A more mature analysis.
Here I discuss a more mature analysis of Napoleon compared to the moronic “movement” drivel described here.
Thus, an analysis of: Nietzsche's Napoleon: The Higher Man as Political Actor, by Paul F. Glenn. In all cases, red font emphasis added:
Nietzsche's concept of the higher man is often seen as vague. The article adds concreteness to the concept by studying an example of a higher man, Napoleon. Napoleon embodied power and spiritual health, and was therefore an admirable person. By looking at Nietzsche's description of Napoleon as an artist, we also gain insight into the higher man as a political actor: he uses the public arena as the medium on which he practices his art. In doing so, he presents himself as a exemplar of humanity, inspiring others to seek their own path to excellence. By studying this, we gain important insight into Nietzsche's political teaching. But Nietzsche's account of Napoleon is not one-sided: he also describes Napoleon's corruption. The fall of a higher man is both a warning of the dangers of the political realm, and a reminder that sickness and health are closely connected. Even the mightiest individual is fragile.
And now, with the same emphasis added, I’ll comment on some interesting selected excerpts from Glenn’s work.
One of Nietzsche's frequently cited examples of an actually existing higher man was Napoleon Bonaparte.
That view contrasts to the cartoonish, sweaty fetishist “movement” view of Napoleon.
As he noted in Ecce Homo, "I never attack persons; I merely avail myself of the person as a strong magnifying glass that allows one to make visible a general but creeping and elusive calamity."
The same applies to Ted Sallis. I do not critique “movement” personages out of personal animus, but because such individuals represent certain “movement” principles and dogmas I wish to examine and deconstruct, and so each of these people represent “a strong magnifying glass that allows one to make visible a general but creeping and elusive calamity."
Just as his critiques of individuals point toward larger issues, so his praise also indicates a general point. Napoleon embodies many of the qualities Nietzsche admired, but more important he was a political leader in an egalitarian era dominated by a populist ethos.
Napoleon therefore exemplifies how greatness is possible in a time of spiritual weakness and widespread cultural decay.
Yes, but that required Napoleon to work within that egalitarian milieu, leading to actions and policies that make racialists look askance, as well as led to his own downfall (both literally and from the Nietzschean perspective). More on that below.
By studying Nietzsche’s description of Bonaparte, we can learn something about the higher man as a political actor.
This is of great interest to us, actors in the political sphere – politics broadly defined (e.g., Yockey – “politics is activity in relation to power”). Far Right activism is a form of politics. How is the Nietzschean conception of “the higher man” compatible (or not) with the Far Right political perspective? With our goals and aspirations?
But though he admired Napoleon, he did not do so for typical reasons. In his descriptions of the French emperor, Nietzsche never mentions Bonaparte's great victories at Austerlitz and Jena. Nor does he care about the glorification of France-in his later works, Nietzsche repeatedly denounced all forms of nationalism.
Author’s Footnote: As will be discussed later, Nietzsche regarded Napoleon's nationalism as a sign of weakness and decay.
This puts into question what Nietzsche’s views on racial nationalism would be. True enough, Nietzsche’s hostility toward the nationalism of his day was more regarding the sort of jingoistic petty nationalism so loved by today’s ethnonationalists. Would Nietzsche – the “good European” – view pan-European racial nationalism therefore as a positive antidote to Greg Johnson’s embrace of petty nationalism?
Instead, Nietzsche characterizes Napoleon as a higher man for who he was, not what he did. The extraordinary character of the man, and not his accomplishments, marks him as elevated. Napoleon was a being of great power and thus stands as a symbol of what the highest exemplars of humanity can become. For this reason, Nietzsche includes him in a list of "the more profound and comprehensive men of this century” (BGE, 256) and frequently praises him.
