we had the power to do so (whether or not it is realistically possible for humans to ever have this power is itself currently an unknown). What if this “unknown” is not so much a “reasoning thing” but some manifestation of nature and nature’s laws that we cannot yet perceive? But, then again, maybe there is some “reasoning thing” involved but something that is not supernatural or part of a hidden “true” world but, again, is a manifestation of a reality that is hidden from us simply because we currently do not have the power to perceive it. Modern scientific philosophy has some interesting ideas related to this approach to Melville's views. See this. And this.
Thus, is the “unknown but still reasoning” thing a part of our reality that has an inherent consciousness of which we have heretofore been unaware?
So, Nietzsche is, in my opinion, correct that there is a reality that is material and that could in theory be empirically determined, that there is no “true” vs “apparent” world, but as part of reality are things that we cannot (yet) perceive and that act (or seem to act) towards us in ways akin to Ahab’s complaint about hidden actors whose presence can make themselves known through certain events.
Tuesday, June 22, 2021
Yockey in the 21st Century
Relevance of Yockey today.
What relevance does the work of Francis Parker Yockey have for the Far Right today, in the 21st century, after the drama of Trump, in the ruins of the Alt Right, after Brexit, and within the context of current-day nationalist activism?
Yockey’s work, including and especially Imperium, has genuine support from a small and very selective fraction of the Far Right, which includes some of its more thoughtful members. Unfortunately, Yockey’s work is also insincerely promoted by some who Yockey would have denounced as treasonous Culture Retarders – ethnonationalists, some of whom proudly self-described as “petty nationalists” and who oppose pan-Europeanism and Yockey’s Imperium idea. We have also seen a resurgence of another rightist paradigm that Yockey opposed – Nordicism (and other similar forms of divisive ethnic fetishism). Yet another extant rightist paradigm that Yockey would oppose, and that itself opposes Yockeyian pan-Europeanism, is the HBD cult, which worships IQ, divides Europeans against each other, and elevates Jews and East Asians as superior Herrenvolk. Indeed, all three branches of the anti-Yockeyian Right have formed an informal collaboration - the HBD-Nordicist-ethnonationalist alliance, which is particularly strong in the Anglosphere, even more particularly in America. So, while Yockey and his work has some cachet on the Right, in general, the current trends in Far Right "thought" are for the most part unalterably opposed to Yockey’s grand idea. In Europe itself, petty nationalist ethnonationalism dominates the Right; the only group related to Yockey’s ideal would be Norman Lowell’s Imperium Europa in Malta. The negative experience of the European Union (EU) has left a bitter taste in the mouth of many in the European Right, much of which is moving away from the idea of “Europe as a nation,” and some of the support these nationalist parties may get from abroad (Russia?) could have interests opposed to European unity.
Indeed, the EU has been a double-edged sword with respect to Yockey’s Imperium ideal. On the positive side, it demonstrated an inherent European desire for cohesiveness, and it neatly refutes one of the (asinine) arguments of the petty nationalists – e.g.., “how can Europeans be together in the same state when you can’t even get Czechs and Slovaks to stay together in the same state,” or some (moronic) variation thereof. Well, Czechs and Slovaks are no longer in the same nation state, but they are both members of the EU, demonstrating that intra-European ethnic rivalries may be best managed as part of an overarching political structure. On the negative side – and it is a large negative – the way the EU has actually been implemented, as an anti-European, anti-White, and anti-Western globalist monstrosity, enabling genocidal race replacement migration and restricting free speech and the political ability of native Europeans to defend their own group interests, has, to many minds, delegitimized the very idea of a “European Union.” Even a pro-Imperium pan-Europeanist such as myself opposes the current EU and cheered Brexit. But one must distinguish the fundamental idea of union from the distorted and flawed implementation of the idea. The fact that many on the European Right still support the idea of the EU, at least in principle, despite is horrific actualization, suggests, along with support for the EU across the rest of the political spectrum, broad support, among a large proportion of the European population, for the idea of at least some type of union. In this sense, at the most fundamental level, Yockey has been vindicated.
