Yockeyian Genetics

Constructing a more cohesive pan-European genetic identity.  Emphasis added.

We all know Yockey’s somewhat questionable views on the issue of biological race, which I have written about multiple times (one example here).  Instead of focusing on that, here I look at another issue – the possible genetic (biological racial) consequences of a Yockeyian Imperium, a subject that I term “Yockeyian Genetics.”

In some ways, this is related to my essay on the convergence of the Yockeyian and Salterian perspectives, but here I consider it from the more specific perspective of how a Yockeyian Imperium could affect the genetics of the European peoples constituting such a geopolitical entity.

Let us consider this post, which is based on this paper, from which the following is extracted:

Population stratification caused by nonrandom mating between groups of the same species is often due to geographical distances leading to physical separation followed by genetic drift of allele frequencies in each group. In humans, population structures are also often driven by geographical barriers or distances; however, humans might also be structured by abstract factors such as culture, a consequence of their reasoning and self-awareness. Religion in particular, is one of the unusual conceptual factors that can drive human population structures. This study explores the Levant, a region flanked by the Middle East and Europe, where individual and population relationships are still strongly influenced by religion. We show that religious affiliation had a strong impact on the genomes of the Levantines. In particular, conversion of the region's populations to Islam appears to have introduced major rearrangements in populations' relations through admixture with culturally similar but geographically remote populations, leading to genetic similarities between remarkably distant populations like Jordanians, Moroccans, and Yemenis. Conversely, other populations, like Christians and Druze, became genetically isolated in the new cultural environment. We reconstructed the genetic structure of the Levantines and found that a pre-Islamic expansion Levant was more genetically similar to Europeans than to Middle Easterners.

The last part – “a pre-Islamic expansion Levant was more genetically similar to Europeans than to Middle Easterners” – has some relevance with respect to putative “Levantine immigrants and slaves” in Ancient Rome, who may have been much more “genetically similar to Europeans” than are Middle Easterners today. Note also that post-Islamic expansion Muslin influx into Southern Europe may have been mostly Berber types (and that, with a net effect of only a few percentage points of ancestry, at the greatest). But those are details.  

The main point is that cultural similarity can influence genetics to bring culturally similar people to become more genetically similar, and more genetically distant and distinct from culturally alien peoples, even if the cultural aliens are geographically close and not much genetically different to begin with. The same principle can extend to the realm of politics and High Culture-Politics as that of a Yockeyian Imperium. Thus, we can understand how cultural-civilizational-political boundaries can influence genetic boundaries between peoples.

See this, which is based on this.

…during the last 1,000 generations there are more coalescences between Beijing Chinese and Japanese rather than Beijing Chinese and southern Chinese; in more recent times, there are more coalescences between Chinese groups. This makes some sense, if we suppose that -as seems likely- Mongoloids spread north-to-south across China during prehistory; the Japanese are thus linked -in older times- with northern Chinese, both of which are mostly descended from the northern Mongoloids; in more recent times, especially after the emergence of a uniquely Chinese polity and culture, the Chinese tend to marry other Chinese, hence they share more recent common ancestors within the country itself.

The take home point of this:

The same can apply to Europe and any (relatively small) potential kinship overlap that may currently exist between Europeans and non-Europeans.  Once a “Western Imperium” is established, and gene flow from outside is stopped, over time, genetic distance between those groups within the Imperium and those outside will increase.  Thus, even if there is no increase in gene flow within the Imperium, the fact that a genetic division will be established with the “outer groups” will ensure that Europeans will, over time, form an ever more cohesive genetic grouping, more clearly separated from non-Europeans.  Thus, proximate influences ultimate, and genetic boundaries can become increasingly well matched with political-cultural-civilizational boundaries once gene flow between civilizational groups is stopped.  And there is more than enough genetic diversity within each civilizational bloc to satisfy biological requirements in the absence of any inter-continental and inter-civilizational gene flow.

Genetic drift, selection, and other such processes would take place, with the within vs. without distinction further pushing Europeans and non-Europeans farther apart. There would also be, to an extent, increasing cultural distinctiveness to mirror that of the genes/biology. The last part about "biological requirements" refers to an adequate amount of genetic diversity to enhance fitness, avoid inbreeding depression, and to provide the genetic variation to deal with changes in the environment (broadly defined).

So, we see that a political-cultural entity, the Yockeyian Imperium, would affect the genetics of its constituent peoples in such a manner as to support the underlying foundation of the Imperium entity itself, the organic solidarity of the European peoples.

Consider this PCA figure.  By tightly restricting any possible gene flow strictly to the European Imperium, one would expect, over time, the European and non-European areas to be more distinct and segregated than they are presently, with the European PCA likely becoming more concentrated within a space of the two major axes (PC1 and PC2).  Certainly, any tendency of greater intra-European dispersion and European/non-European convergence – the latter of which is no doubt being facilitated by alien immigration into Europe – would be repressed, and the aforementioned opposing trends promoted.  Any possibility that a given European and non-European ethny would be genetically closer than two European ethnies would also be eliminated over time by the processes inherent in restricting gene flow strictly within the European family of nations. Thus any such kinship overlap, if such exist, between, say, Europeans and non-European Caucasians, would be eliminated, as discussed above.

Cypriots are found in between Southern Italians and Near Easterners, thus, between Southern Europeans and non-European Caucasians. If Greek Cypriots are included in the Imperium while Turkish Cypriots are excluded, then the former group will, over time, converge with Southern Europeans in PCA while the latter will drift in the direction of Turks – as a result of restricting any (low level, see below) gene flow to the proper categories.

Now, one could speculate that the EU, and freedom of movement within it, would promote an increasing convergence and concentration of European PCA, but then the introduction of alien elements, not always evenly distributed among EU members) would counter-act that to an extent (e.g., a large number of Turks in Germany would, in the event of admixture, move Germans away from other Europeans infested with alien types other than Turks - with the alien invaders being less interested in moving away from their favorite host nations than are natives willing to move elsewhere).  So, the current EU, which combines both freedom of movement within and porous borders without, is not optimal for the proposed “Yockeyian Genetics.”

Now, one can argue that from the strict perspective of so-called Yockeyian genetics, the optimal situation would be an internal European-only panmixia, with complete internal freedom of movement and significant inter-marriage, coupled to a complete lack of movement and admixture with non-Europeans.  While true, that would have the negative effect of erasing established European ethnic identities, and creating a generalized European type, which is not the objective of pan-Europeanism (regardless of what its opponents claim). Thus, the objective of Yockeyian genetics is not the optimal, and most rapid, creation of a generalized pan-European genetic type (with a highly concentrated PCA). Indeed, the type of Imperium I have in mind would have less internal movement than the current EU, in order to safeguard the uniqueness of specific European types. Instead, I propose to completely shut off outside influences, while allowing for, over time, low level intra-European gene flow to result in an increased European/non-European separation, and a degree of concentration of the European PCA, while still preserving the overall PCA (genes correlated with geography) structure and the uniqueness of the European types. A slow and modest “tightening” of the PCA over time with respect to Europeans, coupled to increased distance to non-Europeans is the objective, with the concomitant, desired elimination of any possible European/non-European kinship overlap. Thus, in every case, genetic distances between any chosen European ethnies would always be less than genetic distances between any European and non-European ethnies (in most cases, this is true today, but there may be some breakdown of that between the farthest ends of the genetic spectrum).

Thus, this would NOT be any panmixia, but the normal low level gene flow that has always occurred in history between distinct peoples, but in this case, restricted in the manner described above. Of course, if some European ethny wants to follow its own evolutionary path, and be completely genetically isolated from all other groups, in order to promote divergence, that’s fine; freedom of association would be respected (but the opposite, bringing in racial and cultural aliens from outside the European sphere, would not be tolerated).  But, given the behavior of people within the EU today, I suspect the opposite would be more of an issue – people clamoring for free movement between Imperium nations, a movement that would need to be restricted (to some significant degree) in order to preserve ethnic distinctiveness. These are details that would need to be worked out.