This is an important point, and one Glenn comes back to at various points in his essay. To Nietzsche, greatness is measured by what a man (and only men, not women – Glenn makes clear that Nietzsche, viewing women as inferior, does not believe them capable of true greatness) is, not the specifics of what he does. Now, of course, that is not to say that the great man’s actions are irrelevant; after all, they are the signs by which one can recognize a man of being worthy of being examined for signs of greatness. If Napoleon had merely been a “great soul” living on Corsica as some local bigwig, Nietzsche would never had heard of him, nor would be interested in him if he had. If Goethe – another Nietzsche hero and great man – had merely been a schoolteacher somewhere, how would the “great soul” have been manifested? Of course, if Napoleon had been merely a local Corsican “big shot” and Goethe merely a schoolteacher, then neither would have been a “great soul” to begin with, as their inner greatness would not have been satisfied with those stations in life. So, accomplishments help mark greatness, but they are, to Nietzsche, merely means to an end – the manner in which the great man exercises his will to power – than ends to themselves. Napoleon could have just as easily been an anti-French Austro-Hungarian or German from the Nietzschean perspective. It is not the specifics of the accomplishments, it is not “what he did.” This of course presents problems for us here who have definitive goals, and wish great men to step forward and prioritize the race rather than themselves. From the Nietzschean perspective, that’s degenerate.
The core of Nietzsche's scathing attack on modernity is its weakness. Modernity represents the triumph of values like equality, humanism, peace, and the freedom of the will, which are slavish values: their origin lies in weakness not strength. The French Revolution and the subsequent spread of democratic values in its wake represent a new high point for the hegemony of slave values. Nearly everyone now accepts these values as truth.
Everyone who is part of the System’s “hive mind.”
In the midst of the spread of such values, however, atavistic individuals have appeared, harkening back to an aristocratic past.
Traditionalism! Evola-ites start sweating and foaming at the mouth.
The core of the soul is its constituent complex of drives and affects. In a strong individual, these drives are formidable-they are not easily sated or resisted, but fervently push the individual toward their objects. At times the drives are so strong that they push the person toward self-destruction: often, our drives seek a goal which will destroy us (Z, "On Self-Overcoming"). Nietzsche therefore argues that self-preservation represents a degeneration of the instincts (BGE, 13).
That last part puts into question what Nietzsche’s views on racial preservationism would have been. A strictly literal reading of his views would mean that racial preservationism – self-preservation on a racial level – “represents a degeneration of the instincts” and that a Faustian overcoming of race is compatible with higher drives. I do not say I agree with this, as I view EGI as fundamental, and EGI depends upon racial (and ethnic) preservation. But as the “movement” values Nietzsche, it needs to be honest about his views and how those views relate to “movement” objectives. One could argue that a Yockeyian “horizontal race” view is more consistent with Nietzsche’s ideas than a “vertical” “zoological race” concept. Again, I do not say I personally agree with that viewpoint.
Unlike many of the militant romantics whom he inspired, Bonaparte had no use for glory and accolades because he scorned those who bestowed such honors. And Bonaparte felt no need to obey the moral dictates of those he saw as inferior. For example, when Napoleon was confronted by his wife with charges of infidelity, Nietzsche claims that he responded "I have the right to answer all accusations against me with an eternal 'That's me.' I am apart from all the world and accept conditions from nobody. I demand subjection even to my fancies, and people should find it quite natural when I yield to this or that distraction" (GS, 23).
Napoleon the champion of the manosphere? Dark Triad traits?
Author’s Footnote: This account of what makes for great character fits with several other of Nietzsche's writings. For example, in On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life, he describes creativity of the Greeks in similar language: "The Greeks gradually learned to organize the chaos” (UM, II. 10). And in Beyond Good and Evil section 200 he notes that the warring drives that result from ethnic mixing can be mastered by noble ones (such as Alcibiades and Caesar).
So, a prominent Periclean-Age Greek (actually a nephew of Pericles himself) and a prominent Patrician Roman from the Republic were considered “ethnically mixed” by Nietzsche:
The man from an age of dissolution, which mixes the races all together, such a man has an inheritance of a multiple ancestry in his body, that is, conflicting and frequently not merely conflicting drives and standards of value which war among themselves and rarely give each other rest - such a man of late culture and disturbed lights will typically be a weaker man. His most basic demand is that the war which constitutes him should finally end. Happiness seems to him, in accordance with a calming medicine and way of thinking (for example, Epicurean or Christian), principally as the happiness of resting, of having no interruptions, of surfeit, of the final unity, as the "Sabbath of Sabbaths," to use the words of the saintly rhetorician Augustine, who was himself such a man. But if the opposition and war in such a nature work like one more charm or thrill in life - and bring along, in addition to this nature's powerful and irreconcilable drives, also the real mastery and refinement in waging war with itself, and thus transmit and cultivate self-ruling and outwitting of the self, then arise those delightfully amazing and unimaginable people, those enigmatic men predestined for victory and temptation, whose most beautiful expressions are Alcibiades and Caesar (- in their company I'd like to place the first European, according to my taste, the Hohenstaufer Frederick II), and, among artists, perhaps Leonardo da Vinci.8 They appear precisely in the same ages when that weaker type, with its demands for quiet, steps into the foreground: both types belong with one another and arise from the same causes.