The future, in the short-term and medium-term, does not look bright for Yockeyism. Obviously, the Left, Center, and Mainstream Right reject a key element of his core message – a European Imperium for Europeans and European interests as opposed to a EU that privileges aliens - and to the extent that Europeans have legitimized part of Yockey’s ideal by embracing the EU, that project has been so mismanaged, has been so hijacked into the antithesis of an authentic Imperium, that it has delegitimized the "Europe as Nation" idea for large swathes of both the Right in general and the Far Right in particular. In America, Yockeyism has always taken a back seat to Nordicist Nutzism, and even many who superficially promote Yockey’s work actually promote a petty nationalism that Yockey himself would denounce as culture retarding treason. The main currents of Nordicism, HBD, and ethnonationalism inherent in much of American activism is opposed to everything Yockey believed in, fought for, and died for.
In addition, some individuals who are Yockeyists, or say they are, seem to focus more on the “spiritual” and esoteric aspects of Yockey the man and Yockey the ideologue, and seem uninterested in the hardcore pragmatic political ideals that formed the basis of the Imperium worldview. Despite the fact that Yockey’s name is often mentioned on the Far Right, and in many ways mentioned positively (but not always positively, of course), the fact also remains that the Far Right for the most part rejects and unalterably opposes Yockeyian pan-Europeanism, and rejects and defames those who actually are pan-Europeanists in a real, genuine sense.
Long-term practical prospects are unknown and I will not speculate on those here. I neither want to be a delusional “victory is assured” fascist of the type Roger Griffin mocks, nor do I want to be equally dogmatic in asserting the inherent impossibility of achieving Yockey’s vision. We can merely be realistic and look ahead, forward to a reasonable time frame, and say that things do not look good at all.
That is all from a descriptive basis. What about prescription? Here, I suppose I have nothing to say that will be much of a surprise to long time readers of my work. Obviously, I favor, in general, the Yockeyian pan-European perspective, although I of course disagree with Yockey on some fundamental details of epiphenomena associated with his work, the details of which, again, long time readers of my own material should be familiar with. The superiority of the broad Yockeyian perspective should be (but, alas is not for many activists) self-evident, compared to the “competition.” HBD is transparent Jew-worship and Asian-worship, and is openly hostile to White nationalism and kinship-based racial politics. Nordicism is a factually incorrect, outdated, and needlessly divisive childish ideology, akin in many ways to Afrocentrism, and works against broader White interests. Ethnonationalism is to a large extent responsible for creating the existential race problems Whites face today; further, ethnonationalists typically reveal themselves to be ethnoimperialist hypocrites. Everything Yockey said about “vertical racists” and “culture retarders” fits the Nordicists and ethnonationalists; Yockey couldn’t imagine the stupidity of HBD, but I suppose if you stretch some of his comments against a self-destructively hyper-rationalistic materialist outlook (“it’s all IQ!"), then there would be grist for the mill there. Certainly, one could only imagine what Yockey would think about prioritizing Jewish and Asian interests over those of ethnic Europeans, or what he would think about White “Yellow Supremacists” or “The Arctic Alliance” or “Jeurasian” mongrelization.
We see more and more that the Clash of Civilizations endangers the West. The threat of the Global South, Islam, China, the culture retarders and other traitors in our own ranks, all of this comes down to the hatred of those opposed to the High Culture of the West, and the treason of those within the West with a vested interest in its downfall, or, at least, a vested interest in perpetuating the intra-West fissures that have led to our sorry state. Against all of this the Yockeyian perspective stands like a colossus. We also observe that basing White resistance solely on a pure materialist basis not only runs the risk of degenerating into HBD and Nordicism, but lacks the proper motivating passion, the idealism that has always underpinned the self-sacrificial fervor of the leftist enemy. Yockeyism and its objectives - even if possibly “irrational” from the purely empirical perspective - remedies that. The fact that petty nationalist enemies of Yockey’s Imperium ideal find themselves trying to associate with Yockey, find themselves attracted to his work, even promoting and selling that work (that they actually oppose), attests to that work's power. The EU, for all its faults, points to an inner recognition of European organic solidarity, of White comity, and recent events creates more and more an idea of White solidarity and comity in the European Diaspora, as anti-White forces gather their strength.