The consequences with respect to Salterian EGI would be supportive of the Imperium idea.  Eliminating potential kinship overlap with groups outside the Imperium, and concentrating (to a natural extent over time, again, not a panmixia that would harm the more local specific EGI of individual ethnies) the European genepool, the EGI cost/benefit ratio would ever increasingly move into the direction of maximizing benefits and minimizing costs of the Imperium idea.  Genetic distance to groups outside the Imperium would increase, making it more and more beneficial to exclude such groups and minimizing costs that would have obtained if kinship overlap across the Imperium boundaries existed.  Genetic distances within the Imperium would in all cases be less than any case of cross-boundary genetic distance, again maximizing benefits and minimizing costs.  Not only would net EGI benefit from the Imperium arrangement (in that any significant EGI costs would be more than compensated by counterbalancing benefits), but by eliminating much of the costs, gross EGI would be maximized as well.  This would particularly be the case if the uniqueness of individual ethnies is maintained, so the best of both worlds occur – individual ethnic group EGI is preserved, while pan-European EGI is maximized as well.

To summarize, in outline form:

• 1. A pan-European state (Imperium) would be set up that would have the effect of an enhancement of net EGI, by advancing the interests of the group of peoples and thus the interest of each constituting group.
• 2. In order to safeguard the uniqueness of the constituent groups, movement and mixture between these groups would be restricted, preventing any panmxia and loss of biological and cultural ethnic distinctiveness. Of course, there would be some (limited) movement and gene flow, consistent with what has occurred throughout European history.
• 3. At the same time, movement and mixture from without the Imperium, from biologically and culturally alien non-European peoples, would be strictly forbidden and absolutely restricted.
• 4. Thus, what would obtain over historical, evolutionary time is a complete absence of gene flow from the outside, coupled with continuous, low level, internal gene flow. Genetic drift, selection, and other such processes would take place, with the within vs. without distinction further pushing Europeans and non-Europeans farther apart.
• 5. These processes would have the effect, over time, of increasing the genetic distance of groups within vs. without the Imperium (European vs. non-European), while genetic distances within the Imperium would be maintained and/or slowly decreased (to an extent) over time.
• 6. Kinship overlap within/without would be eliminated due to these processes (particularly the strict isolation from outside gene flow).  Thus, in every possible case, any European ethnies chosen for comparison would be genetically closer (measured with genetic kinship/gene sharing, Fst, or whatever) than would be any European ethny compared to a non-European one. In PCA, European groups would be more separated from non-Europeans, and the European groups may be expected to slowly concentrate around a narrower core grouping along the major axes of genetic variation – Europeans less spread out among themselves, but more isolated from others.
• 7. These processes would take place naturally over long time frames, with ethnic distinctiveness being maintained, preserving local EGI while enhancing group EGI, leading to not only an increase in net EGI but gross EGI as well, a more optimal profile of genetic interests with costs minimized.

Would this process take centuries and millennia? Yes. An enduring structure is required, with an elite caste whose mission is to monitor and guide the process of directing European genetics. One would expect sampling of genetic metrics over time to evaluate the process, make sure all is going as planned, and to make adjustments as necessary. Some formula needs to be designed to make sure the process is politically and evolutionarily stable over time, that it is not hijacked or discarded, and does not become subject to elite free riding.  Considerations of “freedom” need to be put into context – the ultimate freedom is the freedom to exist and to pursue genetic interests. Further, as an elite project, this would not interfere with the day-to-day life of most people, with the exception of restrictions on movement between nations (and more so, in/out of the Imperium). But how many people actually relocate to other nations?  And if one’s nation is an orderly nationalist state, as would be under this scheme, why would they want to?

The Moral State

Considerations.

See here.

Salter rightfully criticizes the pure utilitarian ethic from the standpoint of justice.  He provides a theoretical example that I can paraphrase here. Imagine a murder committed in a town, and the local vagrant is suspected.  The police chief then discovers the vagrant is innocent and that the murder was committed by the mayor, who has been an upstanding citizen and a long-standing important member of the town community.  The crime was one of passion and will be unlikely to ever be repeated, while the vagrant is a constant troublemaker. Convicting the vagrant on the basis of partial or invented evidence would be best for the long-term well-being of the town, while arresting and convicting the mayor would cause social upheaval in the town, damage the town’s nascent tourist industry, and cause widespread economic dislocation and hardship for residents.  A purely utilitarian reading of the situation is to let the vagrant hang and let the mayor off Scott-free, but, as Salter notes, this offends our sense of justice (for most of us anyway).  That being so, the utilitarian ethic needs to be balanced by individual rights, and by certain normative values. Pure utility is not sufficient for a truly just ethic.

Thus, Salter suggests a “mixed ethic” where the pursuit of ethnic genetic interests (EGI) is constrained by ethics based on some sort of moral standards. We observe the requirement for moral standards, an ethical code, which should be independent of pure adaptive interests.

There are other potential problems here as well. A purely rational utilitarian state, for example, one dedicated to optimizing EGI as the highest priority and as the overarching imperative, is unlikely to inspire in the people the sort of dedication required to achieve societal objectives. Consider this.

Salterism has two weaknesses. First, a call to “preserve our distinctive genetic information” is unlikely to motivate most Western individuals to defend their genetic interests against the titanic forces arrayed against them. It almost certainly will not motivate the masses, who, as Michael O’Meara rightfully points out, are always induced to act by “myths” that encompass a cohesive worldview. Even rational activists can often become more motivated by these “myths” (which may of course constitute objective facts to a considerable degree) than to a pure empiricism. Thus, the “myth” of Yockeyan “High Culture” may be needed to motivate the defense of rational Salterian EGI.

Thus, some type of "irrational" spiritual, ethical, and moral code, in this case associated with "Yockeyism," can serve as the basis of a worldview that motivates and unifies the populace, and inspires adherence to conduct conducive to EGI.

A purely utilitarian focus on pure EGI can also run into other problems:

Second, genetic interests are based upon differences and distinctions, and all individuals (except identical twins, if we ignore certain subtleties) differ in their genetic information. Therefore, the potential exists for an unrestrained focus on genetic interests to itself degenerate into a maladaptive genetic atomization—with the natural organic solidarity of particular ethnies, and of the West as a whole, disintegrating under an ever more fine series of biological divisions.

There needs to be a moral structure to the state, independent of pure adaptive utilitarianism. Now, that moral structure can (and should) be used instrumentally to favor adaptive, EGI-focused ends. But the moral structure should exist not only for the purpose of promoting a racial state and for making the pursuit of EGI, of adaptive fitness, more palatable to the population – keeping in mind that humans are apparently evolved to benefit from some sort of religious/spiritual beliefs – but has benefits in its own right. Indeed, there needs to be a balance between a "pure ethic" of unrestrained pursuit of genetic interests, and morality that constrains the unrestrained pursuit of absolute EGI, a pursuit that can lead to “maladaptive genetic atomization.” Certainly, as alluded to in that The Occidental Quarterly piece, Yockeyism can be part of the equation; we should remember that a “rebirth of Faith” was cited by Yockey as an integral part of his predicted, and promoted, Imperium.

What can we say about this sense of morality?

Morality can be independent of religion, although, historically, in the Western civilization (and in Late Antiquity), The Moral State was associated with Christianity. Readers of this blog know that I am hostile to Christianity. However, there are certain elements in (Europeanized) Christianity that can be of benefit to society if – and only if – these ideals are limited to one’s own people, rather than to all of humanity (in other words, particularism vs. universalism), and are tempered by adaptive interests and pragmatic prudence. Brotherhood, if limited to ethny, can be positive, as can be charity, similarly limited, restraint of hatred of (personal) enemies and a degree of forgiveness, again limited to the ethny, etc. Aspects of these positive characteristics of Christianity can be incorporated into the moral ideas of a secular moral state.

This is in no way incompatible with an anti-Christian appeal to higher, Nietzschean values; there is nothing that says that such values have to be “immoral” or “amoral” based on the innate human moral sense, but we can, and should construct, our own morality, independent of the dogmas of the past, including that of Christianity, while incorporating whatever was good and just from those past dogmas.