Note also Frederick II and - perhaps - Leonardo da Vinci to go along with Alcibiades and Caesar. Now, Nietzsche of course is not a population geneticist nor an anthropologist (nor is Kemp or any other “movement activist” for that matter), and his opinions on this matter are just that – opinions. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe how the "movement's" favorite philosopher stakes out a position so different from official “movement” dogma.
The outward manifestation of a great soul is a vibrant and charismatic personality, something both Goethe and Napoleon clearly possessed…
Apparently then, Sallis (and Nietzsche himself) would not be defined as a “great soul.” Actually no one in the “movement” would be. In fact, what prominent person today would be? By Nietzschean standards, we live in the age of the Last Man.
Napoleon and Goethe were able to overcome the mediocrity and pettiness of the eighteenth century because of their magnificent souls. Both resisted the narrow-minded bigotry of nationalism and instead aspired to create a pan-European culture and political arena (WP, 104).
Like Nietzsche they rejected petty national boundaries…
Rejecting Greg Johnson and the other ethnonationalists.
…and sought to be good Europeans.
Both rejected the egalitarianism prevalent at the time and sought to invoke the pathos of distance characteristic of the noble soul.
Glenn contradicts this, regarding Napoleon, in this same essay – implying that Napoleon had to compromise with the egalitarian and populist zeitgeist of his time.
And both were firmly grounded in reality, overcoming the flight into imagination of romanticism. The strength of soul of the two men ranks them among the highest of the modern era and marked them as radiant exemplars of humanity.
While the “movement” may agree about Goethe, it certainly would not agree about Napoleon, which we have seen.
Napoleon as Artist
We have seen that Nietzsche held Napoleon in high repute, but we have not yet discovered how Nietzsche’s account of Napoleon can help us understand the relationship between the higher individual and the political actor. I think an answer to this question can be offered by examining a somewhat curious component of Nietzsche’s descriptions of Bonaparte: his characterization of Napoleon as an artist in a number of passages.
Politics, then, is not a lesser pursuit than art. It is another possible realm of creativity.
Indeed. And it is politics, broadly defined, that talented pro-White activists need to focus their activity on, as their art.
Napoleon is as much an artist-and thus as highly valorized as sculptors, musicians, painters, and writers…Napoleon is not an artist who also happens to be a leader; his art is his political action…
A second key point about Nietzsche's aesthetics is that artistic creation is connected to power.
Remember Yockey’s definition of politics – activity in relation to power.
Art as a representation of the artist's soul explains the third key point of Nietzsche's aesthetics: art serves as an incentive to life. When viewing art (or reading literature or philosophy), we are tempted to strive for our own creation and greatness by the brilliant image of the artwork. But what draws us upward is not simply the painting itself-it is the image of the artist lurking within the painting.
This view suggests that the art is a portal to look into the artist’s soul, and it is that we are ultimately reacting to.
Art serves as a stimulus to life-both for the artist himself and for the spectator-because it lures us upward to higher pursuits.
Inspiration by art. But since High Politics can be art, we should be inspired by that as well. But in which direction? Do we listen to Nietzsche and accept that the objective of the political activity is secondary to the greatness of the man?
Napoleon was (at least initially) a monological artist-he engaged in politics for his own purposes, not to promote the agenda of any group or the glory of the French nation…This fits with Nietzsche's repeated statements that one misunderstands the great person if one judges him from the viewpoint of public utility: the monological artist does not care about the audience, and thus does not work for the general welfare.