Hence, Yockeyism is more relevant than ever, and has more to offer than ever. It is only because of the inherent defects of the “movement” – in America, Europe, and elsewhere – that the descriptive, on-the-ground prospects for Yockeyism is so poor, so disheartening, and why, regardless of what attractiveness “The Cult of Saint Francis” holds for some activists, they reject Yockey’s fundamental message.
The problem is not with Yockeyism; the problem is with the “movement,” broadly defined. Hence, the paradox - in the 21st century, Yockeyism is more relevant than ever, yet it is ignored and disregarded, at least with respect to its practical fundamentals, more than ever. That is a world historical crime for which the “movement” – and the Right more generally – can never be forgiven.
Wednesday, June 3, 2020
Whither Imperium?
Imperium
Finally the insistence upon nationalism became so great, that some leaders were willing to betray their nations into bondage to extra-Western forces rather than join a united Western organism.
Perhaps before it is over, the outer forces will have mobilized the swarming, pullulating masses of China and India against the body of the Western Civilization.
The Synthesis is the period of the Future. It exists everywhere in the minds of the Culture-bearing stratum of the West, and for a while it was actualized, in its first crude, provisional, form during the Second World War.
It returns to the Thesis, but retains the creations of the Antithesis, for this great Synthesis is not a mere negative. No European “nation” of the older type can any longer, under this new Idea, be the object of any forcible attempt to change or abolish its local characteristics.
Local cultures in Europe may be as diversified as they wish, and they will enjoy a perfect autonomy in the European Imperium, now that the oppression of vertical nationalism is dead
Considered as a spiritual reality, the Synthesis cannot be spread by physical force.
Not only in the sphere of nations, but in the totality of the life-manifestations of the Western Civilization, the Synthesis penetrates with its new values, its higher imagination, and its new creative powers.
…there is inner necessity in the final passing of the Age of nationalism and annihilation-wars. The great Synthesis, Imperium, replaces it. The Synthesis contains within it the older components of Thesis and Antithesis. The primal Gothic instincts of the Western Culture are still present in the Imperium-Idea. It cannot be otherwise. Also present are the various Ideas which these instincts, within the framework of this Culture, shaped for itself, the religions, the nations, the philosophies, languages, arts and sciences. But they are present no longer as contrasts, but as mere differences.
Gone— forever gone— is any notion that one of these Ideas— national, linguistic, religious, social— has the mission of wiping out another Idea. The adherents of Empire are still distinct from the adherents of Papacy— but this distinction does not rule their minds, for uppermost now is the Idea of Imperium, the return to superpersonal origins, and both of these mighty Ideas have the same spiritual source. The difference between Protestant and Catholic— once excited into a casus belli— has gone the same way. Both continue to exist, but it is inconceivable that this difference could again rend the Western Civilization in twain. There have been also the racial and temperamental differences of Teuton and Latin, of North and South. Once these may have contributed to the furnishing of motives to History— this can they no longer do. Again, both are part of the West, even though different, and the Imperium-Idea monopolizes the motivation of History.
The former nations, the religions, the races, the classes— these are now the building-blocks of the great Imperial structure which is founding itself. Local cultural, social, linguistic, differences remain— it is no necessity of the Imperium-Idea that it annihilate its component Ideas, the collective products of a thousand years of Western history. On the contrary, it affirms them all, in a higher sense it perpetuates them all, but they are in its service, and no longer in the center of History.