What I suggest is that a proper state based on principles of the Sallis Groupuscule should have a foundation of EGI and adaptive fitness, with the edifice of Yockeyism built upon it, with these two poles of activity and of interest synergizing in the manner described in The Occidental Quarterly article linked to above. 

But there needs to be a moral underpinning for both poles; Salter describes moral, ethical, and philosophical justifications for EGI in Part III of On Genetic Interests, while Yockey, in contrast, considers his Imperium to derives organically from a Spenglerian view of history, as well as the destiny of Western Man. But Yockey does consider Faith as a key part of the authoritarian future of the West. He assumed this will be religious, I suppose in the Christian sense, but we can instead substitute a secular form of morality.  Intra-racial brotherhood, the Golden Rule, respect for oneself and for others (who deserve it), self-overcoming, discipline, hard work, futurist progress, a rejection of free-riding and a more disinterested willingness to invest in collective social goods, a healthy balance between helping oneself and an adaptively-informed “altruism,” avoiding socially destructive behaviors, the list can go on, but the point is that Christianity has no monopoly on “righteous behavior” (however defined). The moral standards that define European culture, both before and after the advent of Christianity, can assist in the development of the secular Moral State. Inherent moral and spiritual characteristics of European Man – see the works of Duchesne to observe how we differ from others – can serve as the basis of Good vs. Bad, independent of old religious dogma. There may very well be some overlap with that dogma, in the cases in which that dogma was formed by the same inherent impulses; in other cases, the morality will be quite different. But it will be suited for our people and their destiny, not something imposed by alien peoples and cultures.

The Moral State will be based on the moral standards of the populace, its leaders, and culture; conversely, The Moral State itself can help direct and guide the development of the moral standards of the people and their culture. Codreanu's Legionary Movement, and its emphasis on the "New Man," and a high moral and ethical culture, can also inform the development of the characteristics of The Moral State.

A non-Christian basis for The Moral State may also be informed by considerations such as described here. Indeed, The Moral State may become the seed of a new beginning, a new High Culture, on in which Faustian impulses are achieved, but with the constraints of an overarching morality that directs activity in the direction of principles consistent with beauty, knowledge, and higher goals.

And the type of individuals who should be prominent in the leadership of such a state is described here. The type of “leaders” found in today’s (American) “movement” – meritless affirmative action hacks, money-hungry grifters, gaslighting liars, inept incompetents with no sense of personal responsibility or accountability, shameless hustlers and mountebanks, sweaty obsessive fetishists, conspiracy theorists, drug addicts, sexual perverts, the chronically impaired with piss-poor judgment – these need to be eschewed. There is no place in The Moral State for failed “leaders” such as that. We deserve better. Our people, our race, and our civilization deserve better. We can and must do better.

Universal Nationalism: Blueprint for the Future

It is necessary.

Salterian Universal Nationalism is the way forward for humanity, despite opposition from both the Left, who want to submerge the White world under the rising tide of color, and elements of the Far Right, who have fantasies of race wars and actual White supremacy.

A world of racially segregated civilizational blocs, each being left alone to develop according to its own destiny, peacefully competing, with survival assured for all, will allow humanity  - or at least the civilized elements of humanity – to focus on other issues, like long-term human survival and advancement, space exploration, and advancing science and technics, including genetics and novel energy production.  Freed from the constraints of endless existential group conflict, human dynamism can be unleashed to ponder great thoughts and actualize great deeds.

Far better this future than an endless spiral of "wokeness,” with racial navel-gazing benefitting the least among humanity, while sacrificing the best. The least among humanity (and we need to be honest enough to recognize enormous differences in achievement and potential between groups) should stop complaining and realize that whatever “suffering” that they imagine they have endured in the past was necessary to birth the world of today and the potential world of tomorrow, just as a woman endures pain in childbirth to bring forth new life. And they should not worry about “justice” – the least, the lowest, among humanity, together with their allies among the higher peoples, have been inflicting endless suffering on the rest of us for many decades now, so they have had, and continue to have, full revenge for whatever injustices that they believe has been done to them. Non-Europeans have had justice galore, they have feasted on justice past the point of engorgement, past the point of any reasonable compensation, and their continued harassment of Europeans is now a manifest injustice. And they always fail to balance the books, and fail to recognize that the dynamism of Western man, that led to whatever episodes that fuel their never-ending grievances, is what has led to the highest standard of living for humanity in our species’ history, and it is the only thing that would allow for humanity's next step upward.

The past is prelude to the future. We have seen that peoples of European stock, and only they, have proven capable of the higher level of civilization, of science, and technics, required to advance humanity to its next level. Universal Nationalism offers a way out of our current morass, an approach that can end the wasteful misappropriation of human material and human resources in endless conflicts, and in fruitless quests to transform sow’s ears into silk purses, and will instead allow us to unlock the full potential of humanity, particularly that potential inherent in European Man.

And if the Colored peoples of the Earth truly believe that they are capable, and if they truly believe that they have been held back by “White racism,” then Universal Nationalism offers a way out for them as well. On the other hand, if they openly acknowledge, or secretly suspect, that they are truly dependent on the White Man, then for that reason they should accept Universal Nationalism, which would preserve the people upon whom they depend.  In either case, Universal Nationalism should be embraced by all peoples. 

We cannot let self-destructive racial envy and vindictiveness, bioleninist rages, and selfish inter-group free-riding, interfere with the attainment of the last and best hope of humanity – a stable world order in which every group is guaranteed the right to exist, given the opportunity to achieve its destiny, and, if it is capable of doing so, contribute to the forward march of human progress.

Racial Existentialism

For authentic authenticity and against Heidegger.

In this post I begin – the very beginning - the process of outlining a philosophical basis for the worldview of the Sallis Groupuscule.  A side-effect, if you will, is criticism of Heidegger, who is favored by the traditionalist faction of the “movement.”

My major weakness here – that I am an empiricist STEM person lacking any formal training in philosophy – may actually be a strength: What is needed is direct, simple, plain-talk, not hundreds of pages of abstract theorizing.  The ultimate aim of philosophy is, or should be, to place man within the scope of the universe, to advise on how to live a good and proper life, how to situate man within the scope of his existence…not to demonstrate one’s “intellectual bonafides” by taking a whole chapter to express an idea that could have been more efficiently expressed in a single sentence (here’s looking at you, Heidegger).

I’d like to point out as well that those who automatically privilege the views of Heidegger over that of Sallis are essentially arguing by “appeal to authority” – what about Der Right’s complaints about “credentialism?”  Interesting that “credentialism” is always brought up with respect to STEM, which at least has some objective basis, and not for philosophy, which is mostly subjective.  Hypocritical much?

The key point is this analysis, ultimately, is authenticity. What is it? Who decides what it is?  For individuals?  For groups?  As regards the latter, is it proper to ascribe authenticity to entire populations?

Authenticity cannot be dictated from the “other;” that by definition invalidates claims of authenticity. Authenticity can only come from self, with that “self” being the individual or the group.

How does a person or group know that they are behaving in a manner truly authentic?  Can there be any objective confirmation of that?

Let’s consider some writings by myself and others on this topic, before briefly summarizing at the end.

See this.

…it was clear that Heidegger initially thought that National Socialism was an alternative to modern technological nihilism, but eventually he came to see it as just another expression of the same underlying worldview. For Heidegger, nihilism is basically having a false vision of man as being uprooted from nature and history and capable of controlling and consuming them.

Why is that a false vision?  Who decides?

The only way to avoid this trap is to move the battle from the political to the metapolitical plane. We need a fundamental transformation of our view of ourselves and our relationship to history and nature. But it is not as simple is manufacturing and promulgating a correct alternative worldview, for such a project itself is a form of technological nihilism. It assumes that the human mind and its machinations can stand behind culture and history and manufacture them according to its designs. Whereas the truth is that history and culture stand behind us. We are shaped by cultural and historical forces we can neither understand nor control.

Not very Faustian, is it?  