This is THE crucial point of this essay. Nietzsche viewed the accomplishments of great men as a means to an end – a way for them to exercise their will to power and to display their greatness, to manifest and actualize their great soul in the realm of achievement, in the case of Napoleon, political achievement. A great man may have done X and not Y, but to Nietzsche, he could have equally done Y and not X – if that had been sufficient to demonstrate his superiority as a "higher man."
But we of the Far Right value specific goals most of all. Racial preservationists struggle for the survival of the White race (or in some cases, like the Nordicists and/or ethnonationalists and/or ethnic fetishists, some fraction of it). Salterians stress the EGI component of racial preservationism. Phenotypists care about preserving certain racial phenotypes. Yockeyians want to build the Imperium, the Empire of the West. HBDers – their leaders at least – want to enslave Whites to Jews and Asians. Silk Road White nationalism is all about black-booted Chinese girls with guns ruling the West, with omega White males getting some sort of masochistic sexual thrill from it. There are various ethnic, racial, religious, social, and political permutations of the Far Right, some compatible with each other, some incompatible. But these are specific goals, specific objectives. Those dedicated to these goals – who would be considered “degenerate” by Nietzsche – would be less admiring of the greatness of a man who cared nothing for these objectives, and would oppose a great man who leveraged opposition to these goals to manifest his greatness.
It should be noted at this point that Glenn suggests that Nietzsche realized that Napoleon was working within the zeitgeist of his time, that being an egalitarian and populist one. Thus, the aspects of Napoleon’s ethnoracial policies that the “movement” objects to were not the result of Napoleon’s innate racial liberalism and aracial universalism (projecting modern “high trust northern hunter gatherer” pathologies on past historical figures), but more of a cynical ploy to leverage the French Revolutions memetic legacy to further Napoleon’s personal ambitions.
But, as a French biographer of Napoleon and spokesman for the contemporary Establishment observes, “Bonaparte had no [racial] prejudices; Egyptians, Sudanese, Jews from Alexandria were all integrated into the Imperial Guard.”
Several points here. First, if, as Glenn suggests, Napoleon was a reflection of his time, and his will to power had to be exercised through the egalitarian zeitgeist of his time – Napoleon coming through the chaos of the French Revolution – then this may be the source of his supposed racial universalism. Second, let’s consider “movement” hypocrisy here. A comment from a biographer, the presence of some non-Europeans in the Imperial Guard (as well as the emancipation of the Jews) is enough to damn Napoleon. On the other hand, let’s consider how the “movement” considers the pro-Black leftist Hubert Humphrey, who pushed policies that resulted in unbelievable hardship and suffering for White Americans:
Hubert H. Humphrey is exactly the sort of person we need on our side. Humphrey was a liberal idealist, of course, but he wasn’t a philosopher, he was a doer.
Why not the same attitude toward Napoleon? Well, consider Humphrey’s ancestry:
His father’s family were of New England Puritan stock. His grandmother, Addie Regester Humphrey, taught at a Quaker school, and Humphrey’s mother, Christine Sannes, was from Norway. Humphrey was baptized into his mother’s Lutheran church, but he worshiped later in life as both a Methodist and a Congregationalist. Humphrey was thus genetically a mix of Minnesota’s native Nordic groups…
And, well, Napoleon was different. A Corsican of Tuscan ancestry, puny Napoleon cannot aspire to the racial grandeur of Hubert Humphrey, eh? Ultimately, that’s the reason – the real reason - why Napoleon’s Imperial Guard composition puts him beyond the pale for the “movement,” while Humphrey’s promotion of racial destruction in America leads to:
Hubert H. Humphrey is exactly the sort of person we need on our side.
Ironically, just like Nietzsche, who admired Napoleon, the anti-Napoleon “movement” judges Napoleon Bonaparte vs. Hubert Humphrey solely based on who they were (in this case, ethnically), not what they did. And if the riposte to my accusation of hypocrisy is that the Napoleon and Humphrey essays were written by two different people on two different forums, my response is that they are ideologically similar; indeed, it is highly doubtful that each would find fault in the work of the other. They are both part of a highly integrated “movement” dogma, so it is perfectly reasonable to suggest, to quote Jack Vance, “It is all one.”