Nor is the Idea of Imperium to be confused with any stupid rationalistic doctrine or system, any cowardly millennium. It is not a program, it is no set of demands, no scheme for justice, no juristic quibbling with the concept of national sovereignty.
Just as the Future has had always to fight against the entrenched forces of the Past, so must this powerful, universal Idea. Its first phase is the spiritual conquest of the minds and souls of the Culture-bearing stratum of the West. This is entirely inevitable.
No force within the Civilization can then resist the Cultural Reunion which will unite North and South, Teuton and Latin, Protestant and Catholic, Prussia, England, Spain, Italy and France, in the tasks now waiting.
Absolute Politics: Authority, Discipline, Faith, Responsibility, Duty, Ethical Socialism, Fertility, Order, State, Hierarchy— the creation of the Empire of the West.
The great dream and aim of Leibnitz, the uniting of all the States of Europe, is closer by virtue of Europe’s defeat, for in that defeat, it perceives its unity. The mission of this generation is the most difficult that has ever faced a Western generation.
…the men of this generation must fight for the continued existence of the West. Ultimately nothing can defeat them except inner decadence.
Anyone who seeks to perpetuate petty-statism or old-fashioned nationalism is the inner enemy of Europe. He is playing the game, of the extra-European forces, he is dividing Europe and committing treason.
Treason now has only one meaning to Europe: it means serving any other force than Europe. There is only one treason now, treason to Europe. The nations are dead, for Europe is born.
The West has something to devote to the contest that neither the Barbarian nor the parasite has: the force of the mightiest superpersonal Destiny that has ever appeared on this earth-ball. This superpersonal Idea has such tremendous force that no number of scaffold-trials or massacres, no heaps of starved or pyramids of skulls, can touch it.
The soil of Europe, rendered sacred by the streams of blood which have made it spiritually fertile for a millennium, will once again stream with blood until the barbarians and distorters have been driven out and the Western banner waves on its home soil from Gibraltar to North Cape, and from the rocky promontories of Galway to the Urals.
How can the liberated West solve this great task of saving one hundred million Western lives? There is only one solution, and it is the nearest one. The agricultural territory of Russia provides the means of preserving the population of the West, and the necessary base for world-dominion of this Civilization, which alone can save the West from the threat of annihilation by the outer forces. It is thus a military solution— and there is no other. Our commercial-industrial-technical monopoly is gone. Our military technical superiority remains, as does our superior will-power, organization talent, and discipline. The glorious days of 1941 and 1942 show what the West can do against the Barbarian, however superior his numbers. Like Russia, the Western Civilization is situated in the Northeast quadrant. Against the West, therefore, Russia enjoys none of the military advantages it has against America. The common land-frontier enables the West to dispense with a gigantic assemblage of seapower as a prerequisite to the land-fight. The West will be able to deploy all of its forces on to the plains where the battle for the Future of the West will be fought.
…the true American people and the Russian people figure only as expendable material. In these two populations, there are wide and deep strata which inwardly belong to the Western Civilization and who look to the sacred soil of Europe as to their origin, their inspiration and their spiritual home. To these also, this proclamation is addressed.
This is promised, not by human resolves merely, but by a higher Destiny, which cares little whether it is 1950, 2000, or 2050. This Destiny does not tire, nor can it be broken, and its mantle of strength descends upon those in its service.
Was mich nicht umbringt, macht mich stärker.(What does not destroy me makes me stronger.)
For example, think of the racial differences between Calabrian and Lombard. What did they matter to the history of Garibaldi’s time?
Between 1900 and 1915 alone, 15,000,000 immigrants came to America from Asia, Africa and Europe. They came mostly from Russia, the Levant, and the Balkan countries. From the Western Civilization came a fair number of Italians, but the rest of the human material was from outside the West.