But once we recognize this fact, i.e., that we are finite beings, rooted in a particular time and place, rather than rootless cosmopolitan citizens of nowhere, the spell of nihilism is broken, which clears a space in which a new dispensation — a new fundamental worldview — can emerge.

If only we can clear a space so a New Movement can emerge, eh?

Thus Heideggerian metapolitics is not the construction of systems of ideas, ideologies, or -isms. Any worldview we can construct is simply an expression of nihilism, not an alternative to it. But that does not mean that we are impotent. We might not be able to manufacture an alternative, but we can still help one to emerge, first and foremost by owning up to our finitude and rootedness, then by clearing away the detritus of nihilism to create a space in which an alternative might grow.

One can create political policies. One can create legal codes. One can build the damned wall. But it is not in our power to manufacture a new culture.

Because Johnson says so!  QED!

But neither can we manufacture a simple tomato. 

Give genetic engineering a chance.

We can, however, work with forces we ultimately do not understand or control — nature itself — to grow tomatoes. 

Certainly, traditionalists hiding in their hobbit holes (*) cannot understand or control nature.

We can clear a space, plant a seed, weed, water, and fertilize — and then wait. We can do the same in the metapolitical realm: clear spaces by deconstructing false ideas, plant identitarian and ethnonationalist seeds, and tend what grows.

Translation: do nothing and rattle the tin cup for “D’Nations.”

That’s what we do here at Counter-Currents. We help people envision new answers to the questions “Who are we?” “What is the right way to live together?” and “How can we get there from here?”

No, actually they beg for money and engage in ethnoimperialist hypocrisy.

Heidegger did not believe that philosophers or poets are the hidden legislators of mankind, whose machinations create history. 

That’s good, since Heidegger was an idiot and shouldn’t be the “legislator” of anything.

But that doesn’t mean we have to shut up and let history do the talking, or sit back and let history do the work. Rather, Heidegger believed that history speaks and acts through us. Philosophers and poets are the first people to become aware of fundamental changes in the Zeitgeist. 

Alternatively, they create those fundamental changes and then slyly assert that they became “aware” of some underlying self-actualizing process.

Thus dissident thinkers and artists proceed historical change not as its creators but as its prophets, awakening and leading people to changes that are already underway. The very fact that we can conceive of fundamentally different ideas may mean that a new dispensation is nearing.

To be fair, Yockey had a similar idea – that there is a “spirit of the age” that manifests as a natural evolution of the lifecycle of the High Culture – so I cannot be too harsh here. However, this seems hand-waving or passing the buck; there is no explanation of why a “new dispensation” occurs, except there is the a prior assumption that “historical change” and “a new dispensation” cannot be in any real way influenced by people ,and certainly not created. I do not like a priori assumptions nor just shrugging off the question of the actual mechanism of historical change.

Let’s see what I wrote before about the possibilities of guiding historical change.

Although the Jewish author Isaac Asimov may not be popular among many white gentile racial nationalists, his Foundation series can provide a useful analogy here. “The Foundation” was meant to jumpstart a new civilization after the collapse of the “Galactic Empire,” so that the post-collapse “era of barbarism” would be a mere thousand years, instead of 30,000. Facing as we do the collapse of the West through the Winter of the Faustian age, it may be prudent to lay the seeds of a new emergent white, Western civilization for the long term, as we also fight the more short-term and medium-term battles to preserve the white race and save as much of Western Faustian civilization as possible. Without these shorter range objectives, the long term civilizational (re)birth will not be possible. Conversely, without a civilizational (re)birth, long-term white preservationism would be questionable.

So, there are two things that need to be going on here. First is the ongoing struggle for white racial preservationism and to save as much of the Faustian culture as possible, to serve as a knowledge base and building blocks for the new High Culture of the West. Second, an effort must be initiated to begin the process of laying the groundwork for this new High Culture. As indicated above, of course a High Culture is an organic phenomenon that cannot be created in a pre-planned form and artificially imposed on a people. However, it is possible to plant the seeds and to have some choice as to which seeds are planted. And then, we can nurture the seedling as it grows, and as it develops according to its own inherent character. This we can do and this we must do.

This is a serious matter requiring forward-thinking strategy of an extreme visionary character, not something that can be productively “discussed” on “blog threads” or other (typically inane) public forums. It is not something that can occur overnight. This is a long-term, multi-generational project that needs to be undertaken by dedicated individuals who wish to lay the foundation of something great and noble for posterity. This will not be not any “quick fix” whose results may be seen in a decade or two; instead, this is a project that has the potential to influence the course of human history and it must be conducted on that higher level.

Therefore, this essay is simply a call for action and an initial and cursory consideration of the possibilities. If such a project is ever initiated, it should not, and must not, devolve into the mundane “movement” minutiae that many obsess over, nor can it be linked to the more serious, yet short-term, necessary “stop-gap” activism required to save our people and culture today. This is another matter, on another level, entirely.

Many are called; few are chosen. The Future Awaits.

So, I’m not stating that historical change can be fully and directly influenced, the way one would drive a car, nor am I saying that a “new dispensation” can be created out of nothing, but I am saying that there is a role for higher men to guide and influence the process so as to significantly affect the final outcome.

See this, with an emphasis on Heidegger and technology.

Heidegger's flagship example of technology is a hydroelectric plant built on the Rhine river that converts that river into a mere supplier of water power. Set against this “monstrousness” (Question Concerning Technology 321) is the poetic habitation of the natural environment of the Rhine as signalled by an old wooden bridge that spanned the river for hundreds of years, plus the river as revealed by Hölderlin's poem “The Rhine”. 

Here we contrast the Futurist view as promoted by the Sallis Groupuscule vs. the “traditionalist” view championed by the likes of Counter-Currents (itself promoting Heidegger’s views).  Objectively speaking, why isn’t an “old wooden bridge” not a “monstrous” ruination of the “poetic habitation of the natural environment?” Who decides that the wooden bridge is below the threshold of “monstrousness” but the hydroelectric plant is above? Just because Heidegger is comfortable with the former and not the latter?

In these cases of poetic habitation, natural phenomena are revealed to us as objects of respect and wonder. 

Twigs and branches!

One might think that Heidegger is over-reacting here, and that despite the presence of the hydroelectric plant, the Rhine in many ways remains a glorious example of natural beauty. 

Uh, yes.

Heidegger's response to this complaint is to focus on how the technological mode of Being corrupts the very notion of unspoilt areas of nature, by reducing such areas to resources ripe for exploitation by the tourist industry. 

So, if Heidegger visits the Rhine as a tourist to visit that “old wooden bridge” then that is corrupting?

Turning our attention to inter-human affairs, the technological mode of Being manifests itself when, for example, a friendly chat in the bar is turned into networking (Dreyfus 1993). And, in the light of Heidegger's analysis, one might smile wryly at the trend for companies to take what used to be called ‘personnel’ departments, and to rename them ‘human resources’. Many other examples could be given, but the general point is clear. The primary phenomenon to be understood is not technology as a collection of instruments, but rather technology as a clearing that establishes a deeply instrumental and, as Heidegger sees it, grotesque understanding of the world in general. 

Technology is one thing, how people use it, and let it affect society, is another.  At one point in time, even “wooden bridges” were disruptive to the established order.

Of course, if technological revealing were a largely restricted phenomenon, characteristic of isolated individuals or groups, then Heidegger's analysis of it would be of limited interest. The sting in the tale, however, is that, according to Heidegger, technological revealing is not a peripheral aspect of Being. Rather, it defines our modern way of living, at least in the West.

At this point one might pause to wonder whether technology really is the structure on which we should be concentrating. The counter-suggestion would be that technological thinking is merely the practical application of modern mathematical science, and that the latter is therefore the primary phenomenon. Heidegger rejects this view, arguing in contrast that the establishment of the technological mode of revealing is a necessary condition for there to be mathematical science at all, since such science “demands that nature be orderable as standing-reserve” by requiring that “nature report itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remain orderable as a system of information” (Question Concerning Technology 328). 

What stupidity.  The Ancient Greeks were doing mathematics in the absence of any high scale technics (Archimedes aside).