As speaking of hypocrisy, if Napoleon was so bad for having some non-Europeans in his Imperial Guard, what about the Holy Nazis having non-European military units, including in the Waffen SS?
Also – if Napoleon had achieved all of his objectives in Europe, I find it highly unlikely he would have used his position to invite the Third World to invade the continent. No, it was the German Merkel who did that. If Napoleon had conquered Great Britain, he would not have flooded the island with Negroes and South Asians; the British people did that to themselves. The French navy was not transporting Afro-Asiatics into Europe – leave that to modern day Germans and Norwegians. Where is Andrew Hamilton critiquing all of that?
If Napoleon had escaped to America, the man who tried to reconquer Haiti would not have championed Negro emancipation – the New England abolitionists did that. Napoleon would not have fomented slave rebellions, as John Brown did.
It is for this reason that Nietzsche writes in places that rule by the higher individuals can be extremely dangerous to the general populace.
If the “movement” considers Hitler to be such a “higher individual” then we can observe the greet damage done by him to the German people and to Europeans in general. I doubt though that Nietzsche would have considered Hitler a great man given Nietzsche’s opinions on nationalism and degeneration, being a Good European, and putting specific goals – always primary for Hitler – secondary to exerting one’s will to power. I suspect he would have had a higher opinion of Mussolini, but even Il Duce far behind Napoleon. This is not to endorse Nietzsche’s views, as I have stated.
Napoleon is a great figure because of the power and vitality of his soul, not because of anything he accomplished.
Again, this is the key point of departure between Nietzsche and those who place utility of action as the highest priority.
Consider the next author’s footnote.
Author’s Footnote: This is not to say that outcomes are simply unimportant: after all, it would be impossible to know the greatness of a person without any artifacts. But Nietzsche is clear that outcomes are secondary, mere symptoms of who the person is…
The key is this – IF we assume Nietzsche is correct, can we get great men (if we can find any) to accept our goals as the vehicle through which to express their greatness? Even if the goals are secondary to them – if not to us – can we associate greatness and pro-White accomplishment so to create a “win-win” situation for both the great man and his people? Conversely, can we create an environment that dissuades great men from acting contrary to the interests of their people? After all, in the current zeitgeist, a great man unconcerned with the direction of the actual outcome of his activity may be tempted to act within the constraints of that zeitgeist, as Napoleon did in his time. That would be devastating to us. Consider how dire the situation is when we have spiritual pygmies, gross defects, as adversaries, and then imagine what would occur if a Napoleon-like figure took up the cause of the System’s anti-Whiteness.
This means that Napoleon did not act simply to bring about a particular objective. While an aesthetic view of politics like this does not rule out efforts to promote specific goals, such goals are ultimately of secondary importance. Nietzschean politics is expressivist, not outcome-oriented…The value of political action, just as with art, is rooted in the act itself, not any consequences that stem from it. Napoleon sought to use the public arena as a testing ground for himself, as the medium through which to express and challenge his vitality. He did not enter politics in order to promote a specific agenda.
Yes, I believe we get the constantly repeated point by now. The question is whether we accept it and then, if we do, how can we get great men to act in our behalf. Whether or not we define greatness in the same manner as Nietzsche is a matter of choice, but there seems to be some truth in that great men are motivated at least in part by personal will to power disassociated from specific objectives. I’m not sure that Nietzsche is correct in the totality and universality of that. Is it possible to have a great man that puts the goal at least equal to that of himself? I think yes, but regardless, we must have great men who – authentically or not – promote our views as the vehicle of manifestation, the actualization, of their greatness.
This argument suggests that Nietzsche offers a political teaching decidedly different from the Western tradition of political philosophy. Since Plato, political philosophy has sought to use the public realm for instrumental reasons. While thinkers may have disagreed over what ends should be sought-from Plato's promotion of virtue to Machiavelli's insistence on stability and endurance-all thinkers accepted the instrumental view. Nietzsche’s philosophy suggests a very different understanding of politics. Political action is valuable for the deed itself, not for any consequences that flow from it. The higher individual, Nietzsche argues, should not make the decision to enter the public realm based on what can be achieved, but on whether the action itself can serve one's soul.