It is absolutely necessary to the continuance of the subjugation of Europe that the outsiders have large numbers— whole societies, groups, strata, remnants of dead 19th century nations— of domestic European populations available for their purposes. Against a united Europe, they could never have made their way in, and only against a divided Europe can they maintain themselves. Split! divide! distinguish!— this is the technique of conquest. Resurrect old ideas, old slogans, now quite dead, in the battle to turn European against European. But work always with the weak, Culture-less stratum against the strong bearers and appreciators of Culture. These must be “tried” and hanged.
This availability of the under-strata of the Culture to outside forces is one type, and the most dangerous, of that form of Culture-pathology called Culture-distortion. It is closely related however to another type called Culture-retardation.
These must be “tried” and hanged.
Europe is equal to its historical task. Against the anti-spiritual, anti-heroic 'ideals' of America-Jewry, Europe pits its metaphysical ideas, its faith in its Destiny, its ethical principles, its heroism. Fearlessly, Europe falls in for battle, knowing it is armed with the mightiest weapon ever forged by History: the superpersonal Destiny of the European organism. Our European Mission is to create the Culture-State-Nation-Imperium of the West, and thereby we shall perform such deeds, accomplish such works, and so transform our world that our distant posterity, when they behold the remains of our buildings and ramparts, will tell their grandchildren that on the soil of Europe once dwelt a tribe of gods.
In 1947, just two years after the fall of Nazi Germany, an American expatriate living in Ireland named Francis Parker Yockey wrote Imperium, a massive tome that advanced a new strategy for post-war European fascism. Yockey insisted that fascists abandon their narrow nationalist viewpoint and, instead, fight for a new European-wide fascist empire, which he dubbed the 'Imperium'. In 1948 Yockey and his closest collaborators left Oswald Mosley's Union Movement and founded the European Liberation Front (ELF), a British-based groupuscule that lasted until 1954. Rejecting the possibility of building a mass fascist movement in post-war Europe, the ELF defined its primary task as ideological: namely, the advancement of the 'Imperium' idea inside the ranks of Europe's 'fascist elite'. The ELF soon ran into stiff opposition from Mosley over Yockey's controversial identification of the United States, and not the Soviet Union, as Europe's 'main enemy'. The ELF also met with fierce resistance from Hitler worshippers inside the British right like Arnold Leese, who rejected the ELF's emphasis on 'culture' over 'race'. Despite the ELF's relatively brief existence as a groupuscule, its introduction of a new kind of 'Eurofascist' thinking has recently led to its rediscovery by contemporary European New Rightists now searching for a new political strategy following both the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the world's sole 'superpower'.
Saturday, December 7, 2019
Nietzsche, Napoleon, and the Overman
Abstract
Nietzsche's concept of the higher man is often seen as vague. The article adds concreteness to the concept by studying an example of a higher man, Napoleon. Napoleon embodied power and spiritual health, and was therefore an admirable person. By looking at Nietzsche's description of Napoleon as an artist, we also gain insight into the higher man as a political actor: he uses the public arena as the medium on which he practices his art. In doing so, he presents himself as a exemplar of humanity, inspiring others to seek their own path to excellence. By studying this, we gain important insight into Nietzsche's political teaching. But Nietzsche's account of Napoleon is not one-sided: he also describes Napoleon's corruption. The fall of a higher man is both a warning of the dangers of the political realm, and a reminder that sickness and health are closely connected. Even the mightiest individual is fragile.
One of Nietzsche's frequently cited examples of an actually existing higher man was Napoleon Bonaparte.
As he noted in Ecce Homo, "I never attack persons; I merely avail myself of the person as a strong magnifying glass that allows one to make visible a general but creeping and elusive calamity."
Just as his critiques of individuals point toward larger issues, so his praise also indicates a general point. Napoleon embodies many of the qualities Nietzsche admired, but more important he was a political leader in an egalitarian era dominated by a populist ethos.
Napoleon therefore exemplifies how greatness is possible in a time of spiritual weakness and widespread cultural decay.
By studying Nietzsche’s description of Bonaparte, we can learn something about the higher man as a political actor.
