Race Traitors, "Good Blood," and the Ethnostate

Punishment required to dissuade free-riding.

There is some disagreement in the "movement" with respect to the question of what to do with "race traitors" after the establishment of a "white ethnostate" - particularly, what to do if such traitors have "good blood" (i.e., good genes, presumably established via phenotype and/or ancestry).

The "Turner Diaries" school of thought is that all such traitors must be punished, "good blood" or not. Other milder perspectives would eschew the bloodthirsty revenge aspects of the "Diaries" but would still insist on expulsion of all traitors, who would be free to live amongst the "diversity" they profess to desire and admire.

However, another school of thought says that "good blood" trumps all, and that we need to have and use the good genes of such traitors even if we dislike the actions of the person. This is said to be the truly "National Socialist" way of thinking. After all, it's all about the "blood," no? This view of course disregards the possibility that (treasonous) behavior, hyper-individualist selfishness and lack of racial altruism, and tendencies toward "liberal" political views, may themselves be genetically encoded and, hence, perhaps signs that the "blood" is not as good as presumed. We'll put that aside for now and concentrate on the main question of whether "good blood" (so defined) should trump actual behavior.

I myself am on the side of the punishment meme, for the reason that free-riding on racial nationalism needs to be repressed if racial nationalism is going to become an adaptive and evolutionarily stable strategy.

Free-riding is essentially taking advantage of a collective good (e.g., group continuity, racial nationalism, the ethnostate) without contributing anything to producing, maintaining, and/or defending that good. Actually, free-riding can be subdivided into "lazy-riding" and "cross-riding" - in the former, the free-rider neither helps nor harms the collective good, in the latter the free-rider actively opposes and harms the good in question. When talking about race treason we focus on this latter group of free-riders: the "cross-riders" who actively harm the race and its needs and objectives. After all, "lazy riders" make up the bulk of the population, who will go in whatever direction they are led; like it or not, we need that herd. Therefore, henceforth in this essay, "free-riding" will refer to treasonous "cross-riding."

Now, the top elite of racial nationalists can be said to be idealistic racial altruists (for the most part), but the bulk of the people - those "lazy-riders" - need some incentive to join racial nationalism. We want them to join us and not the "cross-riders." If we are willing to forgive the race traitors as long as they have "good blood" then we are enabling the worst form of free-riding, and we encourage those in the general population who believe that they may also have "good blood" to also behave badly. Why not? They can "have their cake and eat it too." By being race traitors they can enjoy advantages in the current multiculturalist regime and, if by chance the "racists" win, nothing to worry about, their "good blood" will protect them! Those who ("good blood" or not) make sacrifices for the race and support racial nationalism when it is an unpopular dissident creed have no advantage whatsoever compared to the vilest traitor openly promoting white racial genocide.

This is not an evolutionarily stable strategy - without serious detection and punishment of free-riding, the free-riders will out-compete and crowd out altruists, altruistic strategies and behaviors, altruistic memes, and, eventually, altruistic genes.

Race treason must have serious consequences - even if it is limited to expulsion from a white ethnostate - if such extreme forms of free-riding are to be successfully defeated. Otherwise, many people will just defect to the multiculturalists secure in the knowledge that they will win either way.

Some may invoke a "technological" solution - punish the traitors but after harvesting sperm, eggs, DNA, etc. This "sci-fi" approach is unlikely to be practical in the circumstances inherent in the formation of a new society and the unrest and upheaval (and hard feelings) involved. Even if it were practical, the consequences would need to be considered. Who will bear and raise the offspring of the traitors? Who will keep the secret? And in an ethnostate that values genetic continuity, genetic interests, and adaptive behavior - isn't allowing this genetic continuity of the traitors in the ethnostate still a form of free riding? Even if the traitors do not perceive it as an advantage, others will, and thus encourage more free-riding among those who may otherwise act differently.

What about letting the traitors themselves stay, but in a degraded, lowly position? Is this really practical? What kind of "quality" offspring will be produced - even with "good blood" - from such a degraded position? Will the children be taken from them and raised elsewhere? Is this desirable? Feasible? It raises many of the objections as the "sci-fi" alternative broached above.

In summary, the best, most desirable, and feasible approach is punishment for the traitors, sacrificing a bit of "good blood" for the greater good of the racial community, protecting the collective good inherent in that community by suppressing free-riding.

La Rochelle and European Unity

O' Meara essay on French pan-European fascist Drieu La Rochelle.