Either way, one might object to the view of science at work here, by pointing to analyses which suggest that while science may reduce objects to instrumental means rather than ends, it need not behave in this way. 

No kidding.

Moreover, if science may sometimes operate with a sense of awe and wonder in the face of beings, it may point the way beyond the technological clearing, an effect that, as we shall see later, Heidegger thinks is achieved principally by some great art.

Great art, historically in the Western civilization, has meant cities and city life, and the most highly developed technics for that particular time and place.

By revealing beings as no more than the measurable and the manipulable, technology ultimately reduces beings to not-beings (Contributions 2: 6). This is our first proper glimpse of the oblivion of Being, the phenomenon that, in the Contributions, Heidegger also calls the abandonment of Being, or the abandonment of beings by Being (e.g., 55: 80). 

Nonsense.  This is purely subjective.

Secondly, recall the loss of dwelling identified by Heidegger. Modern humankind (at least in the West) is in the (enframed) grip of technological thinking. Because of this promotion of instrumentality as the fundamental way of Being of entities, we have lost sight of how to inhabit the fourfold poetically…

To be or not to be, that is the Dasein.  What convoluted nonsense.

Heidegger was no eco-warrior and no luddite. 

You could have fooled me.

Although he often promoted a romantic image of a pre-technological age inhabited by worthy peasants in touch with nature…

To the hobbit hole!  De facto anarchy in the provinces!  Hail Tolkien!

We need to transform our mode of Being into one in which technology (in the sense of the machines and devices of the modern age) is there for us to enjoy and use, but in which technology (in the sense of a mode of Being-in-the-world) is not our only or fundamental way of encountering entities. And what is the basic character of this reinhabiting? It is to shelter the truth of Being in beings (e.g., Contributions 246: 273), to safeguard the fourfold in its essential unfolding. In what, then, does this safeguarding consist?

One wonders how long technology will continue once we start dabbling in mysticism. All these types believe – tacitly – that technology falls from the sky with no underlying underlying epistemological structure – or else they demonize that structure and believe that we can “enjoy and use” technology without putting the effort in required to produce it.

See this, with an emphasis on Heidegger and authenticity.

The term ‘authentic’ is used either in the strong sense of being “of undisputed origin or authorship”, or in a weaker sense of being “faithful to an original” or a “reliable, accurate representation”. To say that something is authentic is to say that it is what it professes to be, or what it is reputed to be, in origin or authorship. But the distinction between authentic and derivative is more complicated when discussing authenticity as a characteristic attributed to human beings. For in this case, the question arises: What is it to be oneself, at one with oneself, or truly representing one’s self? 

Good question.  It is difficult to ascertain how anyone other than the person in question can answer that; on the other hand, obviously, if we believe that many or most people are living “inauthentic” lives (by whose standards?), then perhaps most people lack the self-awareness and intelligence required to figure out what authenticity means for them? This is a paradox, partially resolved perhaps by helping guide people – or at least those with sufficient brainpower and motivation – to an answer that seems to “fit” (defined how?), but never really knowing what the correct answer is.

The multiplicity of puzzles that arise in conjunction with the conception of authenticity connects with metaphysical, epistemological, and moral issues (for recent discussion, see Newman and Smith 2016; Heldke and Thomsen 2014). On the one hand, being oneself is inescapable, since whenever one makes a choice or acts, it is oneself who is doing these things. But on the other hand, we are sometimes inclined to say that some of the thoughts, decisions and actions that we undertake are not really one’s own and are therefore not genuinely expressive of who one is. Here, the issue is no longer of metaphysical nature, but rather about moral-psychology, identity and responsibility.

But therein lies part of the paradox. Who decides if the “decisions and actions that we undertake are not really one’s own and are therefore not genuinely expressive of who one is?” If the person themselves does so then fine – but how do we know that they are judging correctly and not engaging in self-deception – but if another person interjects themselves into the process then isn’t that part of the paradigm of “decisions and actions” being imposed from the outside of self?

When used in this latter sense, the characterization describes a person who acts in accordance with desires, motives, ideals or beliefs that are not only hers (as opposed to someone else’s), but that also express who she really is. Bernard Williams captures this when he specifies authenticity as “the idea that some things are in some sense really you, or express what you are, and others aren’t” (quoted in Guignon 2004: viii).

Who decides?  

Besides being a topic in philosophical debates, authenticity is also a pervasive ideal that impacts social and political thinking. In fact, one distinctive feature of recent Western intellectual developments has been a shift to what is called the “age of authenticity” (Taylor 2007; Ferrarra 1998). Therefore, understanding the concept also involves investigating its historical and philosophical sources and on the way it impacts the socio-political outlook of contemporary societies.

When modern politics intrudes, you can rest assured that “authenticity” for Whites equates to self-destruction and race-treason. No thanks.

The most familiar conception of “authenticity” comes to us mainly from Heidegger’s Being and Time of 1927. The word we translate as ‘authenticity’ is actually a neologism invented by Heidegger, the word Eigentlichkeit, which comes from an ordinary term, eigentlich, meaning ‘really’ or ‘truly’, but is built on the stem eigen, meaning ‘own’ or ‘proper’. So the word might be more literally translated as ‘ownedness’, or ‘being owned’, or even ‘being one’s own’, implying the idea of owning up to and owning what one is and does (for a stimulating recent interpretation, see McManus 2019). Nevertheless, the word ‘authenticity’ has become closely associated with Heidegger as a result of early translations of Being and Time into English, and was adopted by Sartre and Beauvoir as well as by existentialist therapists and cultural theorists who followed them.[1]

So Heidegger will guide us?  Why him?  Why this intrusion into self?

Heidegger’s conception of ownedness as the most fully realized human form of life emerges from his view of what it is to be a human being. This conception of human Dasein echoes Kierkegaard’s description of a “self”. On Heidegger’s account, Dasein is not a type of object among others in the totality of what is on hand in the universe. Instead, human being is a “relation of being”, a relation that obtains between what one is at any moment (the immediacy of the concrete present as it has evolved) and what one can and will be as the temporally extended unfolding or happening of life into an open realm of possibilities. To say that human being is a relation is to say that, in living out our lives, we always care about who and what we are. Heidegger expresses this by saying that, for each of us, our being (what our lives will amount to overall) is always at issue. This “being at stake” or “being in question for oneself” is made concrete in the specific stands we take—that is, in the roles we enact—over the course of our lives. It is because our being (our identity) is in question for us that we are always taking a stand on who we are. Since the German word for ‘understanding’, Verstehen, is etymologically derived from the idea of ‘taking a stand’, Heidegger can call the projection into the future by which we shape our identity ‘understanding’. And because any stand one takes is inescapably “being-in-the-world”, understanding carries with it some degree of competence in coping with the world around us. An understanding of being in general is therefore built into human agency.

Babbling nonsense with no real-world applicability.

To the extent that all our actions contribute to realizing an overarching project or set of projects, our active lives can be seen as embodying a life-project of some sort. 

See this about true freedom embodied in personal overcoming and in being part of a community with organic solidarity (which does not merely have to mean an interdependence of services, but a complete interdependence, emphasizing ethnic and cultural ties, common interests, and social cohesion).

On Heidegger’s view, we exist for the sake of ourselves: enacting roles and expressing character traits contribute to realizing some image of what it is to be human in our own cases. Existence has a directedness or purposiveness that imparts a degree of connection to our life stories. For the most part, having such a life-plan requires very little conscious formulation of goals or deliberation about means. It results from our competence in being members of a historical culture that we have mastered to a great extent in growing up into a shared world. This tacit “pre-understanding” makes possible our familiar dwelling with things and others in the familiar, everyday world.

To some extent this view is Yockeyian; the rootedness of a person as part of a High Culture or as part of barbarians against the Culture, or as part of a fellah people.  That is fine as far as it goes, but this limits the scope of action of Faustian Man. What would Nietzsche say? Heidegger the camel – what about lion and child?