But though he admired Napoleon, he did not do so for typical reasons. In his descriptions of the French emperor, Nietzsche never mentions Bonaparte's great victories at Austerlitz and Jena. Nor does he care about the glorification of France-in his later works, Nietzsche repeatedly denounced all forms of nationalism.
Author’s Footnote: As will be discussed later, Nietzsche regarded Napoleon's nationalism as a sign of weakness and decay.
Instead, Nietzsche characterizes Napoleon as a higher man for who he was, not what he did. The extraordinary character of the man, and not his accomplishments, marks him as elevated. Napoleon was a being of great power and thus stands as a symbol of what the highest exemplars of humanity can become. For this reason, Nietzsche includes him in a list of "the more profound and comprehensive men of this century” (BGE, 256) and frequently praises him.
The core of Nietzsche's scathing attack on modernity is its weakness. Modernity represents the triumph of values like equality, humanism, peace, and the freedom of the will, which are slavish values: their origin lies in weakness not strength. The French Revolution and the subsequent spread of democratic values in its wake represent a new high point for the hegemony of slave values. Nearly everyone now accepts these values as truth.
In the midst of the spread of such values, however, atavistic individuals have appeared, harkening back to an aristocratic past.
The core of the soul is its constituent complex of drives and affects. In a strong individual, these drives are formidable-they are not easily sated or resisted, but fervently push the individual toward their objects. At times the drives are so strong that they push the person toward self-destruction: often, our drives seek a goal which will destroy us (Z, "On Self-Overcoming"). Nietzsche therefore argues that self-preservation represents a degeneration of the instincts (BGE, 13).
Unlike many of the militant romantics whom he inspired, Bonaparte had no use for glory and accolades because he scorned those who bestowed such honors. And Bonaparte felt no need to obey the moral dictates of those he saw as inferior. For example, when Napoleon was confronted by his wife with charges of infidelity, Nietzsche claims that he responded "I have the right to answer all accusations against me with an eternal 'That's me.' I am apart from all the world and accept conditions from nobody. I demand subjection even to my fancies, and people should find it quite natural when I yield to this or that distraction" (GS, 23).
Author’s Footnote: This account of what makes for great character fits with several other of Nietzsche's writings. For example, in On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, he describes creativity of the Greeks in similar language: "The Greeks gradually learned to organize the chaos” (UM, II. 10). And in Beyond Good and Evil section 200 he notes that the warring drives that result from ethnic mixing can be mastered by noble ones (such as Alcibiades and Caesar).
The man from an age of dissolution, which mixes the races all together, such a man has an inheritance of a multiple ancestry in his body, that is, conflicting and frequently not merely conflicting drives and standards of value which war among themselves and rarely give each other rest - such a man of late culture and disturbed lights will typically be a weaker man. His most basic demand is that the war which constitutes him should finally end. Happiness seems to him, in accordance with a calming medicine and way of thinking (for example, Epicurean or Christian), principally as the happiness of resting, of having no interruptions, of surfeit, of the final unity, as the "Sabbath of Sabbaths," to use the words of the saintly rhetorician Augustine, who was himself such a man. But if the opposition and war in such a nature work like one more charm or thrill in life - and bring along, in addition to this nature's powerful and irreconcilable drives, also the real mastery and refinement in waging war with itself, and thus transmit and cultivate self-ruling and outwitting of the self, then arise those delightfully amazing and unimaginable people, those enigmatic men predestined for victory and temptation, whose most beautiful expressions are Alcibiades and Caesar (- in their company I'd like to place the first European, according to my taste, the Hohenstaufer Frederick II), and, among artists, perhaps Leonardo da Vinci.8 They appear precisely in the same ages when that weaker type, with its demands for quiet, steps into the foreground: both types belong with one another and arise from the same causes.
The outward manifestation of a great soul is a vibrant and charismatic personality, something both Goethe and Napoleon clearly possessed…
Napoleon and Goethe were able to overcome the mediocrity and pettiness of the eighteenth century because of their magnificent souls. Both resisted the narrow-minded bigotry of nationalism and instead aspired to create a pan-European culture and political arena (WP, 104).