Here.

La Rochelle's vision of a federated Europe that retains internal particularisms while presenting a united front to the outside world is essentially the same as my views. The excerpt below (empahsis added) is useful. I'm not sure what the "myth" comment means - although perhaps from the viewpoint of a Frenchman of the first half of the 20th century, with so much intra-European war and defeat by the Germans, it was difficult to look past the immediate problems to the deeper issues involved.

France, he reckoned, was destined to become either an “Ireland” in perpetual struggle against alien empires—or else a participating member of a European imperium whose peace and order would govern the world.

France, Germany, and the other European nations, in other words, would survive the era of continental empires, with their economies of scale and “tyranny of numbers,” only by federating.

Federation, however, did not mean national liquidation. Unlike the present European Commission, disconnected from Europe’s distinct bioculture, Drieu’s notion of federation was not about subordinating the continent’s peoples to the primacy of market principles.

His concern was Europe’s rebirth, not the economic destruction of its ethnonations. Influenced in his youth by such anti-liberal nationalists as Maurice Barrès, Charles Maurras, and Jacques Bainville, each of whom helped initiate him into “the cult of France,” his affection for “Marianne,” whom he loved “like a beautiful woman he might meet in the street at night,” was unwavering.

But at the same time he saw that nationalism, “this 19th-century ideology,” had reached a historic impasse—both in terms of its self-destructive rivalries and of the limitations it was beginning to impose on the European spirit.

“All nationalisms,” he wrote in 1928, “that make the homeland an end rather than a beginning were rejecting the very energies and creativity born of the homeland.” For the author of L’Europe contre les Patries (1931),[4] nationalism in the continental age had become a résidu subversive both of Europe and the nation itself.

Not France, but Europe as a spiritual community of nations would henceforth claim his allegiance: “France must die as a political entity . . . for her to achieve her true spiritual place.”

The federation he envisaged would draw on local identities and historic institutions in the tradition of Montesquieu’s “community of nations”—uniting Europeans on the basis of the Greco-Roman and Latin Christian legacies they shared, on the mutual reciprocating borrowings that marked their histories, and on the institutional heritage of the jus publicum europaeum.

For one French New Rightist (A. Guyot-Jeannin), Drieu’s Europe was not the bloodless superstate of the bureaucrats, bankers, and merchants, but “a spiritual, cultural, communitarian, and enrooted Europe”—protective of its rich and varied ethnonations and true to its protean spiritual forms.

It was not, as such, to be a “union” open to all the world and destructive of its specific identity—but instead an enlarged Switzerland jealous of its different national families. The nation, even if it lacked viability in a world of continental powers, remained for him a vital cadre, for language, heritage, and place are intimate parts of the individual’s identity.

Given, though, that Europe after 1918 was situated between two hostile extra-European empires, its division into twenty-six sovereign states—none of which had the capacity to dominate the others or “represent itself with dignity in the disproportional competition of the continental empires”—put her at a distinct disadvantage against her rivals, preventing her from assuming the political position, not to mention the spiritual perspective, necessary for surmounting the challenges facing her.

“Only in federation can we revive Europe’s defunct soul and take up the thread of 13th-century Christian Europe or that of the aristocratic and intellectual 18th century . . . This is not a cosmopolitan dream but a pressing necessity, a question of life and death. Europe will federate—or else devour herself or be devoured.”

To this end, European nations were henceforth obliged to alter their relations with one another.

“Born of Europe, they must return to Europe.”

Since the dissolution of Charlemagne’s empire, Europeans had embarked on a millennium-long movement of differentiation, separating and distinguishing themselves from one another “as if it were a matter of quarantine.” With the onset of the First World War, however, the creative phase of this movement reached a point of diminishing returns.

Though Europe could not be Europe without her nations and would die without them, Drieu held that the viability of the nation would henceforth depend on Europe.

He thus exhorted his contemporaries to become like Nietzsche’s “good Europeans”—“the overly obligated heirs of thousands of years of the European spirit.” Just as they had overcame their religious differences in the 17th century, so too they needed now to demote the primacy of their barricading national identities, if they were to survive the 20th century.

This made it imperative that they throw off the “petty nationalist politics” and rigid statist forms, which promised to relegate them and the rest of Europe to the lower rungs of the coming world order.

Drieu acknowledged that Europe was something of a “myth,” but it was nevertheless one whose historical-civilizational resonance still had the power to evoke those forces that might challenge the reigning decadence.