We can argue otherwise – but can we tie “serving one’s soul” to the action of promoting the race? This all seems to be a uniquely White problem. The leaders of other races always make serving their own people the primary focus of their action. Is it that there have never been any truly great non-White men? Regardless, one is hard-pressed to think of non-Whites (great by Nietzsche’s standards or other standards) that rose to prominence through race treason.
Viewing Napoleon in this manner seems to raise a problem. If Napoleon acted only to further his own goals and did not seek to promote the good of humankind, then why does Nietzsche attribute such tremendous influence to him?
Napoleon did not much care for promoting greatness in others.
How can one who consciously serves only his own soul promote greatness in others?
This does not mean that Napoleon could not promote greatness in others, but it would have to be achieved by indirect means. By embodying the values of a nobler time, Napoleon left an indelible impression of what humanity can become at its peak.
So, he was an inspiration for greatness.
It is here that we see Nietzsche's loftiest tribute to Napoleon-the emperor appears as something of a miracle, a man comparable to the greatest men of ancient times amidst the disease of modernity. Nietzsche goes so far as to suggest that Napoleon's appearance may lead to the self-overcoming of decadence in Europe…
Quite the different view from that of the “movement.”
If the crisis of the West stems from the nihilism resulting from the false metaphysics of Christian values, then Napoleon was an earth-shaking figure: he offered a way out of our illness, a way of overcoming Christianity. This suggests that the higher man can achieve eminence in the political realm as well as other spheres…Political action is a legitimate realm for the efforts of the higher man.
“Legitimate realm” – but according to Nietzsche it doesn’t matter precisely what politics are practiced as long as the “higher man” exercises his will to power and accomplishes things to promote his own self-worth. Of course, one can argue that Nietzsche was somewhat hypocritical – assuming if he considered himself as being a higher type (Ecce Homo, assuming sanity on the part of the author, which is questionable , suggests that he did so) – since he promoted certain memes as being “good” and others “bad.” But that aside, let’s continue with this analysis.
There are two key passages in which Nietzsche discusses Napoleon’s demise. The first is at the end of Will to Power, note 1026. He writes that Bonaparte "was corrupted by the means he had to employ and lost noblesse of character."
‘Had to employ” – suggesting that Napoleon promoted certain ideas because of the era in which he lived, the egalitarian ethos of the France of his time. What was Saint Adolf’s excuse for his South Asian SS unit?
It seems clear that the means of which Nietzsche speaks are the methods and practices of democracy…It seems likely that Napoleon was corrupted by democracy.
That is reasonable.
He succumbed to his own myth, coming to believe that he was the great servant of the French nation… Nietzsche makes this point in the other relevant passage. In Beyond Good and Evil, section 256, he remarks that great men of his time succumbed to nationalism in moments of weakness: "only in their foregrounds or in weaker hours, say in old age, did they belong to the 'fatherlandish'-they were merely taking a rest from themselves when they became 'patriots."' Napoleon fell prey to the ideal of service to the nation-a form of nationalism, and connected to populism-when he declined…To paraphrase Urnberto Eco, the habit of pretending to believe evolved into the habit of believing.
So, Nietzsche argues (according to Glenn) that a great man who becomes a “true believer” has become degenerate and will fail - decline is linked to placing a specific goal (e.g., serving a people in a nationalistic “fatherlandish” manner) as the priority, rather than serving self.
What does this say about using great men to serve our goals? If they become true believers, then they decline and become failed degenerates – and in their failure take us and our goals down with them. If they remain self-centered, using our goals cynically to achieve their own personal objectives, at best they may “use us up” in their rise, ruining what we hope to achieve; at worst, they may betray us and our beliefs when doing so serves their purposes. We are left then with either rejecting Nietzsche’s formulation of greatness and instead accepting the great men can at least hold true belief as equal to their own self- aggrandizement, or we have to view great men as potential enemies of our racial objectives. I would promote the former idea, that greatness and true belief are not incompatible.