Like Nietzsche they rejected petty national boundaries…
…and sought to be good Europeans.
Both rejected the egalitarianism prevalent at the time and sought to invoke the pathos of distance characteristic of the noble soul.
And both were firmly grounded in reality, overcoming the flight into imagination of romanticism. The strength of soul of the two men ranks them among the highest of the modern era and marked them as radiant exemplars of humanity.
Napoleon as Artist
We have seen that Nietzsche held Napoleon in high repute, but we have not yet discovered how Nietzsche’s account of Napoleon can help us understand the relationship between the higher individual and the political actor. I think an answer to this question can be offered by examining a somewhat curious component of Nietzsche’s descriptions of Bonaparte: his characterization of Napoleon as an artist in a number of passages.
Politics, then, is not a lesser pursuit than art. It is another possible realm of creativity.
Napoleon is as much an artist-and thus as highly valorized as sculptors, musicians, painters, and writers…Napoleon is not an artist who also happens to be a leader; his art is his political action…
A second key point about Nietzsche's aesthetics is that artistic creation is connected to power.
Art as a representation of the artist's soul explains the third key point of Nietzsche's aesthetics: art serves as an incentive to life. When viewing art (or reading literature or philosophy), we are tempted to strive for our own creation and greatness by the brilliant image of the artwork. But what draws us upward is not simply the painting itself-it is the image of the artist lurking within the painting.
Art serves as a stimulus to life-both for the artist himself and for the spectator-because it lures us upward to higher pursuits.
Napoleon was (at least initially) a monological artist-he engaged in politics for his own purposes, not to promote the agenda of any group or the glory of the French nation…This fits with Nietzsche's repeated statements that one misunderstands the great person if one judges him from the viewpoint of public utility: the monological artist does not care about the audience, and thus does not work for the general welfare.
But, as a French biographer of Napoleon and spokesman for the contemporary Establishment observes, “Bonaparte had no [racial] prejudices; Egyptians, Sudanese, Jews from Alexandria were all integrated into the Imperial Guard.”
Hubert H. Humphrey is exactly the sort of person we need on our side. Humphrey was a liberal idealist, of course, but he wasn’t a philosopher, he was a doer.
His father’s family were of New England Puritan stock. His grandmother, Addie Regester Humphrey, taught at a Quaker school, and Humphrey’s mother, Christine Sannes, was from Norway. Humphrey was baptized into his mother’s Lutheran church, but he worshiped later in life as both a Methodist and a Congregationalist. Humphrey was thus genetically a mix of Minnesota’s native Nordic groups…
Hubert H. Humphrey is exactly the sort of person we need on our side.
It is for this reason that Nietzsche writes in places that rule by the higher individuals can be extremely dangerous to the general populace.
Napoleon is a great figure because of the power and vitality of his soul, not because of anything he accomplished.
Author’s Footnote: This is not to say that outcomes are simply unimportant: after all, it would be impossible to know the greatness of a person without any artifacts. But Nietzsche is clear that outcomes are secondary, mere symptoms of who the person is…
This means that Napoleon did not act simply to bring about a particular objective. While an aesthetic view of politics like this does not rule out efforts to promote specific goals, such goals are ultimately of secondary importance. Nietzschean politics is expressivist, not outcome-oriented…The value of political action, just as with art, is rooted in the act itself, not any consequences that stem from it. Napoleon sought to use the public arena as a testing ground for himself, as the medium through which to express and challenge his vitality. He did not enter politics in order to promote a specific agenda.
This argument suggests that Nietzsche offers a political teaching decidedly different from the Western tradition of political philosophy. Since Plato, political philosophy has sought to use the public realm for instrumental reasons. While thinkers may have disagreed over what ends should be sought-from Plato's promotion of virtue to Machiavelli's insistence on stability and endurance-all thinkers accepted the instrumental view. Nietzsche’s philosophy suggests a very different understanding of politics. Political action is valuable for the deed itself, not for any consequences that flow from it. The higher individual, Nietzsche argues, should not make the decision to enter the public realm based on what can be achieved, but on whether the action itself can serve one's soul.