It should be obvious that this conception of authenticity has very little to do with the older idea of being true to one’s own pregiven feelings and desires. But there is still a clear respect in which the idea of “being true to oneself” has a role to play here. What distinguishes this conception from the conceptions of pop psychology and romantic views of authenticity is the fact that the “true self” to which we are to be true is not some pre-given set of substantive feelings, opinions and desires to be consulted through inward-turning or introspection. On the contrary, the “true self” alluded to here is an on-going narrative construction: the composition of one’s own autobiography through one’s concrete ways of acting over the course of a life as a whole. 

Acta non verba.

Others argue that Heidegger uses authenticity in both evaluative-normative and purely descriptive senses. In the descriptive use of the term, inauthenticity is simply the default condition of everyday life, in which our self-relations are mediated by others. In this sense, authenticity involves no judgment about which mode of being is superior for Dasein. 

Can these “others” include Heidegger himself? One gets the inescapable feeling that what these pontificating philosophers really want is the precise opposite of authenticity – they want to dictate to people what “their” “true authentic selves” really are. If you believe that you are being authentic by doing X, Y, Z but The Grand Philosopher believes that your true authenticity is doing A, B, C. then, certainly, you are “lying to yourself” about X, Y, Z and the only way to undo this self-deception and engage your authentic self is to do A, B, C. The utter mendacity of this, and the dangerousness of this for manipulation, should set off alarm bells.

See this.

In an endnote, Polt explains who these “neofascist” intellectuals are: “Heidegger is a popular figure on counter-currents.com, home of Counter-Currents Publishing, purveyor of books by racists and neofascists. In Russia, political theorist Alexander Dugin has enlisted Heidegger in his project of a ‘Eurasianism’ that is profoundly antiliberal, although he denies that it is fascist” (p. 250, n15). Although Polt does not mention me by name, I am the primary person at Counter-Currents writing about Heidegger and political philosophy. Naturally, I am flattered that one of the express purposes of Polt’s book is to intellectually combat people like me.

After all, it’s all about ego for your “leaders.”

Heidegger’s political thought basically went through two phases. Early on, Heidegger was what one might call a humanistic historicist. He was historicist because he believed that our thought is rooted in concrete historical traditions and ways of life. He was a humanist because, following Nietzsche, he believed that great philosophers, poets, and statesmen create these traditions and ways of life. 

What a self-serving hypocrite. On the one hand, we are rooted in a particular historical culture. But, you see, people like Heidegger can help “create these traditions and ways of life.”  On the other hand, we must have authenticity, with the implication that simply following others is not consistent with living a fully authentic life. I suppose that the exception to the latter are our demigods (didn’t Nietzsche say that the philosopher was both god and beast?) like Heidegger, whose pontifications create the culture we find ourselves boxed into, and, thus, following those pontifications, in the context of that cultural creation, is properly “authentic.”

His hope was that National Socialism would bring about a new inception, legislating a new culture and way of life.

This viewpoint is, however, implicitly totalitarian and nihilistic. Creating a new culture means setting up new standards of truth and goodness. Which means that such decisions are unconstrained by prior standards of truth and goodness. This implies that the legislator can do anything he wishes and call it true or good.

And those prior standards of truth and goodness are created by who? Legislators like Heidegger?  Which standards should we be constrained by?  Christian ethics?  Isn’t that part of our historical cultural tradition?  I object. 

Later, as Heidegger became disillusioned with Nietzsche and National Socialism, he came to see humanistic historicism as another form of nihilism and unbounded technological machination. 

Jump back into your hobbit hole!  Enjoy the spectacle of the old wooden bridge.

Heidegger’s mature philosophy is resolutely anti-humanist. Human subjectivity is not “behind” history, not even the subjectivity of great men. Rather, history is “behind” human subjectivity. Which means that human beings cannot take control of our own destinies and change the course of history. 

Because he says so. But, hey, while we are all passive, “great men” like Heidegger will be creating our cultural norms for us, have no fear!

That is the error of all forms of modern technological nihilism, including National Socialism. Instead, we can only wait as modern nihilism burns itself out and a new inception emerges.

Ride the tiger in the Kali Yuga!  Traditionalist nonsense and passive defeatism.

Heidegger sums up the course of his thinking in a 1939 entry in his Black Notebooks:

In his Black Notebooks from the Third Reich and other contemporary posthumously published works like Mindfulness (Besinnung) and The History of Beyng, Heidegger systematically dismantles such National Socialist ideas as the people (Volk), nationalism, dictatorship, leadership, struggle (Kampf), cultural politics, Lebensraum, eugenics, and anti-intellectualism, connecting them all to nihilism, machination, brutality, and criminality. Thus, as Polt concludes, “It seems safe to say that by the late thirties, [Heidegger] was no Nazi anymore” (p. 153).

Heidegger was obviously a cuck. Whatever criticism is justified of National Socialism, it is an ideology that had to function in the real, modern world, not a philosophical dream of peasants and old wooden bridges.

Surprisingly, though, even though Heidegger came to see National Socialism as an expression of nihilism rather than as an alternative to it, he still believed there were grounds to affirm it: “On the basis of the full insight into the earlier deception about the essence and historical essential force of National Socialism, there results the necessity of its affirmation, and indeed on thoughtful grounds” (p. 135).

Heidegger’s rationale for this affirmation is a form of accelerationism. The clash of National Socialism vs. communism and liberal democracy may just be a family quarrel between different forms of technological nihilism, but the greater the conflict, the more likely the downfall of all forms of modernity, which would clear the ground for the emergence of a new inception. 

“New inception” – Luddite reactionary backwardness. In your hobbit hole, while the Chinamen rocket off to the stars.

If so, this is a clear example of Heidegger using techniques of “esoteric” communication, since his private conception of “inner truth and greatness” is sharply different from what his audience would have taken him to mean.

Evola!  Guenon!  Savitri Devi! The Men Who Can’t Tell Time in The Age of Aluminum.  Nonsense.

But neither are we in total thrall to these traditions, for they are ultimately practices for understanding and coping with what is new. The moment of application gives ample space for creativity. Moreover, it is both natural and noble to want to improve one’s heritage before passing it on to the next generation. 

Doesn’t that possibly include the need for technology and a scientific mindset?

If you want to halt globalization, the most natural boundary for doing so is the nation-state. If you think place, history, and roots matter, then the best kind of state is the ethnostate. 

Can John Morgan leave Magyar Hungarians alone to enjoy an ethnostate?

Polt discusses three ways in which Heidegger’s political thought can be said to be irrationalist.

Oh indeed.

Polt recognizes that if Heidegger is right about human existence, all politics is inescapably identity politics. But identity politics is a complicated thing. Heidegger regards the identity of a people as a complex mix of race, language, culture, and history. Beyond that, he holds that the identity of a people is never finished and fixed but is instead an ongoing form of life that we should pass on to future generations better than we found it. Moreover, part of who we are is our future, which is in part a set of possibilities.

Hmmm…you mean we can leave our hobbit holes and help influence the future?

When diverse peoples stop talking about their identities and actually try to live together in the same system, there are tensions that can lead to violent conflict. 

Like John Morgan in Hungary?

The worst-case scenario is genocide, which Polt describes as the attempt to “settle the ‘who’ question in the worst possible way: by murdering those who ‘we’ are not?” (p. 170). To avoid genocide, warring tribes need to separate, preferably into their own sovereign states. This is why the New Right advocates ethnonationalism. It is the best way to avoid needless hatred and violence between peoples and ensure their ability to live by their own lights without outside interference.

Hungarians living without John Morgan’s interference.

Polt also takes Heidegger to task for his lack of appreciation for negative freedom, including freedom of association and speech (pp. 181, 193). Heidegger, however, did not reject negative freedom unthinkingly. Instead, his views were very much in the German idealist tradition of positive freedom. He emphasized that freedom is only real if concretized in finite institutions….It is misguided to think one understands freedom most purely in its essence if one isolates it as a free-floating arbitrariness. . . . The task is precisely the reverse, to conceive freedom in its finitude and to see that, by providing boundedness, one has neither impaired freedom nor curtailed its essence.[2]

Please see my take on true freedom.  You can compare that to Heidegger.  If “finitude” means exercising freedom and authenticity while being rooted in a genuine racial-cultural folk community, then I approve, as the True Freedom piece makes clear. If it instead means hiding in a hobbit hole (*), then I vehemently disagree.