What does Napoleon’s ultimate failure tell us about Nietzsche’s view of the higher man? It offers a warning and a reminder. First, it is a strong warning of the dangers of the political realm. While it is true that the higher man can use politics just as an artist uses paint and canvas, there are dangers inherent to the political realm which can undermine the actor’s nobility of soul…
This assumes that Nietzsche’s ideal of greatness is correct, and that the hurly-burly of political activity will “taint” the “noble soul” of the great man. If one take a utilitarian view, and if achieving a specific goal defines greatness, then doing what is necessary to achieve those goals will not necessarily undermine the “noble soul.”
Second, Nietzsche's account of Napoleon offers a sharp reminder of the interconnectedness of illness and health in even the highest people…The bad conscience, for example, opened an entirely new arena for creation-the soul. Those who were strong were able to turn their disease into a new enticement to life, a new realm to be conquered. But the illness is always there; it cannot be excised completely. Therefore, there is a fine line between greatness and failure. The bad conscience makes all higher men fragile. Dissolution should be expected…Napoleon's failure is a reminder that greatness is an exceedingly fragile thing. Even in the highest of people, decadence is just a short step away.
The same also applies to other great man other than Napoleon.
Unlike the otherworldly meaning and value provided by Christianity and similar moral codes, the greatness of people like Napoleon is immanent and not subject to the self-destructive flaws of Christian morality. Human greatness offers a way out of what Nietzsche refers to as "whole millennia of labyrinth”…
The failure of the higher man is thus tragic because it deprives us of something magnificent, but it is also almost expected.
If it is “almost expected” then can it be something that can be planned for? Can the waxing and waning of great men be leveraged to assist in achieving the objectives of all of we “degenerates” who focus on specific goals?
Although he is frightening and brings suffering in his wake, the higher man also brings with him the loftiest hopes of humanity. Napoleon wreaked havoc but also opened new possibilities, demonstrating a way out of the traps of Christianity.
I approve of the anti-Christian message here. Note – “loftiest hopes of humanity” – quite a different view of Napoleon than that of the “movement.”
Three main take-away points.
First, there is a conflict between the Nietzschean expressionist view of greatness in the “higher man’ and the utilitarian view. The former sees the accomplishments as merely means to an end, the manifestation and actualization of the greatness, the reflection of the noble soul; the latter sees the accomplishments as the end themselves - the precise accomplishment of specific goals, and the effects that has, is what defines greatness. The former puts the man himself as the priority, what he is; the latter puts the man’s deeds as the priority, what he does. Reality is no doubt a complex mix of both.
Second, if great men are still possible, great men of our race, we need to get at least some of them to pursue pro-White objectives, regardless of where reality lies on the expressivist-utilitarian spectrum. However, keep in mind that the further reality lies in the direction of expressionism of greatness, the more difficult it will be it effectively utilize great men to achieve specific goals than benefit the race as opposed to benefitting the man at the expense of the race.
Third, we have seen, once again, the outrageous hypocrisy of the “movement.” If Napoleon had some Egyptians in is Imperial Guard, we are supposed to recoil in horror, while South Asians in Hitler’s Waffen SS is “move on, move on, there’s nothing to see here.” If Napoleon had some vague racial universalist views – or pretended to have them – to fit in with the zeitgeist of his society, then he was a “chaotic destroyer.” On the other hand, the racial universalism of Hubert Humphrey, which had real-life negative consequences for White America, means that he was an “idealist” and we need more men like him.
Shorn of its Nordicism and ethnic fetishism, the “movement" would not exist. There is nothing else to it.
The author, in his footnotes, outlines how Walter Kaufmann, with mendacity, “whitewashed” Nietzsche’s ideas in order to make Nietzsche and his philosophy “safe” for the masses (after WII and the association of Nietzsche with Nazism and German nationalist militarism).
Kaufmann was raised a Lutheran. At age 11, finding that he believed neither in the Trinity nor in the divinity of Jesus, he converted to Judaism. Kaufmann subsequently discovered that his grandparents were all Jewish.
Who says genetics do not control behavior? If we can believe that Kaufmann originally did not know he was ethnically Jewish, it is fascinating that he “converted” to Judaism and then subsequently found out he was genetically Jewish. Obviously he found Judaism more congenial than Christianity, although he later seems to have disavowed all organized religion – but not his Jewish ethnicity.