Viewing Napoleon in this manner seems to raise a problem. If Napoleon acted only to further his own goals and did not seek to promote the good of humankind, then why does Nietzsche attribute such tremendous influence to him?
Napoleon did not much care for promoting greatness in others.
How can one who consciously serves only his own soul promote greatness in others?
This does not mean that Napoleon could not promote greatness in others, but it would have to be achieved by indirect means. By embodying the values of a nobler time, Napoleon left an indelible impression of what humanity can become at its peak.
It is here that we see Nietzsche's loftiest tribute to Napoleon-the emperor appears as something of a miracle, a man comparable to the greatest men of ancient times amidst the disease of modernity. Nietzsche goes so far as to suggest that Napoleon's appearance may lead to the self-overcoming of decadence in Europe…
If the crisis of the West stems from the nihilism resulting from the false metaphysics of Christian values, then Napoleon was an earth-shaking figure: he offered a way out of our illness, a way of overcoming Christianity. This suggests that the higher man can achieve eminence in the political realm as well as other spheres…Political action is a legitimate realm for the efforts of the higher man.
There are two key passages in which Nietzsche discusses Napoleon’s demise. The first is at the end of Will to Power, note 1026. He writes that Bonaparte "was corrupted by the means he had to employ and lost noblesse of character."
It seems clear that the means of which Nietzsche speaks are the methods and practices of democracy…It seems likely that Napoleon was corrupted by democracy.
He succumbed to his own myth, coming to believe that he was the great servant of the French nation… Nietzsche makes this point in the other relevant passage. In Beyond Good and Evil, section 256, he remarks that great men of his time succumbed to nationalism in moments of weakness: "only in their foregrounds or in weaker hours, say in old age, did they belong to the 'fatherlandish'-they were merely taking a rest from themselves when they became 'patriots."' Napoleon fell prey to the ideal of service to the nation-a form of nationalism, and connected to populism-when he declined…To paraphrase Urnberto Eco, the habit of pretending to believe evolved into the habit of believing.
What does Napoleon’s ultimate failure tell us about Nietzsche’s view of the higher man? It offers a warning and a reminder. First, it is a strong warning of the dangers of the political realm. While it is true that the higher man can use politics just as an artist uses paint and canvas, there are dangers inherent to the political realm which can undermine the actor’s nobility of soul…
Second, Nietzsche's account of Napoleon offers a sharp reminder of the interconnectedness of illness and health in even the highest people…The bad conscience, for example, opened an entirely new arena for creation-the soul. Those who were strong were able to turn their disease into a new enticement to life, a new realm to be conquered. But the illness is always there; it cannot be excised completely. Therefore, there is a fine line between greatness and failure. The bad conscience makes all higher men fragile. Dissolution should be expected…Napoleon's failure is a reminder that greatness is an exceedingly fragile thing. Even in the highest of people, decadence is just a short step away.
Unlike the otherworldly meaning and value provided by Christianity and similar moral codes, the greatness of people like Napoleon is immanent and not subject to the self-destructive flaws of Christian morality. Human greatness offers a way out of what Nietzsche refers to as "whole millennia of labyrinth”…
The failure of the higher man is thus tragic because it deprives us of something magnificent, but it is also almost expected.
Although he is frightening and brings suffering in his wake, the higher man also brings with him the loftiest hopes of humanity. Napoleon wreaked havoc but also opened new possibilities, demonstrating a way out of the traps of Christianity.
Kaufmann was raised a Lutheran. At age 11, finding that he believed neither in the Trinity nor in the divinity of Jesus, he converted to Judaism. Kaufmann subsequently discovered that his grandparents were all Jewish.