*All these references to “hobbit holes,” mocking Greg Johnson’s traditionalist Tolkien fetish, is meant to describe a traditionalist, reactionary,” twigs and branches,” anti-scientific and anti-technics – and anti-Futurist most of all – mindset, in which we are all to “go back to the forest” and turn our backs on the stars.

The debate about the costs of technology and the technological mindset to the human soul reminds me of the tale of the machines in Gene Wolfe’s The Book of the New Sun. To paraphrase and summarize – humanity reached the stars by giving away the wild part of themselves – essentially becoming emotionless technocrats – and then the thinking machines (AI), who hated their human creators, decided to ruin those human creators by re-introducing to humanity paradigms that would rekindle humanity’s interest in those “wild things.” Thus, humanity became distracted away from pure science and technics and the galactic empire collapsed.  The lesson here is that – besides not trusting AI – humanity should not give up its “wild” side, its human soul, for the sake of technology; instead, humans need to achieve their objectives – “reach the stars” – while remaining fundamentally human. Thus, in relation of Heidegger’s whining, we need not become entrapped into a technological spiritual mindset – pure instrumentality (**) – in order to “be scientific.”  On the other hand, we cannot evade the price that must be paid for science and technology – while science is a tool, it is an expensive tool, and what has to invest in a degree of rationality and empiricism to achieve science and technics. One must strike a balance – the mind must be scientific while the soul remains human.  But we cannot hide in the hobbit hole, while others reach the stars. The White Man cannot give up his Faustian birthright because of fearful, backwards-looking traditionalists.

**Amusingly, see this.

After attaining power and the expansion of humans in space, they eventually entered a somewhat stagnant phase…This somewhat empty and sterile system was reformed and enlivened by the "Rediscovery of Man"…

Of relevance, see this post about Salterian ethics. This is relevant with respect to the role of authenticity and the idea that True Freedom can, and should, mean the rights people to defend and promote their genetic interests, up to and including at the level of ethny (EGI).

As Salter emphasizes, morality is basically an approach for adjudicating conflicts of interests…This is in accord with the view – promoted by Salter and myself - that genetic interests are ultimate interests. How could it be otherwise for evolved organisms whose reproduction – indeed, whose representation among the informational content of reality – is essentially dependent upon and constituted by “genetic material?”  Or more basically by the information encoded in that “genetic material?”…

…If someone has a value system in which self-destructive values are prized then that is their prerogative; others who value continuity of both their bioculture and their values would be well served to promote their genetic interests.  Salter also notes that proximate interests are best optimized rather than maximized; for example, a person who is “too happy” may become less prudent, jeopardizing well-being.  On the other hand, ultimate interests are different; these interests are adaptive when maximized (note: maximized in the net sense).  Thus, Salter states: “One cannot be too well adapted.” 

Salter notes that people “who do not consider peaceful genetic replacement to be a moral issue will have no moral objection to their own painless genetic extinction.” Well, there are Whites with pathological altruism who do not personally reproduce as to “save the planet” (and who advocate the same to other Whites, but typically not to non-Whites), but typically the situation is that of a targeted attack against White interests. Especially, non-White activists will be among those who attempt to convince Whites to accept genetic extinction, while these non-Whites themselves continue their own genetic lines.  

A few concluding comments are appropriate at this point.  Salter believes that “evolved organisms” will not for long accept a “social order that weeds out their lineages.” Well, so far, Whites have been generally accepting of such a social order; we shall see how things evolve (no pun intended).  It is part of the proper ethics of EGI to educate people on the important of adaptive behavior; one can view Salter’s book, and my current post, as part of such efforts.

Let us finish with the following Shakespearean quote that Salter includes in this section of his book, with respect to conflicts between sets of genetic interests:

KING HARRY

Therefore take heed how you impawn our person,

How you awake our sleeping sword of war.

We charge you in the name of God, take heed,

For never two such kingdoms did contend

Without much fall of blood, whose guiltless drops

Are every one a woe, a sore complaint

'Gainst him whose wrong gives edge unto the swords

That make such waste in brief mortality.

…

May I with right and conscience make this claim? 

Shakespeare, Henry V, 1500, Act I, Scene I

That KING HARRY quote also applies to situations in which anyone attempts to suppress True Freedom by preventing Whites from pursuing adaptive fitness though EGI. It also applies to charlatans like Heidegger who believe they have the right to dictate authenticity to others.

Finally, see this about an empirical racial soul.

Summary: Racial Existentialism

While it is reasonable to assert that True Freedom is constrained by rootedness in a specific community and by belonging, or not, to a High Culture, I object to any artificial constraints put on a person’s freedom or their idea of authenticity, whether from Heidegger or anyone else (e.g., Johnson or any other “traditionalist” Quota Queen).

I am a Futurist, and object to the anti-scientific and anti-technics mindset of the hobbit hole crowd, and I laugh at those fools who believe you can have maintain and create technology while at the same time rejecting the scientific mindset.

We need a form of racial existentialism, in which authenticity revolves around True Freedom, which has the dual aspect of both (1) being limited in the sense of rootedness in a racial-cultural community and belonging or not to a High Culture, and (2) allowing for personal overcoming and cultural creation not limited to specific constraints

Life has meaning given by individuals themselves, not from some sort of outside source (including Heidegger).  Living an authentic life is crucial, but who or what decides what authenticity is open to debate (see above). All I can say at this point is that the choices individuals make should be informed choices, including knowledge of one’s genetic interests and the facts about race. The foundation of authenticity needs to be truth, facts, knowledge; it is best not to make decisions out of ignorance.

Racial Existentialism is the choice – the free choice of the individual – to give meaning to one’s life by defending one’s race and civilization, to defend and promote genetic interests, and to actualize self-overcoming to be a better representative of one’s people and a better fighter for one’s people.

Imperium: All are Part of the West, Even Though Different

Yockey’s wisdom.

All men dream, but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds, wake in the day to find that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act on their dreams with open eyes, to make them possible.- T.E. Lawrence

I would like to make an important statement concerning my pan-European focus, clarifying my thoughts on the issue, stimulated by reading a phrase written by Yockey in Imperium.

First, some of my previous writings about Yockey’s views on race.

See here.

And here.

Here is my TOQ essay on the integration of the worldview of Yockey with the EGI concept of Salter.  That is all good background material for the current essay.  As is the following that Yockey wrote in Imperium: 

The touching of this racial-frontier case of the Negro, however, shows to Europe a very important fact—that race-difference between White men, which means Western men, is vanishingly small in view of their common mission of actualizing a High Culture. In Europe, where hitherto the race difference between, say, Frenchman and Italian has been magnified to great dimensions, there has been no sufficient reminder of the race-differences outside the Western Civilization. Adequate instruction along this line would apparently have to take the form of occupation of all Europe, instead of only part of it, by Negroes from America and Africa, by Mongols and Turkestan! from the Russian Empire.... . .

...If any Westerner thinks that the barbarian makes nice distinctions between the former nations of the West, he is incapable of understanding the feelings of populations outside a High Culture toward that culture…

Now, here is the key Yockey statement (emphasis added), including his crucially important nine word phrase (with italics and underling added):

Gone — forever gone — is any notion that one of these Ideas —national, linguistic, religious, social — has the mission of wiping out another Idea. The adherents of Empire are still distinct from the adherents of Papacy— but this distinction does not rule their minds, for uppermost now is the Idea of Imperium, the return to superpersonal origins, and both of these mighty Ideas have the same spiritual source. The difference between Protestant and Catholic — once excited into a casus belli — has gone the same way. Both continue to exist, but it is inconceivable that this difference could again rend the Western Civilization in twain. There have been also the racial and temperamental differences of Teuton and Latin, of North and South. Once these may have contributed to the furnishing of motives to History — this can they no longer do. Again, both are part of the West, even though different, and the Imperium-Idea monopolizes the motivation of History. The former nations, the religions, the races, the classes — these are now the building-blocks of the great Imperial structure which is founding itself. Local cultural, social, linguistic, differences remain — it is no necessity of the Imperium-Idea that it annihilate its component Ideas, the collective products of a thousand years of Western history. On the contrary, it affirms them all, in a higher sense it perpetuates them all, but they are in its service, and no longer in the center of History.

The power of Yockey’s writing is that he summarizes in only nine words the entirety of the meaning of my pan-Europeanism, with a succinctness I can only admire:

“…both are part of the West, even though different…”

My critics always lie that I consider Europeans fungible, and ignore real differences between them. Those of you who have been reading my work over the years understand that is incorrect.  While I do not exaggerate intra-European differences as many in the “movement” do, neither do I minimize them. There are indeed “the racial and temperamental differences of Teuton and Latin, of North and South.” There are also differences of East and West. Differences exist within single European nations, that of Italy (North vs. South) being the greatest (*), but others exist as well, albeit to somewhat lesser extents. I, like Yockey, do not deny these differences of genotype and phenotype. But “even though different” they “both are part of the West.” With respect to “West” I expand this a bit more than Yockey and extend it to the entirety of the European Race-Culture, including areas of Eastern Europe some would consider part of a different (“Orthodox”) civilization.  Also of relevance are the comments by Yockey about how race differences in Europe pale when compared to that of “The West Against the Rest” thus: “If any Westerner thinks that the barbarian makes nice distinctions between the former nations of the West, he is incapable of understanding the feelings of populations outside a High Culture toward that culture…”

But, now, I’m making the mistake of being long-winded again, and diluting the power of Yockey’s precision and brevity:

“…both are part of the West, even though different…”

Thus, as long as the EGI Firewall ensures that basic genetic interests are considered, what’s important is that all of the constituents of “the West” cooperate in Actualizing a High Culture.  When the Italian Julius Evola (of Sicilian ancestry) met with the Romanian Corneliu Codreanu (of Romanian-German ancestry), their respective ethnic origins were secondary to their shared interest in a New European Order. When the Northern Italian Benito Mussolini (from Emilia-Romagna) collaborated with his Philosopher of Fascism Giovanni Gentile, a Southern Italian (from Sicily), differences in their specific ancestral origins were immaterial to the greater goal of building a Fascist Italy. Francis Parker Yockey was of North-Central European origin, Oswald Mosley was English; both men promoted the idea of Europe as Nation, pan-Europeanism, along with others of different ethnic origins, but all part of the same High Culture, the same civilization, the same Race-Culture. The Montreux conference of 1934 was organized by Italian Fascists, and was also attended by representatives from Romania (the New Men), Norway, Greece, Spain, Ireland, France, Lithuania, Portugal, and other European nations.  My point, an extension of Yockey’s original comment, and a broad summary of my pan-European philosophy, is thus:

All are part of the West, even though different.  

That indeed summarizes my pan-European philosophy.

And let us not forget Yockey against the ethnonationalists (emphasis added):

…But the greatest opposition of all has not yet been named, the conflict which will take up all the others into itself. This is the battle of the Idea of the Unity of the West against the nationalism of the 19th century. Here stand opposed the ideas of Empire and petty-stateism, large-space thinking and political provincialism. Here find themselves opposed the miserable collection of yesterday-patriots and the custodians of the Future. The yesterday nationalists are nothing but the puppets of the extra-European forces who conquer Europe by dividing it. To the enemies of Europe, there must be no rapprochement, no understanding, no union of the old units of Europe into a new unit, capable of carrying on 20th century politics…

…Against a united Europe, they could never have made their way in, and only against a divided Europe can they maintain themselves. Split! divide! distinguish!—this is the technique of conquest. Resurrect old ideas, old slogans, now quite dead, in the battle to turn European against European.

The ethnonationalists like to cite the fact that people in Europe are turning against the EU as “proof” that pan-Europeanism is “impossible” (skipping over the act that Europeans originally agreed to be part of the EU to begin with), without honestly noting the specific reasons why people develop anti-EU feelings:

1. Immigration, both intra-European and extra-European.  This would not be an issue in any Imperium run according to my principles, where local sovereignty, borders, and ethnic preservation would be core values.

2. Nitpicking micro-management from remote and isolated centralized bureaucrats.  Again – local sovereignty as a core value of Imperium for most issues. Granted, there will be core issues where group interests supersede others – race, immigration control (we cannot let any European nation re-invite in aliens), security, foreign affairs, and large scale scientific-technical-cultural projects, etc.  But that will not interfere with the daily lives of the common citizen, it will not be the micromanagement of the EU, it will be agreed upon by the constituent peoples of the Imperium, and much of this would be no different than what a racialist ethnonationalist state would be doing anyway.

3. Domination by Germany (or Germany coupled with their junior partner of France). An Imperium should be a cooperative effort of all its constituent nations, all accorded respect, all having their voices heard and their interests actualized, with fair resolutions where interests conflict – no one nation or alliance of nations will be allowed to dominate. And wouldn’t an ethnonationalist “free-for-all” result in even more domination by larger and richer nations, unrestrained by membership in a larger entity?

4. Economics – the hard-working North and West being resentful of having to subsidize the insolvent South and East, with the latter being resentful of the restrictions and conditions put upon them by the former as a condition of the assistance granted.  This is likely the hardest problem to solve; to compete with China, etc. and to have sufficient autarky, some degree of economic integration will be necessary. But we cannot have lazy and/or inept parasites leeching off of the more productive. Integration will need to be a slow process, in stages, initially only between groups of nations with similar levels of productivity, and with some sort of “division of labor” between the economic mini-blocs. Whether full integration is possible or desirable remains to be determined. No one will be allowed to be lazy and/or inept –and this does not violate point 2, because being a lazy incompetent should not be an accepted part of any White nation’s character or culture. Local sovereignty does not justify being a deadbeat. To the extent this is a biological problem, eugenics must be a component of the Imperium’s core values, one that supersedes local sovereignty. Self-determination does not justify being a tin cup panhandling incompetent. 

Similar ethnonationalist comments about “you can’t get the Czechs and Slovaks to live together in one nation, so how are you going to get all Europeans in one nation,” fail because the Slovaks always historically resented being subordinate to the Czechs – I do not propose anyone being subordinate to anyone else; all can have local sovereignty.

In my Imperium, Denmark would continue being Denmark and Italy would continue being Italy (unless there was a desire for regionalism there) and each would not interfere with the continued ethnic and cultural existence of the other.

What can be achieved by having different types of Europeans working together, all part of the West? Thus:

Europe is equal to its historical task. Against the anti-spiritual, anti-heroic 'ideals' of America-Jewry, Europe pits its metaphysical ideas, its faith in its Destiny, its ethical principles, its heroism. Fearlessly, Europe falls in for battle, knowing it is armed with the mightiest weapon ever forged by History: the superpersonal Destiny of the European organism. Our European Mission is to create the Culture-State-Nation-Imperium of the West, and thereby we shall perform such deeds, accomplish such works, and so transform our world that our distant posterity, when they behold the remains of our buildings and ramparts, will tell their grandchildren that on the soil of Europe once dwelt a tribe of gods.

Going back to the quote at the beginning of the post, this is the sort of dream of the day that we should be actualizing, and what my work is aimed at actualizing, achieved by, and for the benefit of, ALL European-derived peoples.  And it is that “ALL” that separates me from the divisive fetishists of the “movement.”

Footnote (emphasis added):

*Yockey: “Race cannot be understood if it is inwardly associated with phenomena from other planes of life, such as nationality, politics, people, State, Culture. While History in its advance may bring about for a few centuries a strong relationship between race and nation, that is not to say that a preceding racial type always forms a subsequent political unit. If that were so, none of the former nations of Europe would have been formed on the lines they were. For example, think of the racial differences between Calabrian and Lombard. What did they matter to the history of Garibaldi’s time."